Duquesne University

Duquesne Scholarship Collection
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
2012

Embodying Technology: A Hermeneutic Inquiry into Corporeality
and Identity as Manifested in a Case of Strap-On Dildo Use
Amy Taylor

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/etd

Recommended Citation
Taylor, A. (2012). Embodying Technology: A Hermeneutic Inquiry into Corporeality and Identity as
Manifested in a Case of Strap-On Dildo Use (Doctoral dissertation, Duquesne University). Retrieved from
https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1269

This Immediate Access is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Duquesne
Scholarship Collection.

EMBODYING TECHNOLOGY:
A HERMENEUTIC INQUIRY INTO CORPOREALITY AND IDENTITY
AS MANIFESTED IN A CASE OF STRAP-ON DILDO USE

A Dissertation
Submitted to the McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts

Duquesne University

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By
Amy E. Taylor

August 2012

Copyright by
Amy E. Taylor

2012

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported
License.

EMBODYING TECHNOLOGY:
A HERMENEUTIC INQUIRY INTO CORPOREALITY AND IDENTITY
AS MANIFESTED IN A CASE OF STRAP-ON DILDO USE

By
Amy E. Taylor

Approved March 23, 2012

Eva-Maria Simms, Ph.D.
Professor of Psychology
Committee Chair

Lanei Rodemeyer, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Philosophy
Committee Member

Jessie Goicoechea, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor of Psychology
Committee Member

James Swindal, Ph.D.
Acting Dean, McAnulty College and
Graduate School of Liberal Arts

Daniel Burston, Ph.D.
Chair, Psychology Department
Associate Professor of Psychology

iii

ABSTRACT

EMBODYING TECHNOLOGY:
A HERMENEUTIC INQUIRY INTO CORPOREALITY AND IDENTITY
AS MANIFESTED IN A CASE OF STRAP-ON DILDO USE

By
Amy E. Taylor
August 2012

Dissertation supervised by Eva-Maria Simms
This dissertation takes a deep look at a first-person narrative from a man who
develops complete impotence following androgen-deprivation treatment for prostate
cancer. After feeling depressed for some time about what he imagined to be the
permanent loss of his sexual life, the man, pseudonymously called Michael in this
dissertation, tried using a strap-on dildo. Michael was surprised and pleased to find that
using the dildo for sex brings him sexual satisfaction including orgasm. The dildo
transforms "from object to organ” as Michael gradually comes to experience the dildo as
a part of his own body. He also experiences a shift in his gendered and sexual identity,
discovering that the dildo is neither a prosthetic penis nor a medical device, but a postgendered object subject to playful interpretation. This dissertation aims to elaborate how
the phenomenon presented in the case study narrative takes place, to discuss the
implications this phenomenon has in a number of theoretical domains, and to apply these
iv

findings to clinical practice. It uses phenomenological elaboration and hermeneutic
narrative analysis to explore the case study phenomenon. Then, the case study
phenomenon is interrogated from various theoretical approaches in order to elaborate the
implications of this phenomenon regarding the relationships between physical body
morphology, lived embodied experience, and gender identity, the relationship between the
body and sensorium-expanding technology, and the breadth and range of human
sexuality. The case study narrative serves as a locus for dialogue between feminist
phenomenological and feminist poststructural thought on the question of the relationship
between the material body and identity, and also includes discussions of transsexuality
and male lesbian identities in terms of how the case study phenomenon is related to the
embodied experiences of people in these groups. The dissertation also explores how
Michael’s partner contributes to Michael’s change in embodied experience and identity
and contributes to the creation of an imaginative and playful space for sexuality to
emerge, suggesting that sexuality is created in an interpersonal context rather than being
located in a single person or having a particular aim or trajectory. Dissertation findings
suggest that conceptual and technical playfulness, including the creation of an
imaginative and playful space, may be beneficial in the clinical treatment of sexual
"dysfunctions," persons with non-binary or flexible gender identities, transsexual persons,
and for clinical conceptualization of sexuality and embodiment in general. Dissertation
findings imply that there exists great complexity and variability in embodied experience,
that the body is deeply significant for developing identity and that bodily changes may
alter identity, and that sexuality is an event that emerges with others.
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Chapter 1: Introduction, Purpose, & Methodology
Despite my reservations, I eventually agreed to experiment with a strap-on dildo. My
expectations, though, were muted. At most, I thought I might be able to please my partner.
But I honestly did not envision recreating a fully satisfying sexual experience.
– Warkentin, K., Gray, R., & Wassersug, R., 2006, p. 391

I. Introduction & Research Questions
The above quotation comes from a person who, in the following, shall be referred
to as “Michael.” Michael was in his late fifties when he became fully physiologically
impotent following hormone-based prostate cancer treatments. After receiving these
treatments, Michael felt depressed and lifeless, flawed, and believed he no longer had the
capacity to achieve sexual satisfaction. After spending more than a year in this condition,
he tried intercourse using a strap-on dildo. To his surprise, sexual satisfaction became
possible again. This included orgasm, satisfying sexual pleasure without orgasm,
multiple orgasms, and other nuances of experiencing himself as sexual, sexed, and
gendered which he describes in his first-person narrative in the case study by Warkentin,
K., Gray, R., & Wassersug, R. (2006).
Michael's case presents a fascinating phenomenon that has relevance for multiple
theoretical, and consequently practical (particularly clinical) problems. It raises questions
about the relationship of the body to external material objects: How is it possible for a
person to achieve orgasm by means of an external object? How does this object become
a part of the felt and sensed body such that Michael can experience pleasure with it?
Furthermore, what does the phenomenon of the body extending itself with an external
object reveal about human corporeality generally? The case also has relevance for
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questions about the relationship of the body to a person's sense of identity, particularly in
terms of the person's sex or genderi. What does it mean about the body that it can acquire
a new sexual organ, or an organ with significance for sexual identity? What might it
reveal about the relationship between gender or sexual identity and what the body feels
like? What is the relation of the dildo to the penis, and more generally, what is the
relation of a bodily modification or addition to a person's body and that person's identity?
Finally, this phenomenon is relevant for understanding sexuality, or the sexual
body (or as a translation of the fourth chapter of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of
Perception phrases this, “the body in its sexual being”). What does Michael's change in
terms of sexual functioning and experience during the process of dildo incorporation
imply about sexuality generally? How does the sexual body adapt to change, and how is
it possible for it to change? How does Michael’s case challenge common constructions
of sexuality? Michael's case presents a phenomenon that is at once believable and
astonishing, shedding light on a real but unarticulated (or under-articulated) phenomenon,
adding to multiple conversations about the self and the body. This dissertation aims to
elaborate this phenomenon in order to put it in dialogue with various theoretical
problems, and then apply these findings to practice, especially the practices of clinical
psychology.
Before I begin to introduce Michael's case and my means of unfolding it further, I
wish to briefly explain my interest in this topic. Michael's case narrative presents an
intersection of a number of different but related topics that are of interest to me: the
body's ability to be altered by all kinds of technologies, the experience of living in an
atypical body or otherwise feeling different from the norm, the relationship of the felt
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body to the meanings inscribed on the body by one's sociocultural context, the
relationship between expressing or representing one's identity and a personal, perhaps
private, sense of self. All of these topics are related thematically; they all have to do with
examining the boundaries of what it means to be human, particularly the boundaries of
being a human body, and the significance of relating to other human beings in being
human. In clinical practice and in my own experience, I notice human beings struggling
against definitions of what it means to be human (or to be an adequate human body, to be
a woman, to be a man, to be mentally healthy, to be lovable, and so on), trying to adapt to
a form, or to exist where an alternative form seems all but unintelligible in the social
world. This project, which explores a human being adapting and renegotiating his body
boundaries and identity in a striking way, is meant to open up the meaning of “human”
and point to the complexity diversity of human phenomena and possibility.
***
This dissertation begins with a brief case history analysis of the phenomenon of
dildo embodiment as presented in the case by Warkentin et. al. (2006), as well as two
additional but briefer case study articles, the first of which (Gray & Klotz, 2004) refers to
the same patient, and the second of which refers to another patient who underwent the
same androgen deprivation therapy and considered using a strap-on dildo as a means of
renegotiating his sexuality (Wassersug, 2009). These two additional cases do not include
first person narratives or extensive detail, but are included to support and validate the first
case as more than an anomaly, since the same or a similar phenomenon appears in
another person, and the phenomenon is observed in the same patient by a different group
of researchers. The phenomenon of dildo embodiment will then be developed in a series
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of theoretical and interpretive chapters.
This first chapter, in addition to narrative summaries and brief analysis of
Michael's case and related case write-ups, includes a description of the methodology used
in unfolding the phenomenon in Michael's case and supporting cases. It situates this
project in the context of ongoing conversations and explains the purposes of this research,
thus providing an explanation of the relevance of this research. This chapter also
elaborates the various questions and practical applications each chapter will address, and
briefly references questions and possibilities for research which may follow from
elaborating the phenomenon of dildo embodiment in this dissertation.
Chapters 2-4 each deal with a theoretical problem which has practical relevance,
particularly in the realm of clinical practice. While each of these chapters has a distinct
aspect of the phenomenon at its center (and superficially appear to deal with quite
different topics), because these chapters are all examining a particular phenomenon from
a different point of view, these chapters will overlap in some ways. Additionally, while
there are certainly a number of aspects of this phenomenon worthy of analysis, the ones
here were selected because they elucidate the phenomenon at the level of the embodied
experience, or what the phenomenon reveals about human beings as embodied. Chapter
5 unfolds this clinical relevance and also deals with how the problems raised in the prior
chapters are understood in sociohistorical context and in institutions relevant to clinical
practice. This chapter discusses how gender and sexuality and generally regarded by
expert clinical knowledge and the medical model, including a discussion of how sexual
dysfunction and variations in sexual and gender identity are conceptualized. It then
elaborates an alternative approach based on ideas from previous chapters with an
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emphasis on embodied experience as a significant aspect of clinical conceptualization
and practice. These findings are relevant not only for groups referenced specifically,
including persons with impotence, transgendered persons, etc., but for understanding
human experience in general, insofar as we are all embodied, sexed, sexual, and gendered
beings.
Chapter 2 is a discussion of the body's relation to external objects and addresses
the question of how a body is able to make an external object into a bodily organ. This
chapter includes a general discussion of material objects or “things,” and how an object
becomes a technological extension of the body. It does this via phenomenological
literature on the body's boundaries and phenomenal field from Merleau-Ponty and
Heidegger. It also uses literature which focuses specifically on the relationship between
the body and specific technologies, particularly from “postphenomenology” which takes
particular interest in how technologies, particularly simple tools like the strap-on dildo,
mediate human experience. This chapter explores ideas from Don Ihde, Peter Paul
Verbeek, and Bruno Latour.
Chapter 3 is about sex and gender in relation to the body. This chapter elaborates
how changes in the body are related to changes in sex and gender identity. It includes
debates in gender theory about whether sex and gender identities are part of one's innate,
prediscursive and embodied way of being, or whether sex and gender refer to imposed
categories that are merely inscribed upon the body. It situates Michael’s case within this
representation/ material binary. It addresses the status of the dildo in relation to the
material penis and the symbolic phallus. The discussion in this chapter includes works
by Luce Irigaray, Iris Young, and Judith Butler. This chapter also addresses transsexual
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phenomena and the relationship between gender and sexual identity and the body present
in trans bodies. It incorporates writings by and about being transgendered or transsexual,
particularly the work of Jay Prosser. The chapter overall explores the relationship
between one's felt body and one's sense of being a given sex or gender, and again, how a
change in the body relates to identity.
Chapter 4 is about the sexual body and sexuality. This chapter is based on
Merleau-Ponty's “The Body in Its Sexual Being” from Phenomenology of Perception. It
critiques and elaborates Merleau-Ponty, and includes critiques made by Iris Young and
others that Merleau-Ponty refers to a particular kind of body and thus creates a normative
standard for being embodied. Then, making use of both Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology
and critiques or revisions of it, the chapter presents a phenomenological reading of the
phenomenon of sexuality as presented in the Michael's case study. It reads Michael's
narrative as a snapshot of a sexual world. Specifically, it contrasts Michael, whose sexual
horizon expands following a change to his physical body, to Merleau-Ponty's discussion
of Schneider, a patient whose sexual horizon recedes following a physical change. It also
includes an elaboration of the role of others in composing these horizons, an particularly
Michael's sexual partner, since the emergence of sex as an event between people is left
out of Merleau-Ponty's particular existential-phenomenological discussion of sexuality.
Thus, this chapter is a revision and elaboration of Merleau-Ponty's way of understanding
the body in its sexual being.
Chapter 5 applies these findings to clinical practice. It provides a sociohistorical
discussion of how Western culture regards issues surrounding masculinity and femininity,
impotence, and gender variability. This includes a discussion of the DSM's stance on
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gender-related diagnoses and rules based on Harry Benjamin's initial “findings” about
transsexuality, which define and regulate sex transitions. The clinical implications of
findings from previous chapters are elaborated. This elaboration draws from Didier
Anzieu's concept of the “Skin Ego” and his invitation to engage in imaginative
psychotherapeutic case formulation and intervention. This chapter discusses how
Michael was able to succeed in his “transition” and suggests some ways clinicians might
differently regard, and therefore differently treat patients with issues surrounding the
sexed, sexual, and gendered body.
The dissertation closes with a summary of findings and suggestions for further
study. This dissertation is a pilot study, in some sense, since it is meant to open up a
phenomenon that is relatively unexplored, likely leading to further questions. Each
chapter addresses an aspect of the question, “What is happening here?” with regard to the
case phenomenon, unfolding the phenomenon in order to elaborate sets of relevant
questions, all of which may be explored further either theoretically or empirically. The
final chapter of this dissertation will offer some possibilities for following up on this
preliminary research.

II. Case Summary: The Phenomenon of Dildo Embodiment
In Michael's narrative from the published case study by Warkentin et. al., 2006,
Michael describes encountering traditional treatments for physiological impotence
(surgically inserting an inflatable device into his penis, injecting drugs into his penis, or
using a vacuum pump device) which either do not work for him or that he finds too
unappealing to try. Michael feels desperate and depressed, believing his sexual life has
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ended. He describes himself as “sexually incapacitated” and his penis as a “functional
failure” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391). Michael’s close lesbian friend tells him that she
attains sexual satisfaction via strap-on dildo, and suggests he could do the same. Michael
doubts this, but his depression begins to abate with the opening up of this possibility.
Eventually—over a year later, and with a number of worries and reservations—he
accompanies her to a sex shop and buys a dildo.
Michael also “discussed extensively” with his female partner (to whom this
project gives the name “Susan”) the possibility of using a dildo for penetrative sex.
Susan is “supportive of the exploration” and they have sex with Michael wearing the
strap-on dildo (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391). Michael is amazed and delighted by the
“naturalness” of the act, stating, “It caught me by total surprise how natural intercourse
felt with this strap-on device” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391). Michael and Susan
continue to engage in dildo sex with increasingly positive results. “[S]exual satisfaction
has become easier, because both of us have come to accept the dildo as part of our sex
play” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392).
Michael describes trying various sexual positions with the dildo and reports that
he and Susan “have both been able to have orgasms many times using the dildo”
(Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392). He adds that there are some things he is able to do with
the dildo that were not possible when he was able to have erections. For instance, he says
“with the dildo, I am able to continue pelvic thrusts long and hard enough that [my
partner] now regularly achieves an orgasm in the missionary position” (Warkentin et. al.,
2006, p. 392). Michael also says, “I discovered that I [...] could enjoy sex without
orgasms,” and “I can [...] have multiple orgasms!” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391). He
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describes the sexual experimentation that he and Susan engage in, and says that
eventually, he is even able to attain pleasure from receiving oral sex while he is wearing
the dildo.
Through this process, Michael changes the way he thinks of himself, moving from
“functional failure” to “joyfully empowered.” He says that sex becomes more playful
than it was prior to using the strap-on dildo, and states that he can enjoy “the 'play' part of
sex” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 393) and that he thinks of the dildo as “'a toy'”
(Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391). Others in Michael's life, particularly Michael's partner,
add to this atmosphere of erotic playfulness. Michael describes one morning when he
walked into the bathroom to discover “the dildo sitting upright on the counter-top
wearing one of my favorite neckties,” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392) interpreting this as
a signal of Susan's “personification and personalization” of the dildo, and her pleasure
and acceptance in the dildo as a part of Michael. Michael comes to experience a
“transference from 'object' to 'organ'” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 393) with respect to the
dildo, and alongside this development, his attitude toward the dildo, dildo sex, and his
identity change. Michael’s words are quoted extensively throughout this dissertation as
this phenomenon is elaborated, and Michael's entire narrative is available in Appendix 1
of this dissertation.
Gray & Klotz (2004) refer to the same patient, affirming that he was able to have
satisfying penetrative sex using the strap-on dildo. Wassersug (2009) describes a patient
he calls “Dr. A” as a “62-year-old medical school professor, diagnosed 10 years ago with
prostate cancer” (p. 634). This man became impotent following hormonal prostate cancer
treatment. Wassersug (2009) states “ADT [androgen deprivation therapy] has led to
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profound changes in Dr. A, such that he no longer considers himself a man... [he] now
considers his gender to be that of a eunuch” (p. 634). Dr. A is described as finding this
label empowering, and as having a fulfilling and orgasmic sexual life, and as having a
long-term female partner he met after identifying himself as a eunuch. His “sexuality no
longer depends on a functional penis” (p. 635) and his sexual life includes the use of
dildos (p. 636). According to Wassersug (2009), the patient regards using a dildo for
sexual activity as “sexuality reborn” (p. 636), much like Michael’s experience of recreating sexuality with the strap-on dildo.
Michael's narrative and supporting cases are fascinating for a number of reasons.
Not only do they address how external objects become body parts and what constitutes
the relationship between the body and sex/ sexuality/ gender, but does so in a way that
seems to open up a new, surprising dimension of what it means to be a body. This
phenomenon addresses the question of what it means to have a sexualized or gendered
body since it provides an example of flexible and adaptive sexuality which appears in an
atypical body, in a person whose sense of personal and gender identity changes. By
observing gender and sexuality in flux, this case provides a unique opportunity to catch
them becoming. The persons in these cases reveal, both with and without explicit
awareness that they are doing so, how gender becomes embodied, or how gender (as well
as sexuality) is an embodied event.
Michael goes through a change in sexuality. He experiences a loss which
ultimately becomes a gain as he finds a new way of being a sexual body that includes
possibilities that were unfamiliar before he incorporated the dildo. At different points in
his narrative, Michael implies or describes his dildonic body as lesbian, hyper-masculine,
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feminine, and dispersed across space. The implication is that sexuality is not linked to
body parts, or at least, not permanently or specifically linked—it can relocate. It is also
surprising that bodily supplementation is possible to the degree Michael's case suggests.
What is initially a loss, and culturally framed as a lack, loss, and non-event alike,
becomes Michael's gain. This dissertation will aim to open up or give language to a
particular world, or a particular way of being a body as it appears in this case study.

III. Methods & Approach
Phenomenology
This dissertation uses a phenomenological research style in that it aims to produce
close descriptions of lived human experience. These descriptions are meant to reveal a
phenomenon so that it may be better understood. Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology
serves as a starting point because this dissertation is about an embodied human
experience, and this approach places great significance on the body as a source and locus
of meaning. Merleau-Ponty (1962) writes of the errors of prior ways of thinking about
the body: “while the living body became an exterior without an interior, subjectivity
became an interior without an exterior, an impartial spectator” (p. 65). Here, the body
and identity are joined (although the particular ways in which they are in relation is
ambiguous, and is a major theme of this dissertation).
Case Study Methodology
This dissertation will be an interpretive, hermeneutic unfolding of the narrative
from the study by Warkentin et. al. (2006) along with contributions from the two
supporting case studies. I am approaching this narrative as a “revelatory case study”
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(Yin, 2009) and as a “theoretical-heuristic case study” (Edwards, 1990). According to
Yin (2009), a “revelatory case” is one which provides to a researcher a unique
opportunity to “analyze a phenomenon previously inaccessible to social science inquiry”
(p. 48). Although this usually refers to phenomena which are rarely observed because
they occur rarely, such as the aftermath of a singular event, one could apply the concept
of a “revelatory case” to a case which does not appear for observation except in rare
instances, regardless of how frequently it may occur. This method is justified here
because the phenomenon in the case is not accessible otherwise (further material about
the same case is presented by Gray & Klotz, 2004). The phenomenon of strap-on dildo
incorporation is difficult, if not impossible (particularly within the limitations of my
study) to access. It is probably not rare or new, but mostly hidden because it is a taboo
subject and people do not openly speak about it. It presents itself between sexual partners
or confidantes, in support groups, or between therapists and their patients. Indeed, I have
searched online and offline support groups and discussion boards for men using dildos as
a way to expand their sexual lives and/ or cope with impotence, and have not been
allowed access to these intimate communities. In every case, I was explicitly refused
access or my requests for access received no response. These included groups for
younger men and groups for gay men, since I imagined these audiences may be more
open to including me. These also included support groups to which I was referred by Dr.
Richard Wassersug, one of the authors of the primary case study analyzed in this
dissertation.
Another option I considered was to extend the scope of this phenomenon to
include multiple instances of strap-on dildo use, whether by self-identified men, women,
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trans persons, or persons who do not identify with any of these categories. However, it
was not clear that this would be the same phenomenon in all instances, nor that the
phenomenon would be much more accessible even with an expanded population of
potential participants. My purpose here is to better understand the phenomenon in its
most foundational dimension in order to articulate themes and questions for future study.
Another way of saying this would be that this project attempts to “front-load
phenomenological insight” (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008) in order to “inform the way
experiments are set up” (p. 38). The insights gleaned from my project are meant to
inform the design and content of later studies. For this kind of case study, “the case study
is... worth conducting because the descriptive information alone will be revelatory” (Yin,
2009, p. 49). This dissertation’s descriptive analysis of the case introduced by Warkentin
et. al. (2006) opens up this otherwise inaccessible phenomenon. It asks a broad “what”
question—what is going on, what is the meaning of this phenomenon—as a preface to
possible “how” questions—how does this phenomenon occur. In this sense, my
dissertation is a prolegomena to possible future empirical studies of this phenomenon,
once the phenomenon itself is better defined.
The method used in this dissertation may also be classified as a “theoreticalheuristic” case study (Edwards, 1990, p. 20). In this sort of case study, a case is selected
because it is “likely to be revealing,” meaning that various sorts of questions may be
addressed by the case. As Edwards (1990) states, “The researcher should motivate the
selection of a specific case in the context of the theoretical goals of the study” (p. 20).
Michael's case is selected here because it may be interrogated from multiple theoretical
perspectives, with multiple kinds of questions. This research method aims to open up
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nuances of this case for further study and also learn about corporeality, gender, and
sexuality through what this case reveals. In sum, the selected case provides access to a
phenomenon that is relevant for various theoretical questions.
Hermeneutic Approach and Narrative Analysis
This project is a hermeneutic exploration of case study information.
“Hermeneutic” means simply a way of interpreting a text. The reading of the case study
narrative in this dissertation uses a combined “hermeneutic of care” or restoration and
“hermeneutic of suspicion” or demystification as outlined in Josselson's (2004) narrative
approach. These two approaches to the narrative unfold distinct meanings. Narrative is
understood here as “an organized interpretation of a sequence of events” (Murray, 2003,
p. 113) which represents an attempt by the narrator to create order and structure to his or
her world and sense of selfhood (Murray, 2003). Narrative analysis attends to the
structure and content of the narrative, discerning the different parts of the narrative
including the main plot and sub-plots and connections among these (Murray, 2003). It
attends, also, to the way the narrator tells her or his story—what is emphasized, which
words are chosen, what metaphors are used, the order in which events are presented, etc.
(Murray, 2003). A narrative approach is well-suited here since Michael presents his case
as a narrative, a tale of transition.
The goal of this two-sided hermeneutic approach to narrative is to “examine the
various messages inherent in [a]... text, giving 'voice' in various ways to the participants”
(Josselson, 2004, p.1). This involves looking for the meanings present in the text,
including not only what the narrator presents straightforwardly, but the meanings he gives
to those facts. These meanings include what is presented indirectly, implicitly in the text.
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That is not to say these meanings are disguised, but that they require elaboration, either
via restoration of the meaning present (hermeneutic of restoration) in the text or
explication of meanings that are pointed to but left unarticulated (hermeneutic of
demystification).
One may also think of this as examining the “visible and invisible” in the text, to
borrow from Merleau-Ponty's text with that title. Looking for the participant’s intended
meaning in the narrative is the visible dimension, and the invisible lies in the elisions,
absences, and surpluses of meaning present in parts of the text. These “invisible”
elements give some context to the text, and evidence as to how the meanings present
came to mean what they do. This is the basic project of the hermeneutics of suspicion.
Josselson writes, “the researcher working from the vantage point of the hermeneutics of
suspicion problematizes the participants' narrative and 'decodes' meaning beyond the
text” (2004, p. 5). This also includes examining the context, including sociohistorical
context, which gives meaning to the narrator's text, or allows the narrator to give
meanings to his own text.
A basic assumption in this paired hermeneutic approach is that the other is
speaking truthfully (thus, one approaches their text faithfully, drawing it out and restoring
or expressing the meanings therein). As Josselson states, “The aim of the hermeneutics
of faith is to re-present, explore, and/or understand the participantive world of the
participants... The [narrative] thus provides a window on psychological and social
realities of the participant” (2004, p. 5). A hermeneutic of suspicion adds that the
participant's words are overdetermined and point to meanings beyond her or his attention
or awareness.
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Understanding Michael’s experience and giving it voice is a hermeneutic of
restoration. Interrogating Michael’s text and drawing out the surpluses of meaning is a
hermeneutic of demystification. This analysis attends both to what the participant states
about how the phenomenon took place, and sources of meaning beyond this. It does not
seek a straightforward cause and effect, but multiple pieces of meaning that reveal the
phenomenon. Stated broadly, this project examines Michael's world both from his
perspective and from a critical observer's perspective; it reads the text of Michael's life
from over his shoulder and watches from some distance away.
One might also see this approach as an attempt to understand a phenomenon aside
from discourse but also as it is contained in discourse. Hence, this analysis attempts to
not assume the meanings of terms and concepts like “transsexual,” “transgender,”
“homosexual,” etc. Rather, it attempts to understand the embodied experience of
sexuality and get a sense of the participant’s self-understanding, without the imposition of
predetermined identity markers. For instance, it would detract from the phenomenon to
try and understand Michael’s sexuality as straight, queer, trans, etc., before getting a
sense of what this experience might be like for him, or how he understands himself.
When discussing Michael's experience, attempting to see it as mediated through the lens
of gender categories is an imposition. Michael's experience seems to transcend gender,
and is best understood at the level of embodiment. These initial descriptions provide a
snapshot of a sexual world, or a possibility of how to be a human being with a body. It is
this concrete phenomenon that this project will move through with various questions and
ongoing discussions to better understand the meanings and implications of this world.
This project will preserve the critical reading of this phenomenon and how it is
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constructed, but will also aim to reveal the prediscursive, embodied phenomenon. This is
also meant as a beginning to an improved phenomenology of the sexual body, as other
discussions leave elements lacking (elaborated later in this dissertation). Hopefully, it
will lead to later work which will supplement this project by using my elaboration and
questions to explore other cases and applications.
Validity
How can I respond to my research questions adequately using a single case?
The advantage to studying this single case is that it presents a rare, likely singular,
circumstance to study a particular phenomenon. The disadvantage of using a single case
gathered by other researchers is that the case may not provide as detailed or as conclusive
a response to the project’s research questions, even if it is possible to gather as much
detail as possible about the case by communicating with the case study's authors.
However, because the purpose of this dissertation is to better understand the phenomenon
and open up possibilities for further inquiry, the results need not be generalizable.
This project aims for “touchpoint validity” (Fischer, 2005), the goal of which is to
“connect with theory... in a productive way” to affirm, revise, or expand this theory. It
also works toward “revisionary validity” which aims to revise prior understandings of a
phenomenon for “a change in conception or depth of understanding” (p. xvii). This
project, particularly the fifth chapter on clinical applications, also aims for “efficacy
validity,” which is met when a project “make[s] a difference for theory and/ or practices”
(Fischer 2005, xvii). In sum, the validity of this project is based upon its ability to
develop theoretical understanding of the phenomenon of dildo embodiment as presented
in the case study narrative and to develop a body of theory related to this phenomenon.
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How do I know my case study (or studies) is not an anomaly?
Here, having multiple case histories likely would be of value. The following
published case study (on Dr. A, mentioned above) is available in addition to the primary
case study discussed in this dissertation: Wassersug, R. (2009). Mastering Emasculation.
Journal of Clinical Oncology. This case provides evidence that the phenomenon from
the Warkentin et al case is not an anomaly, but provides little additional description for
analysis since it is a brief article which does not include many details about the practical
actions leading to dildo incorporation in this patient. On the other hand, because this
project is a “revelatory case study” which is meant to reveal a phenomenon that has not
been studied in this way previously, it could be approached as a pilot study. That is, this
project would reveal a previously silent phenomenon, and the analysis of Michael's case
could then be used as a guide for the analysis of further cases. The aim of this current
study is to describe a phenomenon in sufficient detail to approach an explanation for its
meaning and how it takes place. Finally, even if this is a very rare phenomenon, it
illustrates some human possibilities surrounding corporeality, sexuality, and
transformation of personal identity.
Will using material that is already published for my analysis be a problem?
This project aims to open up the phenomenon of strap-on dildo incorporation. It
is intended to discuss the phenomenon as presented by the primary case study in a way
that can lead to further inquiry. The project has a slight disadvantage in that it is using a
text mediated through other researchers rather than one gathered by the author. However,
the case authors are available to provide context for the research. Also, the
methodological approach used here (combined hermeneutic of demystification and
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restoration) aims to understand the meanings around a text, and takes into account the
situation of the research. Finally, even though the author of this dissertation did not
gather this narrative, the narrative preserves the participant's voice.

Summary
This dissertation explores a number of questions about the body and identity as
revealed by the phenomenon of strap-on dildo embodiment. These questions are
connected by examining how changes to the body relate to experience and identity.
Apparent paradoxes about the body, or ways of being a body which seem to conflict,
appear throughout the dissertation. These include the social body and personal body, the
material body and the representational body, the socially constructed body and the felt
body. The dissertation as a whole argues for a thesis that human experience is varied and
flexible, and that changes or variations in embodied being constitute different worlds as
opposed to flawed or reduced worlds. This is also an attempt to overcome a dichotomy
between the idea that there is a particular essence to being human or a particular way of
being human, and the opposite extreme that embodied experience is irrelevant in light of
what Ihde (2008) calls “textism,” or the tendency to reduce everything to a text abstracted
from experience. This project is interested in experience, and the way experiences lead to
particular results or shapes identity. Practices change the body, and the body is how we
connect with and create worlds (Bourdieu, 1977; Young, 2005; Ahmed, 2006).
This study will hopefully be of relevance to academic conversations by
enriching the human science understanding of the body and identity. Further, it is also
intended to serve social justice ends by expanding the way we think about sex, sexuality,

19

and gender. Finally, this research is meant to be of clinical relevance to doctors and
therapists alike, particularly in the areas of health psychology, couple therapy, and sex
therapy when treating individuals experiencing issues related to sexuality, gender identity,
and sexual “dysfunction.”
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Chapter 2: Humans & Things
The pressures on the hand and the stick are no longer given; the stick is no longer an
object perceived by the blind man, but an instrument with which he perceives.
– Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 176
Merleau-Ponty describes the human world as organized in reference to our bodies;
“the body is our general medium for having a world” (1962, p. 179). What it means to be
embodied, however, or what constitutes embodiment, is difficult to define. The body is
vague. For instance, Merleau-Ponty describes a blind man who modifies his body to
incorporate a walking stick: “Once the stick has become a familiar instrument, the world
of feelable things recedes and now begins, not at the outer skin […], but at the end of the
stick” (1962, p. 175). His body boundaries have changed to include the stick, and it has
become another organ, or an extension of his skin.
This chapter explores how the strap-on dildo, an object separate from Michael's
body, becomes a means of experience for Michael. Michael goes from regarding the
dildo as a “piece of purple plastic” to an “organ” of his own body (Warkentin et. al.,
2006, p. 391), and experiences the dildo as such—evidenced not only by his explicit
statements, but by his ability to achieve sexual satisfaction through the dildo, a striking
example of an object working in concert with the body, or extending the body beyond the
skin. This raises questions about Michael's case and human-technology relations in
general, including: How is it that objects may change a human's experience of the world,
or of his or her body, or both? How does an object become experienced as a part or
extension of one's body, rather than something that is merely laid upon the body? When
is an object not merely being used by a body, but has become a part of body? How is an
object, such as the strap-on dildo, “in-corporated” and what is the experience of bodily
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extension like? This chapter addresses these questions by bringing the case study
phenomenon into dialogue with phenomenological (mostly Merleau-Ponty's discussions
of the phenomenal field in Phenomenology of Perception and to a lesser degree
Heidegger's discussions of tools in Being and Time) and “postphenomenological”
(primarily from Don Ihde and Peter Paul Verbeek, supplemented by Bruno Latour's work
on the agency of objects) ideas about human-technologyii relations. This chapter
examines how these theoretical approaches elaborate what takes place in Michael's case
and supporting cases, and how Michael's case may inform these theories. This chapter
includes both findings about Michael based on this way of looking at human-technology
relations, and an argument for this way of thinking about technology-human relations.
The overall aim of this chapter is to better understand how human beings and external
objects relate in order to better understand the physical body and identity more broadly.

I. Theoretical Framework for Understanding Relations Between Humans & Things
Material Hermeneutics
Phenomenology and postphenomenology provide ideal starting points for a
detailed exploration of how human beings and technologies relate at the level of
embodied human experience and action. As mentioned in chapter 1, phenomenological
research aims to provide detailed descriptions of human experience. In this chapter,
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology and examples of human-technology relations, and to a
lesser extend Heidegger's phenomenological discussion of tool-use in Being and Time
(particularly I.III, sections 15 and 16), provide jumping-off points for a detailed
description of human experience relating to objects at the level of embodied activity.
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Postphenomenology is grounded in these phenomenological approaches to
human-technology relations, but also elaborates and critiques them. Postphenomenology
is “a modified, hybrid phenomenology” (Ihde 2009, p. 23) that preserves
phenomenology's recognition of the importance of embodiment and experience, but also
takes cues from pragmatism and poststructuralism. It is interested in “retaining the rich
descriptions of phenomenology” (Ihde, 2002) and the emphasis on human experience and
human-world relations that come from phenomenology, but with a greater emphasis on
material and praxis. Ihde calls himself, at one point, a “phenomenological materialist”
(2002, p. xv). Verbeek (2005) calls this methodology a “material hermeneutics” in which
“an analysis of the technological mediation of our experience produces a new
interpretation of hermeneutics” (p. 119). It avoids the idea that we can understand things
“as they really are,” discover predetermined essences, or “return” to something more
“original,” as phenomenology seems to imply, or has been accused of attempting
(Verbeek, 2005). Rather, postphenomenology is interested in the concrete practices
between humans and things that constitute their relationships. For instance, MerleauPonty states, in the context of distinguishing phenomenology from science, that
phenomenology returns us to “direct experience” (p. ix). This seems to imply not only
that human-world relations are of primary importance, but also (and here is the point of
disagreement), that there are more and less direct levels of contact with the world. This
problematically implies a true “essence” and impels us to venture nearer, and,
paradoxically, removes us from pure descriptions of experience. It seems that MerleauPonty suggests that there is a world, rather than worlds of experience. Verbeek (2005)
summarizes the critique thus: “An uninterpreted world, a world in itself, cannot be
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experienced; an untouched world cannot be lived in. Human beings never encounter a
world in itself, only and always a world for them” (p. 107).
Despite this critique, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology presents a basis for
understanding how human beings and their worlds come about. Merleau-Ponty states
that, “there is no inner man, man is in the world, and only in the world does he know
himself” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. xii). Indeed, this may be Merleau-Ponty’s response to
the critique that he only recognizes a single world. This shared world is the common
world of human experience, the grounded phenomenological space in which human
beings agree and meet (without this kind of space, we risk a problem of relativism—the
idea that there are no limits to human experience or what constitutes a human world).
Because “man” only knows “himself” in the context of interactions with other beings in
the world, Merleau-Ponty already places human beings, and his phenomenology, in the
realm of practices and presence. The aim of his project does not appear to be only to
understand what makes these practices possible or what human essence precedes them,
but also those practices themselves (Verbeek, 2005). Merleau-Ponty states that we are
“immediately in touch with the world” (p. xiii), meaning we are always already in the
world, and it is not possible to know ourselves as though we were separate from it. Our
human existence precedes essence, and our existence is our concrete practices.
Things Themselves
This chapter refers to objects, things, artifacts, material objects, technologies,
equipment, nonhumans, and perhaps more, all to speak about external material objects
that engage with human beings in some way. There will be some distinctions among
these terms along the way, but all of these terms are meant to refer to specific objects that
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appear in the human world. “Technology” refers to technological devices that make up
much of the population of objects in the contemporary world, or a particular class of
things with which human beings engage. This term, however, is meant to be distinct
from technology in general, or technology as some sort of force or mindset (or
technology with a capital “T” associated with later Heidegger's critique of technology
(Ihde, Verbeek)), and instead refer to specific technologies and their concrete applications
as they appear in different contexts. “It does not alter our sense of incorporation if the
instrument is simple or complex, modern or ancient. In all... cases, it enters into my
bodily, actional, perceptual relationship with my environment” (Ihde 2009, p. 42). Thus,
context and use are the most significant features for categorizing objects, for instance,
whether the object is being actively attended to or used as a means to do something else,
whether the object has become “transparent” to the user as though it were a part of his
own body, what sort of possibilities for use the object presents and how human beings are
taking up these possibilities (or how the object is shaping human action via the
possibilities it presents), and so on.
Postphenomenology may also be thought of as a literal response to Husserl's
original phenomenological command, “To the things themselves!” (Verbeek 2005, Ihde
2009). Another point that follows from postphenomenology's critique that
phenomenology has sometimes been more interested in finding essences than in
elaborating concrete and specific practices (Verbeek, 2005) would be to say that it has
overlooked things in favor of examining essences and abstractions. This applies
particularly to Heidegger's later philosophy of technology, as presented in “The Question
Concerning Technology” and elsewhere, particularly veers from understanding specific
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human-technology interactions. As Ihde (2002) explains, Heidegger regards technology
as “a sort of transcendental dimension that posed a threat toward culture, created
alienation, and even threatened a presumed essence of the human” (p. 113) instead of
exploring particular, concrete technologies (Ihde, 2002). The postphenomenological
approach, as well as all of the approaches used in this chapter to analyze the phenomenon
of Michael’s particular engagement with a technological device, regards viewing specific
technologies as important (rather than talking about technology in general, or technology
as an idea only).
This approach is more closely in line with early Heideggerian work, which seems
to begin a project that postphenomenology takes up: “to articulate the way in which tools
play a constitutive role in the relation between human beings and world” (Verbeek 2005,
p. 82). In Being and Time, “technology... is a way of revealing the world instead of a
reduction of our access to it” (Verbeek 2005, p. 80).iii It develops the idea that
technological artifacts “generate specific forms of access to the world for human beings”
(Verbeek 2005, p. 76) and “disclose a world” (Verbeek 2005, p. 79). Heidegger's early
philosophy of technology, as presented in Being and Time, gives an account of human
engagement with external objects that offers some basis for analyzing a relationship
between a human being and a specific external object. Thus, postphenomenology takes
up the descriptive, close look at the world that phenomenology provides, but focuses on
concrete practices in human-technology relationships.
Based on this understanding of technology, it may be possible to apply this mode
of understanding technology to even the most complex human technologies; however, the
purpose and scope of this chapter limits our discussion to those simple technologies, like
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the strap-on dildo, that may be understood as tools. All following references to
“technology” are limited to this class of technologies (see footnote 2).
Co-constitution of Subject and Object
Postphenomenology also takes objects or things seriously by recognizing that
“subject and object are not merely intertwined with each other but constitute each other”
(Verbeek, 2005, p. 112). This is an attempt to draw out the implication from MerleauPonty and to a lesser extent Heidegger that objects form the basis for the other's existence
(rather than merely being in some type of relation to one another). It seems that what
Merleau-Ponty does “is to develop an analysis of the relations between human beings and
their world, and he localizes this relation primarily in perception. Merleau-Ponty does
not, then, describe the world, but rather the way in which human beings comport
themselves to it” (Verbeek, 2005, p. 108). There is space, however, to develop this
system of relations into an understanding of how subjects and objects are co-constituted.
Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception provides “a very subtle and
nuanced discussion of the role of the body, perception, and action, that is embodiment
through technology” (Ihde 2009, p. 36), adding that for Merleau-Ponty, the body is
“praxical.” Merleau-Ponty writes, “What counter for the orientation of the spectacle is
not my body as it in fact is, as a thing in objective space, but as a system of possible
actions, a virtual body with its phenomenal 'place' defined by its task and situation. My
body is wherever there is something to be done.” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, pp. 249-50).
Hence, what postphenomenology attempts to do, and what this chapter attempts to do, is
to use implications from phenomenology both to look at specific, concrete and contextual
technologies, and to focus on the relation between human beings and world in terms of
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how these constitute one another (meaning, too, how objects mediate this coconstitution).
Verbeek (2005) calls the idea that subject and object constitute one another a
“reinterpretation of phenomenology” (p. 112). This reinterpretation means that human
beings and world are both defined in terms of their relations with other things and
humans, as opposed to referring beyond themselves to a predetermined “essence”
(Verbeek, p. 150). Latour, whose work shall be elaborated later in this chapter, presents
entities that cannot even be clearly understood as either subject or object, but instead are
“hybrids” (Verbeek, p. 152). Humans and “nonhumans” (as Latour calls them) are not
separable. Verbeek (2005) notes, "the relation between subject and object always already
precedes the subject and the object themselves, which implies that the subject and object
are mutually constituted in their interrelation" (p. 130). The precedence of the
relationship further implies that subject and object have no definite essence or fixed way
of being; rather, they come about mutually. For example: “Someone who wears
eyeglasses... is not the same without them” (Verbeek 2005, p. 130). Similarly, Michael is
not the same without the dildo; his world is shaped by this relation. The chapter addresses
the question: is in what way do the dildo and Michael mutually constitute one another?
Verbeek (2005) offers a few basic questions we can use for understanding the role
of objects in constitution, the first of which is more about how human beings “read” the
world, the second set about how artifacts change human life, including perception and
behavior: “What role do technological artifacts play in the manner in which human
beings interpret reality?” (p. 121), “What role do things play in human life and action?
How do they contribute to shaping our existence?” (p. 147). He provides some samples
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of how these may be applied to particular things: “In what way to telescopes... shape our
access to the world?” and “How does the television set affect the way we divide up our
day?” (p. 119). This approach is used here to answer the set of questions about Michael's
world and his experience based on strap-on dildo use.
In sum, the postphenomenological approach “looks at concrete technologies with
an eye to the relations between human beings and world that they make possible and
elucidates the structure of these relations” (Verbeek 2005, p. 9), which is what this
chapter shall do for the phenomenon, or the particular human-tool relationship, presented
in Michael's case narrative and supporting cases.

II. Technology as Mediator
This section elaborates more specifically the way in which technology participates
in human-world co-constitution, and applies these to Michael's case.
Body 1 & Body 2
Merleau-Ponty acknowledges two modes of possible embodied being, the livedbody mode and the body that pertains to how others see one (a body that Merleau-Ponty
says encompasses some area “from head to knees,” 1962, p. 173). Ihde (2002) calls these
“body 1” and “body 2,” and further associates body 2 with the body as inscribed by
culture and “echoes with a Foucauldian framework” (p. 17). The experiences of these
two components of embodiment may also be thought of as “microperception,” or bodily
sensory perception which corresponds to body 1, and “macroperception,” which refers to
“the frameworks within which sensory perception becomes meaningful” (Verbeek 2005,
p. 122) and corresponds to body 2. The boundaries between our felt, lived bodies and our
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culturally shaped bodies are ambiguous, as all experience is culturally mediated and
human being is always embodied. Each exists with the other, for embodied experience
takes place in a cultural medium, and “for there to be a marked cultural body, or body
two, there must be a body one that is markable” (Ihde, 2002, p. 70). These two modes of
embodiment may also be thought of as subjective/ objective bodies, though these terms
are more problematic, given the difficulty or perhaps impossibility of providing a clear
distinction between subject and object. This is also to say that technology, which
provides a link between these two kinds of embodiment, informs the constitution of
subject and object, or of human and world.
Ihde elaborates that body 1, “our motile, perceptual, and emotive being-in-theworld” (p. xi) is a Merleau-Pontean “lived body” (corps vécu) “that holds that the active,
perceptual being of incarnate embodiment is the very opening to the world that allows us
to have worlds of any sense. At bottom, the anonymity of the active, perceiving bodily
being... could be... both preconceptual and precultural” (Ihde, 2002, p. 17). This is also
the aspect of embodiment Husserl (1989) calls “Leib,” which refers to the “body as
sensory experience” as well as “lived, embodied experience” (Rodemeyer, 2012, p. 10).
Body 2, on the other hand, Ihde describes as “a thoroughly cultural body, often
described and analyzed in a third-person perspective... Insofar as there is experience, it is
experience suffered or wrought upon human bodies” (2002, p. 17). Ihde goes on to
explain how body 2 still refers to embodied experience, but the experience of bodies as
mediated by culture: “For most of those reared in western traditions, the female breast is
an erotic zone, whereas for many from Asian traditions the nape of the neck is equally or
more strongly such a zone. These locations are... culturally constructed” (2002, p. xi).
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This third-person, objective body is called “Körper” by Husserl (1989). It is “the
body as causal object, subject to laws of physics as well as intersubjective appropriation”
(Rodemeyer, 2012, p. 10). The Körper has two senses: it is both a physical object acted
upon by the physical world (including physical aspects of the body itself, such as
hormones and bodily contours), and a social object acted upon by the world of others.
The second sense of Körper seems to be what Ihde primarily emphasizes in his
conceptualization of body 2, but the first sense of Körper is important as well in
understanding embodied experience. This first sense of Körper as physical body is
distinct from Leib because the physical Körper, although it refers to the skin and organs
of the body, may or may not correspond to the sensory experiences of the Leib. Indeed,
although the way others see one’s body (social Körper) and the physical events of one’s
body (physical Körper) may influence the way one experiences one’s body (Leib), i.e,
feeling male or even feeling like something different than any known sex or gender, the
“Leib might be its own ‘reality’” (Rodemeyer, 2012, p. 11). In other words, lived
experience is in relation to cultural mediation and biological processes, but these do not
necessarily subsume the felt body.
Technologies, or things, are mediators between body 1 and body 2 (Ihde, 2002).
Technology transcends these two bodies and changes the experience of embodiment. The
technological object is initially added to the physical body from without, but becomes a
part of the lived body. Ihde (2002) sees these as instances of “instrumental realism,” in
which technology (specifically, tools) act as material instrumentation extending the
body's innate capacities. This also means that tools, or bodily instrumentation, are
mediators between body and world. Technologies provide another way for a body to
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inhabit the world or make a meaningful world.
One way to understand this relation is that human beings and the world “are not
merely intertwined with each other but constitute each other” (Verbeek, 2005, p. 112).
One point which follows from this is that human embodiment is always already
immersed in technology or being shaped by technology. “Embodiment is, in practice, the
way in which we engage our environment or 'world,' and while we may not often
explicitly attend to it, many of these actions incorporate the use of artifacts” (Ihde, 2009,
p. 42). Another point is that things actively shape human experience: “Things... are not
neutral 'intermediaries' between humans and world, but mediators: they actively mediate
this relation” (Verbeek, 2005, p. 114), and “what humans are and what their world is
receive their form by artifactual mediation” (Verbeek, 2005, p. 130). Technology acts in
human life, in addition to humans taking up technology. An important part of
understanding human relations with technology is to make sense of the opposite
question—how does technology act on human life? Verbeek (2005) notes that
technology's agency (“What Things Do,” the title of his text—italics mine) “can only
become visible when technology is considered from the point of view of its concrete
artifacts” (p. 6). Technology is in relation with humans, each modifying the other.
Mediated Action
Indeed, technologies are not neutral, they have certain “instrumental
intentionality” (Ihde, 2002), meaning they shape human action in a particular way.
Latour (2005) takes this notion further, explaining that artifacts have agency and are
actors. In other words, technology includes some sort of imperative that directs or
influences action. For instance, the computer is an interface between my fingers and my
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text, and suggests, or allows, a certain style of composition. I am not obligated to
produce my text in a linear way, or to produce it in a single, careful stream. Marshall
McLuhan (1995) offers an example of how typing influences text, citing the poetry of e.e.
cummings as only possible in typed form. Analogous to the way that a keyboard shapes
writing, how does the dildo shape Michael's embodied being? And further, how does it
shape his actions—what sort of imperative does the dildo provide for Michael? Let us
look at how Michael answers this question, first with his material description of the dildo.
***
An important part of technology's ability to engage with human beings is the
shared materiality of the technology and the flesh (Ihde, 2002, p. 7). Here, Michael
(Warkentin et. al., 2006) describes the materiality of the dildo:
In the store I debated buying a dildo that looked relatively natural or one that was
beyond the realm of real anatomy. I finally selected one that was similar in size,
shape, and angle to my erect penis before cancer treatments, to the best of my
recollection. It is made of silicone, which makes it durable, appropriately stiff, yet
still flexible, like a natural erect penis. Beyond that, the dildo that I bought bears
little resemblance to a human penis. Granted, it has an expanded “head,” like the
real glans penis but a uniformly smooth shaft, with none of the irregular surface
texture caused by real-life veins. And it is purple! Clearly, it does not constitute a
realistic bio-mimetic prosthesis (p. 391).
The dildo partially suggests a penis (and particularly, his own erect penis) to Michael, but
at the same time it is not a penis and does not (indeed, cannot) be a part of the body in
precisely the same way. When one uses a hammer, “the hardness—but not the
coldness—of the nail is experienced through the hammer” (Ihde, 2002, p.7). In the same
way, the dildo is an incomplete mediator, and “the missing elements [of experience] can
be filled in only by the full bodily sensory awareness that is a part of the ordinary
experience of the artifact-user's world” (Ihde, 2002, p.7). The possibilities left open by
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the dildo as an incomplete mediator of experience allow room for imagination and play—
there are multiple ways to take up the dildo. Chapter 4 discusses the way in which
Michael and his partner make use of this space and fill in the missing element of
experience.
The dildo's materiality allows it to act as an extension of Michael's body and
change his experience of embodiment. Based on Michael's description, it seems that the
dildo focuses his embodied experience away from restoring the visual presence of a penis
and instead prepares him for a novel embodied experience. He has selected an object that
will be functional for the sexual acts he engaged in previously, and something that is not
“realistic,” but that moves in the direction of fantasy. The materiality of the object seems
to suggest playful activity, a suggestion which Michael takes up in his way of thinking
about and using the dildo.
How else does the dildo influence Michael's action? Objects may also be thought
of as actors or agents, meaning an object does more than modify human action—it acts,
too. Latour (2005) understands an agent to be anything about which one could answer
“yes” in response to the following questions: “Does it make a difference in the course of
some other agent's action...? Is there some trial that allows someone to detect this
difference?” (p. 71). A trial might be, for instance, noting the difference between hitting a
nail with or without a hammer, or simply that the presence of the implement makes a
difference. Latour states, “it does make a difference under trials and so these implements,
according to our definition, are actors, or more precisely, participants in the course of
action” (2005, p. 71). Objects may influence or act upon the world in any number of
ways—Latour lists “authorize, allow, afford, encourage, permit, suggest...” and more
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(2005, p. 72), as defined by effects, rather than intentions. Thus, objects have a distinct
place in the human social world as non-human actors.
Noteworthy verbs Michael uses to describe what the dildo does include: “bears
little resemblance,” “gives me... sexual capacity,” “pleased her,” and “sitting upright...
wearing one of my favorite neckties.” The dildo produces effects, making a difference in
the course of his action and others actions. In these examples, the dildo seems to be an
independent object, in contrast to other moments in which Michael describes it as a part
of himself, or as a possession belonging equally to himself and his partner. At times, the
dildo is part of Michael's body schema; at other times it is either too impersonal or too
imbued with its own agency to be a part of Michael. He attributes the effects of the dildo
to the object itself, rather than himself by means of the dildo, or perhaps the hybrid of the
combined intentionality of Michael and the dildo. Objects have other ways of
influencing the action of others (human or nonhuman/ other objects) than by extending
the body, and to become bodily extensions, they must do something more than influence
action. The next section discusses other conditions of object “in-corporation.”
Embodiment Relations
Ihde discusses two types of mediation, embodiment and hermeneutic, which seem
to usefully apply to this phenomenon. Hermeneutic relation refers to how technologies
change the ways in which we interpret reality, which has been discussed to some degree
already in this chapter. Technology here is something that interfaces with the body,
modifying felt body experience and how we live our bodies. Ihde (2002) calls these
“embodiment relations” and explains that a technology-body relation means
“experiencing something in the world through an artifact, a technology” (p. xi). Verbeek
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(2005) elaborates: “Human contact with reality is always mediated, and technologies
offer one form of mediation. On the other hand,… any particular mediation can only
arise within specific contexts of use and interpretation” (p. 11).
When one relates to an object via an embodiment relation, the object becomes a
medium of perceptual experience—one lives through the technology as one lives through
one’s body. The technological object is initially added to the body from without, but
becomes a part of the lived body. A classic example would be eyeglasses: one's visual
perception is changed by the lenses; one experiences the world through the glasses. They
become like a part of the body, both in that they are lived through, and in that they can be
forgotten and become a means rather than an object of perception (Verbeek 2005).
Heidegger discusses the transparency of tools when they are functioning properly, or how
they “withdraw” from attention (Ihde 2009). They are “ready-to-hand” and “make a
practice possible without themselves becoming objects of experience or action” (Verbeek
2005, p. 226). Practices may develop around the object or be guided by the object when
it possesses this transparency.
Another example of an embodiment relation could be the way wearing high-heels
changes the body gestalt, or Merleau-Ponty's example of a person with a feather in her
hat. The person navigates herself through a doorway without hitting the feather on the
door-frame, she has an awareness of the boundary of the feather like her awareness of her
body boundary; the feather is a bodily extension. A more familiar and comparable
experience for us might be driving a car through a tunnel:
A woman may, without any calculation, keep a safe distance between the feather
in her hat and things which might break it off. She feels where the feather is just
as we feel where our hand is. If I am in the habit of driving a car, I can enter a
narrow opening and see that I can 'get through' without comparing the width of
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the opening with that of the wings, just as I go through a doorway without
checking the width of the doorway against that of my body. (Merleau-Ponty,
1962, p. 165).
Merleau-Ponty explains that “the hat and the car have ceased to be objects” and are “no
longer perceived for [themselves]” but “[extend] the scope and radius of touch.” He
writes, “[The stick] is a body auxiliary, an extension of bodily synthesis” (p. 176). The
objects that were once distinct from the body become a means of experience. “In short,
embodiment or bodily intentionality extends through the artifact into the environing
world in a unique technological mediation” (Ihde 2009, p. 36). The object mediates
experience in a particular way, and by becoming so close to bodily experience, it
becomes a part of the body. “The artifact is symbiotically 'taken into' my bodily
experience and directed toward an action into or upon the environment” (Ihde 2009, p.
42). As Donna Haraway asks in her Cyborg Manifesto, “Why should our bodies end at
the skin?” (Haraway, 1991, p. 178).
Michael states: “It caught me by surprise how natural intercourse felt with this
strap-on device” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392). Michael did not expect something
external to his body to feel “natural,” yet this “device” is quickly incorporated. He is
surprised by how naturally something that was part of a world that seems to be outside of
his body becomes a part of his body, how easily his perceptual life adapts to this
variation. His body is not “fixed” but can be modified—not only that, but this seems to
happen almost effortlessly. To quote Merleau-Ponty on the blind man's ability to modify
his body to incorporate a walking stick: “Once the stick has become a familiar
instrument, the world of feelable things recedes and now begins, not at the outer skin
[…], but at the end of the stick” (1962, p. 175). The dildo has become familiar to
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Michael, and so it becomes part of his felt sense. The sensory world begins at Michael’s
body boundaries, which now includes the dildo.
Merleau-Ponty (1962) discusses “perceptual habits,” which are the result of
repeated practices. He explains that the blind man with a stick is not simply reading the
same sensations again and again when he uses his walking stick. Rather, with enough
practice, he is relieved of the necessity of conscious interpretation of these sensations, for
the stick becomes a means of perception. Merleau-Ponty writes, “The pressures on the
hand and the stick are no longer given; the stick is no longer an object perceived by the
blind man, but an instrument with which he perceives” (p. 176). The bodily field of
action and perception shifts in a particular way, whether this is a narrowing, expansion, or
intensification, or something else. Michael goes on to state: “I had not expected to
achieve an orgasm and was astonished that it happened” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392).
Michael is further astonished that his body can work with this device. To quote MerleauPonty again, “the stick is no longer an object perceived [...], but an instrument with which
he perceives” (1962, p. 176). His body truly does seem to end where the dildo ends; the
dildo is no longer a mere object. It seems that Michael expected using the dildo to be
awkward, unpleasant, and strange. He seemed to expect that it would not allow his body
to perform as it did before, that it could not do or achieve the same things, and is
surprised to find that his body is so adaptable.
Michael describes the development of this perceptual, embodied habit over time:
“Each time we use [the dildo], it becomes further imbued with the knowledge of the
previous sexual satisfaction it has provided” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392). The dildo
is becoming acceptable to Michael, a meaningful object. He has acquired a new
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perceptual habit and his perceptual field is altered. Although this seemed to happen for
him almost immediately, it seems that a further incorporation takes place every time
Michael uses the dildo. One might imagine that each time he uses the dildo, he is less
surprised by his ability to perform with it, and it becomes less of a separate object he is
“using” and more a part of him. Michael discusses his initial doubt about how the dildo
is not “innervated,” making him skeptical that it could bring him any pleasure. However,
the dildo has become “innervated” with memory, with imagination, with his own
perception.
This becomes yet more striking, as it seems Michael does not require skin contact
to experience the dildo as part of his body: “[...]There has now been enough acceptance
of the dildo as a sexual object—and transference from 'object' to 'organ'—that the visual
image of my partner mouthing the dildo was indeed highly erotic in the context of our sex
play” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 393). Michael brings a united sensorium to his
experience of sex play, vision and touch providing sensory data that is not objectified or
analyzed into these separate parts. In seeing his partner's mouth on the dildo, Michael at
once feels pleasure. “In the gaze we have at our disposal a natural instrument analogous
to the blind man's stick [...] To learn to see colours is to acquire a certain style of seeing, a
new use of one's own body: it is to enrich and recast the body image” (Merleau-Ponty
1962, p. 177). Like a child learning to distinguish categories of color, Michael has
learned a new way of seeing and a new use of his body—not only does the dildo feel like
a part of his body (as he says, it becomes an “organ”), but he sees it differently, and has
acquired a different sort of gaze. The dildo, as part of his body, goes from an object
external to him to something that is a part of him, or from something that is only seen to
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something that is both seen and felt. The dildo becomes a part of Michael's “body 1”
experience.

III. Mediation and Identity
Objects call forth new possibilities for the body, new or changed perception and
actions. How does the change in embodiment brought about by engagement with an
object affect one's sense of identity?
Multistability of Artifacts
Objects can have multiple meanings, so the way they shape or engage human
activity is flexible. Because objects are understood in relation to human beings, and are
thereby inseparable from their contexts, the identity of objects is based on how they are
used. Ihde (2002) calls this the “multistability of artifacts.” Multistability, or the
presence of multiple aspects, is defined by Wittgenstein (2001, p. 167): “I describe the
alteration (change of aspect) like a perception; quite as if the object had altered before my
eyes.... The expression of a change of aspect is the expression of a new perception and at
the same time of the perception’s being unchanged.” The object remains the same, but it
may be seen in various ways, or contains various possibilities. Ihde (2002) and Verbeek
both use the example of the Necker cube to explain multistability: “When we look at this
figure, we can see more than one thing... different ways of seeing produce different
figures. This figure allows multiple interpretations. What it 'really' is remains
undetermined. It is many things at once; it is 'stable' in multiple ways” (Verbeek 2005, p.
118). Different points of view, or different implied bodily locations or positions,
correspond to different aspects or variations.

40

Like the Necker cube, objects in the world have variations. We can liken the
multiple identities of objects or technologies to the multiple “things” we can see when we
look at a Necker cube. A Necker cube appears in multiple ways at once, so it has no
essential or true identity, but identities determined relationally (Verbeek, 2005). MerleauPonty notes that the different aspects of an object are only intelligible as the same object
because the body moves around this object in space: “I could not grasp the unity of the
object without the mediation of bodily experience” (2002, p. 235). The object does not
have a single preferred mode of existence (an “objective” existence), but finds stability in
whichever mode is presented by the body mediating the object in a given spacial and
temporal context (these modes are called “profiles” in a translation of Merleau-Ponty's
Phenomenology of Perception by Richard Rojcewicz).
This also includes cultural context; things are embedded in culture and derive
meaning from this relation. An object presents itself in different ways, for different kinds
of use, depending on its “materiality... bodily technique of use, and the cultural-historical
role this technology plays as a variant” (Ihde 2009, p. 18). In other words, how the object
appears depends on multiple contextual components. Ihde explains that multiple aspects
of an object (in his example, a bow and arrow as built and used differently by various
groups across history) come about in “differently structured lifeworlds relative to
historical cultures and environments” (Ihde, 2009, pg. 19). This way of understanding
technology relies on attending to the context of use, concrete practices around an object,
and the object as material. Verbeek (2005) elaborates: “The insight that technologies
cannot be separated from their use contexts implies they have no 'essence'; they are what
they are only in their use. A technology can receive an identity only within a concrete
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context of use, and this identity is determined not only by the technology in question but
also by the way in which it becomes interpreted” (p. 117). This context of use also
includes how the body comports itself to the object, or which profile of the object
appears, beyond how the object is interpreted according to cultural context.
So, what is Michael's interpretation of the dildo? That is, what are the variations
of it that Michael encounters, and what are the contexts that bring about these variations
or the point of view in Michael that allows him to witness these variations? For Michael,
the dildo takes on various meanings, and becomes more attached to particular meanings,
as it presents itself in different contexts and as Michael and his partner make use of it.
For instance, it is “a purple piece of plastic” when Michael first encounters it. This
description implies that it is an object distant from Michael—it is rather nondescript, and
this phrase offers no hint of it as a useful object, or even a complete object. It is a mere
“piece” of something. Later, Michael refers to it as “our dildo,” which implies a different
set of meanings—this is a shared object that belongs to Michael and his partner, it is a
link between them invested with care. Michael also refers to it as a “prosthetic penis” at
one point, and later, after Michael and his partner have taken up the dildo outside of any
medical context, he refers to it as a “toy”—not as a penis or penile referent. The question
of how the dildo relates to the penis and the contexts that determine this relation will
return in the next chapter; for now, it is enough to state that the dildo as an object has
multiple context-determined meanings.
A Different Body
Jensen (2009) discusses the importance of material objects in expressions of
gender and sexual identity. The body is not a vague abstraction which can only signify,
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but a lived material entity. He writes (2009, p. 52), “Identities, bodies, and material
artefacts all structure each other,” and offers the example of the relationship between a
marathon runner and her shoes: “In the short term, shoes afford running, in the long term
running re-shapes the body” (p. 52). Human bodies become the product of technological
objects, and human agency is shaped or mediated by non-human agents. Michael makes
use of the dildo, and over time, it shapes his body and world in a significant way,
including his gendered and sexed identity. His practices change in various ways. For
instance, he states, “I am able to continue pelvic thrusts long enough and hard enough
that [my partner] now regularly achieves orgasm in the missionary position” (Warkentin
et. al., 2006, p. 392). Michael also states (Warkentin et. al., 2006):
I... put on the dildo and harness ahead of time. I covered myself with a bathrobe,
but there was no mistaking the fact that when I looked down there was sticking
out what looked like a large firm erection... I felt joyfully empowered... My
thoughts went to a glib one-liner from my lesbian friend: 'A dyke with a dildo can
outlast a male anytime.' I realized that was equally true for a prostate cancer
patient with a dildo...” (pp. 392- 3).
Michael's sexual performance changes with dildo incorporation, but also his way of
seeing himself and the world. He feels empowered by his performance capacity, but
clearly different from how he felt about his body and performance when he had a prostate
and erections, or when he was not using a dildo. The next chapter will detail the
implications of this for gender identity in particular, but it seems that the repeated activity
of using the dildo has shaped not only Michael's body, but his sense of identity. Like
running shoes shape a person's actions and body such that she becomes a runner, the
dildo shaped Michael's actions and body toward a new sense of identity.
Verbeek (2005) describes Ihde's notion that technology “plays a constitutive role
in the production of scientific knowledge” (p. 144). He describes how technology allows
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for different sorts of perceptions than would otherwise be available—for instance, the
way in which a camera or a microscope enable human beings to perceive the world in a
different manner (Verbeek, 2005, p. 134). If mediated perception plays a constitutive role
in scientific knowledge, it seems that it would play this role in human knowledge
generally. Not only does Michael's embodied activity and perceptual world shift, but
consequently, Michael's knowledge about the world seems changed following use of the
dildo (and use of hormonal drugs). The “reality investigated” changes based on the
instruments used (Verbeek 2005); the instruments bring forth aspects of reality.
Michael's experience of reality changes greatly, particularly his experience of sex,
revealing a more complex world of sexuality than hegemonic standards imply (which
shall be elaborated further in chapter 4). Prior to prostate disease and using a dildo,
Michael “found it incomprehensible when a woman claimed she had pleasure from
sexual stimulation and yet had not had an orgasm” and that “sexual arousal that did not
lead to ejaculation was frustrating” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392). However, after
dildo incorporation, “I... could enjoy sex without orgasms. I can also have multiple
orgasms!” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392). Michael also states, “I find it easiest to
achieve orgasms when my partner wants me to... but far more difficult on my own”
(Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392). New aspects of the world, particularly of sexuality,
emerge for Michael.

Conclusions
Objects have an active role in shaping embodied identity (just as human beings
have an active role in creating the identity of objects). The dildo is no exception—it
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shapes and is shaped by Michael. It contributes to and changes his felt sense of his body,
and in doing so, changes his way of understanding himself.
The next chapter will further explore how physical embodiment relates to identity,
and will specifically address gender identity. Like the practices described in the previous
section on how a human being engaged in a practice shaped by running shoes makes her
a runner, it seems that there are practices which shape gender identity, which are,
necessarily, embodied. Michael provides a unique window into this phenomenon
because he presents a case of embodiment and identity in flux, in a moment when they
may be caught becoming. The next chapter will continue to explore the relationship of
the body to identity by exploring how a shift in embodiment seems to produce a shift in
gender identity for Michael.
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Chapter 3: Body Morphology & Gender Identity
[W]here is the self in relation to the body's surface?
– Jay Prosser, 1998, p. 62
This chapter is an inquiry into the relationship between the felt body and
discourses about the body, particularly as these pertain to sex and gender identity.
Michael's experiences and the phenomenon he presents in some ways reveal this
relationship. His body changes and so does his embodied sense of himself, including his
personal, sexual, and gendered identity. Michael thinks of himself differently and
encounters the world differently as he proceeds through a change in his physical body.
The previous chapter explains how Michael's experience demonstrates that one's identity
is lived out through the body and the extensions which become a part of it. This implies
that the body is not an object the self encounters, but the medium of lived experience.
The experience he presents in his narrative implies that identity and the body are
irreducible, or that they vary together. At the same time, however, Michael must learn to
live his new body. He searches for words to identify his experience and for discourses
matching what is happening to him. Michael's experience is of course not totally naïve;
rather, it takes place in a matrix of meanings he applies to himself.
This chapter is a continued exploration of the relationship between the body and
identity. It addresses discourses about gender and sexual identity as they illuminate the
case study phenomenon, as well as how the case study phenomenon challenges or
supports these discourses. Additionally, this chapter addresses tensions between theories
which present identity, and the body, as a product of language and discourse, and theories
which present identity as emerging from the body.
***
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This chapter makes use of a rather extensive list of terms to describe the body and
identity. For the purpose of clarity and to ensure consistency of use throughout, some of
the more stable terms are defined here, taken in paraphrase from Golombok and Fivush
(1994). Sex refers to biological maleness or femaleness, although the extent of what
belongs to “sex” is controversial (for instance, whether or not certain behaviors
associated with sex are biologically based). Which biological traits matter for
determining a person's sex seems unclear, too (Genitalia? Secondary sexual
characteristics like facial hair? Invisible characteristics like chromosomes and
hormones?). Gender refers to “social traits and characteristics associated with each sex,”
(Golombok & Fivush, 1994, p. 3) but this term is as controversial as sex, which reveals
that the concepts of sex and gender have unclear boundaries. Gender identity refers to a
person's sense of his or her own gender, and may or may not correspond to sex—for
instance, a biological female may be “masculine” or a biological male may be
“feminine.” A gender role includes behaviors or characteristics deemed appropriate for a
given sex; a gender role might be described as the gender others associate with a person's
sex, whether or not it matches the person's gender identity. Gender identity, then, may be
thought of as subjectively felt gender versus gender role which refers to socially
prescribed gender. Later on, this chapter will discuss the meanings of transgender and
transsexual identities. Finally, sexual orientation refers to a person's object of sexual
desire (whether the person is heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual, or something else).
Zita (1998) also describes this as socioerotic identity, based not only on erotic desire but
also on sexual behavior. It is based both what one feels and what one does, or both how
one experiences oneself and how one presents oneself to others (these two aspects of
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sexual identity may conflict, adding complexity to one's overall sexual identity). As the
attached illustration implies (Fig. 1), these aspects of gender and sexual identity exist
along continua. For instance, someone may have a male gender role but a gender identity
that is female, or somewhere between male and female, or one may identify as bisexual
but engage in heterosexual sexual behavior, and so on.
Like Hale (1998), this chapter uses these and other terms as approximations, or in
somewhat “primitive” ways (p. 341) to acknowledge that all of these terms contain
degrees of ambiguity, are used in multiple ways, and shift in meaning. Often there are
unclear borders between different markers of identity, particularly those categories which
have more recently emerged into language (for example, Hale, 1998, discusses the border
zone some find between butch lesbian women and ftms, or female-to-male transgendered
persons). Hale (1998, p.322) explains, “drawing a distinction between butches and ftms
in terms of masculine subjectivity threatens to elide both some ftms’ self-identifications
and some butches’ self-identifications relative to the categories 'man,' 'male,' and
'masculine.'” Thus, some of the definitions employed here are approximate, and
descriptive rather than categorical. This is not to say that these definitions are conflated,
but only that the distinctions between them may be made differently by different people,
and that some find themselves most at home in an ambiguous space between distinct
identity categories.
Another purpose of maintaining the ambiguity of identity categories is to remain
hermeneutically faithful to Michael's encounter with a changed sense of embodiment and
gender identity. For the most part, his narrative is descriptive in a way that suggests but
rarely names different terms or identity markers. For instance, at one point Michael
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states, “I can also have multiple orgasms! [...]My orgasms are less anatomically focused,
radiating across my pelvis” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391). He does not, however, call
his pelvic multiple orgasms female or feminine, nor does he compare his experience
explicitly with female experience, even if his statement here may suggest something like
this. Indeed, Michael's account seems to draw out some of the instability in various
categories related to gender and sexuality, perhaps already challenging theories in which
language is constitutive of experience, although the discourses from which these terms
emerge also present ways of understanding or putting language to Michael's experience.
This chapter will discuss these discourses and ways of understanding the
relationship between gender and the body, and will be placed in dialogue with the
phenomenon presented in Michael's narrative.

I. The Material Body and the Discursive Body
This section presents ideas about the ways in which the body is meaningful and
about the relationship between the body and one's identity. These ideas provide the
background for understanding the phenomenon described in Michael's narrative.
Discursive Body
This section elaborates a discourse about the body that regards it as fundamentally
discursive, or constructed through language and knowledge. Butler (1988) states that
“gender is instituted through the stylization of the body and, hence, must be understood
as the mundane way in which bodily gestures, movements, and enactments of various
kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self” (p. 519). This is to say, gender
has no ontological status—gender is an idea. This idea is taken up by the body through a
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set of acts that takes on the appearance of something with substance. It is an
epistemological category, a mere appearance that comes about from a way of thinking or
seeing (the seeing and thinking is primary here, and the appearance of a category
follows). With sufficient repetition, gender takes on the appearance of an enduring,
original component of one's body. Because gender comes about through acts, it has no
status prior to these acts (Butler, 1988).
These acts are ongoing and repeated. Young's work (2005) includes accounts that
may be read as the gendering of the body, or as descriptions of some of the acts that, as
Butler describes it, “stylize the body”: “When I was about thirteen, I spent hours
practicing a 'feminine' walk, which was stiff and closed, and rotated from side to side” (p.
44). This physical practice is a way of taking up a feminine gender, training a body to be
a woman's body. This practice is also a way of taking up a broader discourse about
femininity and what it means to be a woman in a particular social and historical context.
The modification or restriction placed on the way some bodies inhabit time and space
illustrates the notion that “performance renders social laws explicit” (Butler, 1988, p.
526). As an illustration of this idea, Bordo (2004) presents an exercise for men that is
meant to bring attention to “how female subjectivity is normalized and subordinated by
the everyday bodily requirements of 'femininity'” (p. 19). The participant is instructed:
“Sit down in a straight chair. Cross your legs at the ankles and keep your knees pressed
together. Try to do this while you're having a conversation... but pay attention at all times
to keeping your knees pressed tightly together” (Bordo, 2004, p. 19). Indeed, this
restriction of the body reduces the range of actions that are permitted or possible, and in
this way bodily actions are physical manifestations of oppression. The idea of a bodily
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“habitus,” Bourdieu's (1997) term, describes how bodily practices become persistent and
seem to have little malleability, even if there is no essential link between gender identity
and body. According to Packer (2010, p. 318),
Bourdieu defined habitus as embodied expertise: it is a set of dispositions that
incline a person to act and react in particular ways. Habitus is a way of standing,
talking, walking—and at the same time a way of feeling and thinking... It is
inculcated in that one’s habitus develops in childhood as the body is molded, and
as particular ways of acting, talking and so on become second nature. Habitus is
'embodied history.'
In other words, one learns a way of living one's body that permeates broadly and deeply,
affecting the ways one lives one's body. In sum, this is the way bodies are taken up by
discourses, and the way gender is inscribed upon the body. It should be noted that this is
not necessarily a permanent inscription or necessarily one that becomes complete at a
given point, as bodies change and gender (as well as other identity markers) is re-learned.
To elaborate further, this process provides the context in which bodies acquire
meaning, and is not merely a layering of meanings upon a body which already possesses
them. Butler states, “The body is not passively scripted with cultural codes, as if it were
a lifeless recipient of wholly pre-given cultural relations. But neither do embodied selves
pre-exist the cultural conventions which essentially signify bodies” (1988, p. 526, italics
added). In other words, bodies take on meaning within culture, and only become selves
in culture. This also means that sex is an effect of gender, rather than the other way
around. The physical body takes on certain meanings—one might think of the body as
the text and gender as the interpretation, but the interpretation comes first and the body
must act it out (Butler, 1988). Parts of the body become significant, inscribed with
meaning and definitive of a person of a certain sex/ gender. The claim, then, is that the
anatomical body with which a person is born only becomes significant in a context. In
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sum, according to this viewpoint represented here mainly by Butler, identity and the body
are products of language and discourse.
Material Body
This section explores another approach to the body which places emphasis on the
material or pre-discursive body, regarding the body as meaningful in a certain way before
it is invested with meaning through language and culture. In other words, the body does
not acquire meaning simply through language and discourse, but that the materiality of
the body is itself significant beyond its function as a surface for inscription.
Because the context in which bodies come to take on meaning influences how a
person comes to live and experience her body, it would seem that there are different
times/ spaces/ worlds for different kinds of bodies, and particularly, for differently sexed
bodies. For instance, someone with an anatomically female body who acquires an
understanding of her body and identity in a patriarchal context may live her body in a
restricted way, as suggested by Young (2005). Her way of engaging with the world
differs from those in male bodies or bodies in a non-patriarchal context. Grosz (1995)
states that, “it is not clear that men and women conceive of space or time in the same
way” (p. 100). She suggests that popular ways of understanding time and space contain a
sex bias, stating that it is also not clear “whether their experiences are neutrally presented
within dominant mathematical and physics models” (p. 100), and adds that an alternate
conception of space and time would make more sense out of women's embodied
experiences. Irigaray (1977/1993) also posits the idea that the world is structured
differently for female bodies than it is for male bodies, meaning that female bodied
persons structure the world differently. From males bodies follows a masculine logic
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(Irigaray, 1977/1993, p. 363):
“[T]he more or less exclusive—and highly anxious—attention paid to erection in
Western sexuality proves to what extent the imaginary that governs it is foreign to
the feminine. For the most part, this sexuality offers nothing but imperatives
dictated by male rivalry: the 'strongest' being the one who has the best 'hard on'...”
Irigaray's suggestion seems to be both that physical bodies, and especially the
body's sexual anatomy, contribute to how one engages with the world in a fundamental
way; that is, the structure of one's world (at least, or perhaps especially, one's sexual
world) is mapped onto a structure of one's body. The ways one thinks, understands, and
expresses oneself are significantly determined by one's body. It also follows, as stated
previously, that forces of oppression in the social world influence and restrict the way one
lives one's body—i.e., that there are specifically feminine ways of being that have been
suppressed by dominant masculine being-in-the-world. The restricted range of motion
Young (2005) discusses in the example above of “feminine walking” (as well as in her
other writings, particularly in the essay Throwing Like a Girl, 2005) is merely one piece
of visible evidence of a total restriction on female bodies and worlds. According to
Irigaray: “if we refrain from invoking the hystericization of her entire body, the
geography of her pleasure is far more diversified, more multiple in its differences, more
complex, more subtle, than is commonly imagined” (1977/ 1993, p. 366). In other words,
and in contrast to Butler's account, female bodily experience contrasts significantly from
male body experience not only in that it is restricted by oppressive conditions, but also
differs essentially by virtue of how the body is structured (and not merely how this
structure is taken up in social context). This difference would be even more obvious if
female experience were allowed to manifest itself unrepressed. Female experience,
however, takes place in a patriarchal world which renders it as pathological. This world
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sometimes even equates femininity with the pathological, damaged, or weak, or simply
leaves female experience unintelligible or invisible. A person is her embodied
experience, and this experience is misinterpreted or perverted by popular, patriarchal
discourse.
In contrast to Butler, Irigaray suggests that gender and sex have an ontological
status, and are linked. This account also suggests that feminism's primary task (at least
politically) should be liberating female bodies/ female sexuality from dominant
masculine (“phallogocentric”) influences so that its full unrepressed essence can emerge.
This is a different aim than the one suggested by Butler (1990), which entails creating
“gender trouble”—revealing gender as a constructed rather than natural category by
highlighting its ambiguities and performativity.
***
These divergent accounts leave the body ambiguous. While it is clear that identity
and the body are always in relation, it is not clear how. That is to say, it is not clear
whether, on the one hand, the body has a natural or perhaps authentic trajectory which
must only be released from constraint, or whether, on the other hand, the body is a
template for cultural inscription that in an important way only comes to be through and
following this inscription.
It is also unclear whether identity—one's felt sense of gender identity, the way one
shapes and encounters the world—proceeds from the body or is taken up by the body
through repeated, formative acts. In other words, while there is certainly some
relationship between the self and the body, or a way in which the self is the body, a
number of questions remain about the way in which this is true. It is also worth noting
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that both ways of seeing the body offer pictures of body and identity as irreducible or as
parts of a co-constitutive entity, both also have points at which they risk slipping into a
dualistic idea of self and body as separable.
This rest of this chapter interrogates the contrasting accounts of sex and gender as
ontological and essential versus the idea that gender is an epistemological category of
which sex is an effect, as informed by Michael's experience.

II. Penis and Phallus: Body Parts
If the structure of one's world is based on the anatomical structure of one's body,
as suggested by Irigaray and in different ways by others, then do some parts of the body
matter more than others for this purpose (such as the “two lips” and “mucous
membranes” that Irigaray (1977/ 1993) writes about)? Do visible, or sometimes visible,
signifiers of sex—breasts, penises, facial hair—matter more than aspects of sex that are
internal or invisible, like hormones or genes? Furthermore, what, if anything, about a
penis is essentially masculine (alternately, what about masculinity, if anything, is
essentially phallic)? How are we to understand self-identified men without functional
penises, as one might view Michael and as he may view himself, or self-identified
women whose bodies have penises, perhaps because they are in the process of male-tofemale transgender surgery, because they possess instrumental additions (as discussed in
the previous chapter), atypical genetics, or because they simply identify as women while
having bodies others may regard as male? How do body parts shape experience?
Overdetermination of the Penis
The penis seems to be the human body part most inscribed with cultural
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significance, the part most identified with the whole. Ihde (2002), in an attempt to
elaborate male bodily experience in a specific and self-aware way (rather than presenting
masculinity as the unquestioned norm for all human experiences), states that “the penis is
haunted by the phallus” and that the penis “must live up to the phallic cultural
expectations” (p. 28).iv In other words, the penis as a signifier or product of discourse and
the penis as a material body part have a gulf between them, with a demand that the latter
approximate the former. This divide corresponds to Ihde's “body 1” (the sense of being a
body and lived experience) and “body 2” (the culturally constructed significance of the
body, as well as the objective physical body), discussed in the previous chapter. The
cultural treatment of erectile dysfunction as a failure of masculinity (and the attention
paid to the erection as the focus of sexuality in Western culture, as pointed out by
Irigaray, above) attest to Ihde's (2002) claim.v The penis becomes a symbol of power,
redefined as “the phallus,” and is associated with masculinity. Annie Potts (2000, p. 86)
states, “The penis is distanced from its purely anatomical functions of urination and
insemination and comes to stand as an object. This displacement permits the penis to
represent the phallus at a symbolic level and vice versa.” Grosz (1990) explains “The
phallus functions to enable the penis to define all (socially recognized) forms of
sexuality” (p. 117), either by its presence or absence, sustained erection or failure to
achieve and sustain erection. The demand that the penis live up to the phallus, and that
all sexuality be defined by the penis (that is, by its presence or absence, functionality or
failure) places barriers on the imagination and bodily adaptation humans are capable of
bringing to their sexuality. In this way, the penis is overdetermined and given symbolic
meaning apart from its materiality.vi
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Before trying out the strap-on, Michael is “afraid that [he] would feel foolish and
humiliated by using a strap-on penis” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391). He adds that this
would mean confronting the “functional failure of [his] own flaccid phallus” (Warkentin
et. al., 2006, p. 391). He feels that his penis is not living up to the phallic ideal and
Michael himself feels like a failure, translating his physical inability to a symbolic failure
to meet the ideal. Michael worries that someone he knows will discover him purchasing
the strap on and mock him (Warkentin et. al., 2006), i.e., that society will judge him as
sexually inadequate or inadequately male. At this point, the dildo is to Michael, “a strapon penis”; it is a direct replacement for his own penis which he regards as inadequate or
missing. It also seems, at this point, that the forms of sexuality Michael recognizes are
defined by the phallus. He feels that with a functioning erection, prosthetic or not, he is
sexual, but without it he is “sexually incapacitated” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 390).
This idealized, symbolic, discursive phallus is only male by association, however.
Butler (1993) suggests that the phallus is not essentially male: “Precisely because [the
phallus] is an idealization, one which no body can adequately approximate, the phallus is
a transferable phantasm, and its naturalized link to masculine morphology can be called
into question through an aggressive reterritorialization” (p. 86). That is to say, although
the phallus is linked with or even equated with the penis, this is a cultural link rather than
a natural one, and an ideal which the penis (or any body part, if one were to select some
other body part as a symbol of power) cannot carry out. It seems, then, that the phallus
could belong to or be applied to any body, and be taken up as a component of anyone's
embodied experience. Indeed, “The phallus is a mythical construct... even if more
dominant in certain configurations than others, nevertheless spills over clear and clean
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boundaries” (Ihde, 2002, pp. 29-30).
While the power associated with the phallus seems to accrue in male bodies, it is
not essentially male and is certainly accessible from non-male bodies. Butler notes that
many body parts may function as phalluses but only the penis becomes a symbol of
phallic power (Butler, 1993). One might even say that masculinity, insofar as masculinity
is synonymous with phallic power, is not essentially male. Ihde offers the simple
example of a female university president having “enough 'balls' to carry the day” to
indicate that “the phallus is not simply male” (2002, p. 29). Indeed, power is not
essentially located anywhere. Halberstam (2011) suggests the dildo as a more accurate
symbol of phallic power than the penis, as power and dominance are present in different
bodies at different times—the phallus is detachable.
Re-Orienting the Body
If the penis as a representation of phallic power differs from the embodied
experience of having a penis, then it is a mistake to too readily equate the penis with the
phallus or with masculinity, the phallus with the male, and the male with the penis or with
the phallus. The meanings attributed to male bodies, and particularly to male genitalia,
may be taken up by non-male bodies. “Cultural genitalia” (as defined by Prasad, 2009)
differs from “physical genitalia—the anatomical possession of a vagina or a penis” (p.
242) and provides a basis for describing how features associated with one kind of body
may be taken up by other kinds of bodies. Cultural genitalia is “assumed to exist... as
evidence of 'natural sexuality,” so that “even if the genital is not present in the physical
sense, it exists in a cultural sense if the person feels entitled to it and/or is assumed to
have it” (Prasad, 2009, p. 242). This means that not only is the phallus transferrable, but
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that the penis (and vagina, and by extension, other body parts associated with sexed
bodies) is also transferrable. In other words, one may experience a gender identity and/
or live a gender role or socially assumed gender that does not match the sex and gender
assigned to one at birth. Prasad (2009) uses this idea particularly to refer to male
lesbians, suggesting that males who identify as lesbian could “take on the cultural
meaning of a vagina” (p. 243) without alternations to their physical morphology.
Michael discusses “reconceptualizing the situation” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p.
391) once he acquires the dildo. Michael seems to be altering his body on the discursive,
symbolic level. He determines that the dildo is not a “'cure' for ED” and is not “a medical
appliance” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391), meaning the dildo is not a means of curing a
physical disease. Rather than trying to replace his penis or act as though his sexuality
were unchanged, Michael takes on a different orientation toward the dildo and sexuality.
He de-links the dildo from the penis and stops thinking of his identity and sexuality in
terms of his ability to sustain erections. This is quite remarkable, given the power of the
penis to define and determine the limits of sexuality. Michael and his partner are
somehow able to circumvent this imposition on their sexuality (the role of Michael's
partner in this event is elaborated in the next chapter). Rather than work in the context of
phallogocentric imperatives, Michael decides that he is “heading into the theater of the
absurd, and [is] going to play the part of the lesbian!” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391).
Michael re-orients his body toward a new kind of sexual identity, developing what
Halberstam (2005) might call a “queer” orientation to the world, defined as
“nonnormative logistics and organizations of community, sexual identity, embodiment,
and activity in space and time” (p. 6). This is a different way of living one's body and
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world outside of expected or naturalized roles.
While these orientations are embodied or lived through the body, they are not
linked to the body in a singular or essential way. Orientations “involve directions toward
objects that affect what we do, and how we inhabit space” (Ahmed, 2006, p. 28).
Orientations “line up” or pull us in various directions. These accounts, rather than
positing a male body experience and a female body experience, one kind of femininity or
masculinity, or desire as lining up in only a certain way (i.e., in a heterosexual or
“straight” way), instead allow for multiple kinds of embodied experiences or “pulls” and
identities. For Michael, thinking of dildo use as something “completely different” from
his sexual activity prior to prostate cancer treatment leads him to experience a shift in his
personal identity, gender identity, and sexual orientation in terms of how he inhabits his
sexual body and space (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391).
It seems that the answer to the question posed at the beginning of this section is
that the physical body and identity have no necessary connection. This kind of
reconceptualization allows for bodies made up of combinations of aspects or parts that
are not typically thought of as belonging to the same body. Zita (1998) notes that “the
disarticulation of modernist body paradigms allows for new sexes, sexualities, and
genders that can dislodge the signs of gender and sexuality from the trump of genital
signification” (p. 82). By thinking of the body not as a natural unity, but an assemblage
of parts that are put together personally and culturally into an apparent whole, the body
becomes “capable of disassembly and rearrangement” (Zita, 1998, p. 81). Like Donna
Haraway's cyborg, these bodies are “ambiguously natural and crafted” (Haraway, 1991, p.
149), making sex and gender also ambiguous and malleable, leaving open new
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possibilities for ways to be embodied or identify oneself.
This opens up, for instance, an option for vulnerable (non-phallic) male bodies
that are not read as feminine, but simply a different kind of male body (Thomas, 2002,
Halberstam, 2002). This also allows for different categories, based on putting together
ideas that are presumed not to go together—i.e, having a male body and lesbian desire.
In order to recognize a male body as lesbian, we could “overlook the body as we
habitually read it and attend to other evidence of sex identity” (Zita, 1998, p. 100), i.e.,
how the male understands himself and experiences his body, in which case
...the penis is not disposed of, but its significance is deposed: it is no longer the
phallus. It remains an appendage, useful perhaps, interesting perhaps, a location
of pleasure like the clitoris, but a perforate clitoris with some optional functions
(Zita, 1998, p. 100).
Dissociating the penis from the phallus, or the penis from the idea that the penis has come
to represent, opens up a range of possibilities for interpreting other parts as the phallus, or
re-interpreting the penis as something else. This also seems to privilege the felt or
experienced body over the body as interpreted by othersvii; that is, this way of thinking
about sex and gender demands that we change our way of viewing a body to match what
that body feels (or at least, prefers to be viewed as) versus basing our way of viewing a
body on what it looks like, or is presumed to look like if we could see beneath its
covering.
Zita (1998) explains that “this is an ontological shift into the 'opposite' sex
category, not a masquerade of belonging to it” (p. 106, italics added). In other words,
insofar as one can be male or female, “male” lesbians are female. This does not refer
only to how others view a body, but how that body itself experiences the world. “[T]he
very idea of a male sexual identity produces sensation, produces the meaning of
61

sensation, becomes the meaning of how one's body feels,” (Stoltenberg cited by Zita,
1998, p. 96). “[T]he sensations derive from the idea” rather than the anatomy
(Stoltenberg cited by Zita, 1998, p. 97). An idea (or a discourse) can re-orient the body in
ways that go beyond appearance to experience. Although the body and sex identity are
not essentially linked, sexual identity labels are still meaningful as lived categories and
even productive of lived experience.
A debatable and problematic implication of this argument (which will be
discussed further later on in this chapter) would be that altering the body's physical
morphology to better fit bodily contours associated with another sex is for the sake of the
interpreting audience more than for the sake of the person altering her body. This
argument implies that changing body morphology is not necessary to take on a different
sex (or that it is only one way to take on a different sex), or perhaps the function that a
change in the physical body serves has more to do with others’ perceptions or with
passing (i.e., being accepted as a lesbian by one's community or potential partners, being
allowed into women only spaces, being regarded as a female by strangers) than it does
one's embodied feeling. Being female is defined here as an embodied feeling that
corresponds to no particular external morphology, except by association. As Zita (1998,
p. 86) asks, “Why should we privilege genital anatomies in defining the truth of our
sex?,” or broadly, the truth of our identity?
The following subsection will discuss how this view of the sexed body and
identity applies to how Michael takes up the strap-on dildo.
Dildo Dissociation
If the penis is not essentially male, and if the morphological form of the penis can
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be read and interpreted as something other than a penis, and if body parts other than the
penis can be phalluses, then surely the dildo can also have multiple meanings. In her
aptly titled essay, “Dildonics, Dykes, and the Detachable Masculine,” Hamming (2001)
suggests that although the dildo seems to imply a male body, “it has the potential to be
recoded as a post-gender, non-phallic signifier” (p. 330). In other words, the dildo can be
thought of as a bodily supplement rather than a replacement for a lack (i.e., the lack that
is present in the “castrated” female, as in Freud's theory of psychosexual development, or
a male without the ability to have erections who regards himself, like Michael does at
first, as a “functional failure”). The dildo should not be equated with the penis, or even
with the phallus.
This means that lesbian sex with a dildo is not an imitation of heterosexual
intercourse (or at least, not unless this is the case in the shared fantasy emerging between
sexual partners), but rather, the lesbian is a “cyborg” with “gender flexibility” who can
use the dildo as a “prosthesis” (Hamming, 2001, p. 330). In this understanding, the dildo
is an interchangeable part that belongs to no original whole that a lesbian can use to
transform her body at will. It may even be used to express “female transsexual desire,
however temporary or continuous,” (Zita, 1998, p. 101), also suggesting that dildo use
may sometimes be a voluntary and temporary transformation. This seems to be the
model of sexuality that Michael's lesbian friend presents to him when she “insisted that
[Michael] consider [the dildo] 'a toy'” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391).
Michael's approach to selecting a dildo at the sex shop reflects the notion that the
dildo is not a replacement penis, and therefore is not affiliated with any particular body.
Michael observes that the dildo he selects “is appropriately stiff, yet still flexible, like a
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natural erect penis” but that otherwise his dildo “bears little resemblance to a human
penis” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391), suggesting that it is something else entirely.
Similarly, for Michael, sexual activity with the dildo is “something completely different”
that is not “meant to restore [his] masculine sense of sexuality” (Warkentin et. al., 2006,
p. 391). For Michael, the dildo is not a prosthesis for performing masculinity, but a
means of changing his horizon of sexual experience. “The dildo acts as a post-gender
prosthetic” (Hamming 2001, p. 337, italics added), meaning that neither Michael nor
lesbian women who use dildos are necessarily playing at being men when they use
dildos. Instead, they may present “the dildonic body as altogether different” (Hamming,
2001, p. 337).
In interviews with FTMs, whom one may expect to challenge the idea that the
penis and dildo are genderless, Lee (2001, p. 354) also concludes that “being a man” does
not require “having a penis.” It seems that having a penis is not essential to masculinity
for these interviewees. She reports that, among her participants, “None had undergone
surgery to acquire a penis and, although all reported that they would undergo this surgery
if the cost was reduced and the techniques were improved, none considered that being
without a penis made them 'any less of a man'” (pp. 354-55). Masculinity is not an effect
of bodily contours.
Lee states that these FTMs “appropriated the dildo as an extension of their own
penis” (p. 355). In other words, they already experience themselves as having penises,
and regard surgery as an unnecessary but possibly welcome secondary step, corroborating
the notion that felt experience derives from an idea or discourse. This transsexual
experience seems quite similar to Michael's experience in that the dildo is experienced as
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a part of the body and extends the body. It differs, however, in that Michael does seem to
regard the dildo as essential to his sexuality in the absence of his former sexual body.
This also seems to imply that the FTMs in this example do not regard themselves as
missing anything (or at least, anything essential to their identities), whereas Michael felt
damaged or incomplete without either his erection or the dildo, and does feel like less of
a man without an erection (although when he incorporates the dildo, he regards himself
as transforming into something different than a man and does not present this
transformation as a loss). This alternative transsexual discourse that is more comparable
to Michael's experience is discussed in the next section of this chapter.
Michael's ability to adapt and incorporate the dildo and undergo sexual
transformation suggests that he possessed the capacity for a different bodily schema, or
for a different perceptual field. Michael seems quite comfortable in what he identifies as
a lesbian role, perhaps even more comfortable than he was in his role as a potent male.
Indeed, Michael seems to have exchanged his masculine sexuality, “the product of
phallocentric imperatives” (Potts, 2000, p. 88) which constitutes masculine sexuality as
“hard and fast: it strives to achieve the powerful proportions and position of the phallus”
(Potts, 2000, p. 88), for a new, more experimental sexuality. Both his new, post-gender
sexuality and his prior hegemonic, functionality-focused masculine sexuality are
variations that Michael is able to embody.

III. Transsexual Bodies and Transformations
Halberstam's (1999) statement, “we are all transsexuals” summarizes much of the
argument in the previous section (including those aspects of the argument that are not
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about transsexuality directly). Heyes (2000) provides context for the meaning of this
statement:
Halberstam is concerned with identifying and making more inhabitable the spaces
between genders, bodies, and sexualities. Her theoretical inclination is always to
detach one identity label from another, to point to the erasure of experience and
possibility that any reduction causes, most notably the reduction of masculinity to
an effect of male bodies (p. 178).
As “genders, bodies, and sexualities” can be matched and changed any imaginable way,
categories disappear and transsexuality becomes a metaphorical idea, or a boundary
concept meant to represent this sex and gender flexibility. When one recognizes the
naturalized associations between identity markers as such, it becomes apparent that this
flexibility exists for all bodies and identities. “[W]ithin a more general fragmentation of
sexual identity, the specificity of the transsexual disappears... we are all transsexuals”
(Halberstam, 1999, p. 126).
Kate Bornstein's experience of her transsexuality supports the idea of transsexual
desire as representative in the way Halberstam frames it. Bornstein presents
transsexuality as “a desire for transformation itself, a pursuit of identity as a
transformative exercise, an example of desire itself as a transformative activity” (Butler,
2004, p. 8). She does not have “a simple desire to conform to established identity
categories” (Butler, 2004, p. 8). Bornstein writes, “'I'm told I must be a man or a woman.
One or the other... Don't question your gender any more, just be a woman now—you
went to so much trouble—just be satisfied. I am not so satisfied'” (cited in Halberstam,
1999, p. 131). Butler (2004, p. 65) elaborates: “there is... a serious and increasingly
popular critique of idealized gender dimorphism within the transsexuality movement
itself,” invoking Bornstein's argument “that to go from F to M, or from M to F, is not
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necessarily to stay within the binary frame of gender, but to engage transformation itself
as the meaning of gender.”

In other words, transsexuality is the practice of undoing the

binary categories of gender and desire and undoing the idea that certain terms or ways of
being naturally go together (i.e., male body, masculinity, heterosexual desire for female
bodies, etc.). As Hale (1998) explains, “Masculine subjectivity cannot be simply reduced
to self-identification as a man, for not all ftms self-identify as men in any simple,
nonproblematic way” (p. 321). Given the ambiguity of sex and gender, and the diversity
of human experience, it seems that transsexuality is not necessarily a matter of having a
body that is one sex while wanting to have the body of the other sex.
Body Malleability
However, the deconstruction of sex and gender in general, and this way of
discussing transsexuality in particular, raises some problems (some of which are already
beginning to emerge in the discussion above). At the most extreme, the lack of essential
connection between body and identity or body and meaning (i.e., different body parts can
mean different things, there is no particular meaning necessarily assigned to a part)
suggests a kind of dualism or denial of the significance of the material body (Grosz,
1994, Zita, 1998). As Bordo argues (2004, p. 226), “here is where deconstruction may
slip into its own fantasy of escape from human locatedness... adopting endlessly shifting,
seemingly inexhaustible vantage points.” In other words, framing the body as mutable
and open to an endless range of readings seems to be an abandonment or annihilation of
the material body, “treat[ing] the body as immaterial to (or an infinitely malleable
accessory of) identity” (Hausman, 2001, p. 474). If the body may be conformed to any
identity, then specific, material bodies seem to be secondary to or even irrelevant to
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identity. Not only does this lose the idea that human beings are their bodies, but it seems
to overlook aspects of human experience that do not fit this discourse—e.g., Michael's
experience, mentioned above, that not having an erection does make him less of a man, or
the experience of a transsexual who does want to alter her or his body contours.
This dislocation also contains the problematic suggestion that gender identity,
sexual identity, and perhaps sexual orientation may be adopted voluntarily, i.e., if there is
no link between the body and identity, one may choose one's identity and one's body and
alter these at will. One of the problems with the notion of sex and gender voluntarism is
that it does not necessarily challenge hegemonic categories of sex and gender.
Halberstam (2005, p. 18) asserts that gender flexibility and resistance to “labeling,”
should not be regarded as a “sign of progress and liberation” because these qualities do
not, in fact, challenge heteronormativity and rigid sex and gender categories. Rather,
gender flexibility is a valuable commodity in that it indicates a willingness to behave as
an ideal consumer ready to adapt oneself to any trend. In sum, fluidity points to a lack of
substance.
Grosz (1994) articulates the problem with regard to sexual difference:
I am reluctant to claim that sexual difference is purely a matter of the inscription
and codification of somehow uncoded, absolutely raw material... That is to deny a
materiality or material specificity and determinateness to bodies... It is to make
them infinitely pliable, malleable (p. 190).
On the other hand, “Bodies are not fixed... Differences between bodies, not only at the
level of experience and subjectivity but also at the level of practical and physical
capacities, enjoy considerable social and historical variation” Grosz (1994, p. 190).
Things which seem unchangeable or impossible in one sociohistorical context are entirely
possible in another, suggesting an incredible variation in bodies and in sexuality. This
68

implies that while bodies across time and place may have incredible variations, individual
bodies are not infinitely flexible. The body's inscription with sex identity does not imply
“a protean self ambulating between 'positionalities'” (Zita, 1998, p. 107); the body is, in
fact, “located” not only spatially but historically.
Michael's transition to using the dildo is not a simple, fluid transition of the sort
which suggests that sexual and gender identity may be exchanged voluntarily, nor that the
material body is irrelevant to how one understands or constructs one's identity. His
transition requires courage and imagination, and a long process of “reconceptualizing...
sexuality and gender performance” (Wassersug, 2009, p. 2). In addition, it requires
Michael to learn how to live his body differently, implying that gender performance here
constitutes a body 1viii change. In other words, Michael's transition to using the dildo is
also a transition in terms of how his body feels and how he experiences it, in addition to
coming up with new concepts or language to describe his experience. While the dildo is
detachable, Michael's association with it is neither voluntary nor temporary—once
Michael has incorporated the dildo into his body and into the sexual world he shares with
his partner, it remains a part of him, even if his flesh is not in direct contact with it. He
reports an anecdote that took place after the dildo had been part of his life for some time:
“in order to tease me, my partner started playing with the dildo in a flirtatious fashion... I
found the activity erotic and sufficiently distracting that I had to ask her to stop so I could
concentrate on what I was doing” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 393).ix Bodies and
identities change but are not interchangeable.
Return of Sex
Based on this apparently overlooked significance of the material body, one might
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ask, in Jay Prosser's (1998) words,
if sex as much as gender is performative, an effect of our doing not a fact of our
being (“gender all along”), how can we conceive of the transsexual as intervening
in sex at all? If there is no sex left over, no immanent sexed part of the self that is
not already gender, what substance is there for the transsexual to change? (p. 64)
Indeed, what is the “leftover substance”? If any body can be adapted to any
identity without physical alteration (as in the case of Zita's male lesbians), then sex
change would seem to be mainly about aiding others in correctly interpreting a person's
sex and identity, and therefore, in becoming more accepting of the person's desires and
gendered expressions. The sex change will reduce the “imposition of other-extending
attributions that 'sex' the flesh” (Zita, 1998, p. 107), or the way that others' interpretation
of one's body influence one's experience as male or female (for instance, if I am assumed
by others to be a man, my sexed experience is different than if others assume I am a
woman), and the individual's struggle against misinterpretation will decrease. The body
is altered for the sake of others to adhere to normalized categories, with the implication
that it would not be necessary to alter the body if society at large were more accepting of
a range of sex and gender identities, including a range of what, for example, a “male” or a
“lesbian” may look like. This also leads to the conclusion that transsexuals are sex and
gender conformists, willing to adopt culturally imposed categories for the sake of
recognition by others as their experienced sex or gender, rather than challenging the
rigidity of these categories and demonstrating, for example, the broad range of what a
“man's body” can be. This further implies that the surgery involved in a sex transition is
akin to cosmetic surgery, altering a surface for the purpose of looking more how one
wants to look, but without much effect on one's feeling of identity (Prosser, 1998). From
this perspective, altering sexually interpreted body parts seems less significant (i.e, this
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change makes no real difference, so it should not be so regulated) because these surgeries
are not necessary or do not feel necessary to the persons who undergo them.
An alternative interpretation of sex change that perhaps better accounts for why
someone would go through the process of body alteration would be that these persons are
demonstrating and reasserting the significance of sex, the body, and physical morphology
for reasons beyond how the body is read and responded to by others (rather than
undergoing unnecessary surgery!). Prosser (1998) writes, “In transsexuality sex returns,
the queer repressed, to unsettle its theory of gender performativity” (p. 27). As opposed
to Butler's formulation which “retain[s] a dualism of discourse and matter where matter is
posited as radically anterior” (Budgeon, 2003, p. 42), sex transition demonstrates the
significance of the body and reclaims the category of “sex” (hence reclaiming a sex/
gender distinction, rather than reducing sex to gender).
This further confirms that individual bodies are not entirely flexible and
malleable—sex and gender are not costumes that can be exchanged at will. Rather,
becoming a biological sex is a process, and a long-term, arduous one at that. The image
of a transsexual body in transition is not one of performance and play, but “a map of the
loss and longing that tinges all transsexual attempts to 'come home' to the body”
(Halberstam, 2005, p. 111). In sum,
[W]ords and cultural representations may have tremendous power in our lives, but
people live in real bodies made of substantial flesh, and those bodies routinely
carry more weight in people's perceptions of themselves and others than do words,
texts, or abstract discourses. (Devor summarizing Prosser, 1999, p. 207)
Our physical bodies are “not simply costumes for our experience of our bodies, our
theoretical conceptions of the body are foundationally formed by and reformative of
them” (Prosser, 1998, p. 96). As Colebrook (2000, p. 78) notes, “The body is, it is true,
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only thought after the event of discourse. But does this render the body itself an effect of
discourse?” In other words, experience of the body precedes organizing this experience
into existing discourses.
Schewe (2009), citing Lanei Rodemeyer, states, “the body is not simply
experienced through the medium of discourse, but rather... the body contributes to that
discourse as we try to write the narratives of our own identity,” (p. 684). Rodemeyer
(2012, publication pending) notes that the body overflows discourse: “the body
exemplifies the margins or demonstrates that which has been excluded, it stands both
within and without discourse at once” (p. 7). Beyond discursivity, the body “has its own
density as well, a density that sometimes can rupture discourse” (Rodemeyer, p. 8, 2012,
italics added). The substance that is left over, and that ruptures discourse, marks the gap
between sex and gender identity. The former is not reducible to the latter, and sex does
not only emerge from gender but vice versa.
Continuing to use transsexuality as a way to understand the relationship between
body and identity, what might be a better way to describe or understand transsexuality
than as a symbol for sex and gender flexibility? Prosser asserts that “being trapped in the
wrong body is simply what transsexuality feels like,” explaining, “body image is
radically split off from the material body” (Prosser, 1998, p. 69) and this dysphoria is not
overcome by reconceptualization alone (as in Zita's male lesbians). The transsexuals in
Prosser's work, feeling that “identity has... vacated... the body” (1998, p. 68), experience
a sharp divide between gender and the body's sex. Prosser (1998) points out that some
transsexuals simply want “to be,” rather than to subvert or perform, and to achieve their
desired sexed embodiment. One's sex is not an activity, but an achievement, the telos of a
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transition. For Prosser, transsexuality is a body 1 (see chapter 2) condition, affecting the
sense in which a person feels that she is her body and lives through it. “For if the body
were but a costume, consider: why the life quest to alter its contours?” (Prosser, 1998, p.
67).
Reconfiguration of the Flesh, Reconceptualization of the Body
The phenomenon Michael illustrates supports the notion that “gendered
becoming” involves “a refiguring of the sexed body that takes place along corporeal,
psychic, and symbolic axes” (Prosser, 1998, p. 67). Michael undergoes anti-androgen
hormone therapy and has his prostate removed surgically, a typical treatment for prostate
cancer. The “hormonal therapy” leaves Michael without a “functional...penis”
(Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391). His experience parallels Prosser's description of sex
change: “Hormone therapy begins this process, dramatically contravening the functioning
of the gonads, refiguring the body's contours, altering tissue structure...” (Prosser, 1998,
p. 66). Surgery continues the “transformation of the body's surface” (Prosser, 1998,
p.66), akin to how Michael describes the transformation of his body's surface via the
addition of the strap-on dildo. Michael's change follows a narrative arc, in which he goes
from calling the dildo “this piece of purple plastic” to “the dildo” to “my dildo,” (italics
added) at which point it is definitively a part of his body and his dildonic body and
identity seem to match (i.e., the dildo is not an alien appendage, and Michael is not
thinking of himself as a disfigured man with a prosthetic). This parallels the
“refiguration” the transsexual undergoes to, for instance, “name the somatic material
(skin, tissue, and nerves) transplanted from his forearm or his abdomen to his groin 'my
penis'” (Prosser, 1998, p. 67). This transformation happens not only through re-reading
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the body, but through changing the body itself.
What does the significance of the material body mean for sex and gender
identities, like Michael's, that do not fall into heteronormative or typical categories? In
response to the idea that one may feel like neither a man nor a woman, Schewe (2009, p.
684) argues in reference to Kate Bornstein that,
Bornstein nonetheless says she feels glad she had genital reconstruction surgery
“just for the comfort I now feel with a constructed vagina.” In other words,
Bornstein’s certainty that she is “not a man” comes from a very different place
than does her recognition that she is “probably not a woman either.” The former
may be understood as a truth of the body, a feeling deeper than intellect that has
existed for Bornstein since childhood, while the latter is an intellectual truth,
arrived at through reading and analysis.
Schewe implies that Bornstein has a true gender identity which may be discerned from
Bornstein's feeling of comfort with her constructed vagina, and assumes that this feeling
is more significant than and precedes Bornstein's sense that this change does not
complete her identity, that there is something more to her that does not fit the category
“woman.”
In contrast to the feeling-intellect binary Schewe invokes, Michael's experience
seems to be that his transition is a combination of changes to his body and deepening
self-understanding. Feeling an identity and learning an identity seem to coexist for him.
In Michael's case, however, this is not a transition from male-to-female, but a transition
from a body with a “functional penis” to a dildonic and post-cancer treatment body.
Another prostate cancer patient (“Dr. A”) who undergoes a similar hormonal treatment
with “emasculating effects” identifies as a “eunuch” or acquires a eunuch-body. He
comes to realize that “his sexuality no longer depends on a functional penis” and feels
“no longer driven in a narrow, testosterone- determined, direction to achieve orgasm
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through coitus,” and “relies instead on his hands and sex toys" (Wassersug, 2008, p. 635).
For both Dr. A and for Michael, transition involves changes to the body and deepening
understanding, leading to a change in experience. In addition, both of them maintain
their notion of manhood—they do not feel like they are still men but with different
bodies, they feel like they are something different than men.x Manhood and male bodies
remain linked for them and renegotiation involves narrating an identity that matches their
altered bodies.
It seems that Prosser's discussion of transformation applies to all kinds of changes
to the flesh, or all kinds of bodies “noncoincident with body image” (Prosser, 1998, p.
93), which also seems to mean bodies that do not feel whole to the person living them
(Dickemann, 2000). Indeed, there are many ways the body can feel incomplete or
mismatched that do not seem to fall into a sex binary. Hale (1998) argues for greater
“access to such medical technologies” and an end to regulations on sex transitions that
“position male and female embodiment as all-or-nothing and as intimately linked with
embodiments of dominant cultural norms of masculinity and femininity” (p. 334). For
example, “a butch dyke can obtain not merely breast reduction but breast removal and
chest reconstruction and a non- transgendered butch leather man may receive an
oriechtomy” (Hale, 1998, p. 334). That persons would desire such a change suggests that
changes to the flesh are important for alignment with identity—even if that identity is not
hegemonically recognized. Alterations to the flesh are not simply for the purpose of
conforming one's body to a recognized identity, but to one's own identity. Indeed,
[Prosser's] conception of borderlands as 'the uninhabitable space' between painful
wrong embodiment and home... leads to a binary consequence for border zone
dwellers: either we are seized by a figuration of transgender that elides our border
zone specificities, or we are thrown out of the realm of transgender and subsumed
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under the opposing sign. (Hale, 1998, p. 340)
In other words, those bodily changes that do not fit clear definitions are not recognizedxi,
although physical transformation may be important there, too.
As one's sense of self may lead to changes in the body, so do changes to the body
result in changes to a sense of self. An example would be “Audre Lorde’s account of the
violation of her self-identity in losing a breast to cancer, an opposite but parallel evidence
of the significance of skin, body, and sexualized body parts to our selves” (Dickemann,
2000, p. 464). Michael does feel “sexually incapacitated” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p.
390) and “mutilated” (p. 393) by the loss of his erect penis, and feels “restored” by the
dildo, but not to his former self—not to the same “whole” he was before. Michael
describes looking at himself wearing the dildo under a bathrobe, feeling “joyfully
empowered” after he feared the experience would be a “demoralizing” confrontation
(Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 393). Michael states: “I was playing a role and doing it better
than I ever could before I became impotent. I had acquired a performance capability that
surpassed 'male'” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 393). Michael implies here that he is more
capable in his role than he was as a pre-prostate cancer male. He seems more at home in
his body, and to be enjoying his body more, than he did even before his transition.
Transitions from one recognized sexual identity to another are not the only kind of
corporeal transformations that restore wholeness to a body.
Body Narratives Without Disembodiment
The reassertion of the importance of the material body, however, seems
paradoxically to contain its own risks of losing the significance of the body for identity.
Recognizing the significance of the flesh for identity does not require one to recognize
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traditional sex categories, but does it require one to maintain a disembodying divide
between body image and the substantive body?
Prosser's account of transsexuality presents a radical split between physical body
and body image. This suggests that identity is a disembodied phenomenon—one can
have an identity that does not match one's body. He offers the image of “the body as a
false outer casing with nothing inside” (1998, p. 68). Transsexuality is, then, an
experience of “wrong embodiment,” as described by Prosser, or of identity as divorced
from (one's) body. Theorizing transsexuality this way creates a split between the body
and identity and seems to undermine the significance of the body as a source of identity;
there is, according to this way of conceptualizing the self, a “me” that is not my body.
This split posits a body that “should have been” (Prosser, 1998, p. 83), suggesting that
there is a representational body prior to the physical body and creating a dualistic divide
between material body and felt identity.
This divide seems to conflict with a sense of identity as deeply embodied. Being
“trapped in the wrong body” is indeed the medical model of transsexuality's “most
famous rhetorical trope” (Prosser, 2005, p. 104), and reflects a dualistic theorization of
transsexual body experience. Deeply embodied identity seems to be closer to Michael's
experience, and suggests a different conceptualization. Michael seems to feel that his
body is wrong, and that therefore he is somehow wrong. That is, Michael's identity
transforms along with his body, to a limited (i.e., not infinitely malleable) extent. At the
same time, Michael goes from a sense of missing something (his sexuality, his erection)
to gaining something, though not a precise substitute for what he lost, as he describes it.
Michael's body narrative describes a gradual transition through different modes of
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embodiment, which includes changes in his physical body and different ways of thinking
about and experiencing his body. This transformation does not include anything “prior”
to the body, such as a sense of true gender that precedes his transformation (i.e., he is not
transitioning back into a man): “Neither the self nor the body can be chosen because they
are very often lived as though they are already there. The body is already the self. The
self is already the body” (Budgeon, 2003, p. 46).
How, then, can we theorize changes to the material body, like the one Michael
undergoes, which avoids a binary between representation and material? Presenting the
body as an “event” offers an alternative way of thinking about the body that preserves its
materiality without reducing it to discourse or to performance, and retains an emphasis on
narrative production:
...bodies are inherently implicated in the ongoing process of the constitution of
self-identity yet never wholly contained with the realm of representation... in
order to understand the ways in which [we] actively live [our] embodied
identities, we need to develop an approach which can envision a body beyond the
binary of materiality and representation—the body not as an object but as an
event” (Budgeon, 2003, p. 36).
An “event” refers to “the space in between subject and object” (p. 3, Mølbak, 2010). An
event is not located, but is a process that takes place in a “non-place” that privileges
neither the “objective reality” of “substance,” nor “subjective” experience (pp. 3-4,
Mølbak, 2010). The body is not simply material substance, nor is it simply interpretation.
Material body and representational body, subject and object, are together an irreducible
whole in ongoing development.
As suggested in the previous chapter, subject and object, or body and identity, are
co-constitutive. Regarding the body as an event avoids creating an opposition between
the discursive or representational, on the one hand, and the body as experienced on the
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other hand. Michael invokes different ways of understanding his body as it changes and
as he incorporates the dildo. This includes taking up different discourses and
performances, most prominently, “play[ing] the part of the lesbian” (Warkentin et. al.,
2006, p. 391). He also learns from felt experiences: “it caught me by surprise how
natural intercourse felt with this strap-on device” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391).
Neither discourses nor Michael's physical experience alone account fully for his
transition. Instead, we might view Michael as a “psychological subject who is always in
the process of becoming and does not interact outside of a particular interaction with the
environment... the sense of identity is not rooted within, but is the identity of a 'style of
becoming' or a series of transformations” (Mølbak, 2010, p. 6). Identity is an embodied
transformative process, taking place ongoingly in the world, and in the space between
material and discourse.

Conclusions
Neither identity nor the body preexists the other; instead, they form an irreducible
whole. A change in the body changes one's felt sense of identity. Altering the contours of
one's flesh may eliminate the sense that one's body, and therefore oneself, is wrong.
Michael's sense of his body as a failure meant that he also viewed himself as a failure.
Altering his body boundaries and applying a different discourse to his body (not one of
failed masculinity, but of alternative sexuality) allowed Michael to experience his body
differently. He came to experience the dildo as an appendage of his altered body rather
than a shameful prosthetic signifying bodily failure.
The next chapter elaborates the context in which this change comes about, as this
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process does not take place “inside” Michael. Rather, his transformation is permitted and
supported by others, particularly his partner. In other words, Michael's identity is not
located entirely inside the boundaries of his skin. Others provide a context in which
Michael can live his new sexual body.
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Chapter 4: The Sexual Body & Others
Let us try to see how a thing or being begins to exist for us through desire or love and we
shall thereby come to understand better how things and beings can exist in general.
– Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 178
This chapter addresses how a sexual body comes to be in the world. It continues
the notion that the body is an event, or, that the body (here, the sexual body specifically)
is in a continual process that involves not only self-narration but is held in place by the
world of people and things. It is an ongoing creation between subject and object,
between one's experience and the world in which this experience takes place. “The event,
as the basis of both subjective experience and objective reality, designates a 'happening'
that is not caused by a thing... and is not owned by a subject who is its agent or source”
(Mølbak, 2010, p. 3). Others take up the body as an object, and one's lived experience as
a body that exists on a continuum between activity and passivity, is significant in
sexuality as well as in developing and maintaining an identity.
This chapter is a response to Merleau-Ponty's question about “the relation
between sexuality and existence” (Stoller, 2010, p. 104). It critiques Merleau-Ponty's
specific notion of sexuality (as heteronormative, sexist, and able-ist) while staying with
the spirit in which Merleau-Ponty takes up his elaboration of “the body in its sexual
being.” This chapter builds upon Merleau-Ponty's elaboration to address how Michael's
post-prostate cancer sexual body emerges at the level of bodily sensation, as well as how
the emergence of this sexual body constitutes a change in Michael's identity.
I. Merleau-Ponty and the Sexual Body
In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty describes “how a thing or being
begins to exist for us through desire or love” as a part of his project to “elucidate the
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primary function where we bring into existence [...] space, the object or instrument, and
describe the body as a place where this appropriation occurs” (1962, p. 178). To
understand the body's hold on the world, Merleau-Ponty examines a particular kind of
hold; that is, he examines the kind of hold on the world present in sexuality. He states,
“sexuality, without being the object of any intended act of consciousness, can underlie
and guide specified forms of my experience” (p. 196).
Sexuality as a kind of force that “underlies and guides” existence contrasts with
ways of understanding sexuality that present it as a superficial or contingent aspect of
human existence. Merleau-Ponty (1962) presents sexuality as “interfused with
existence... so that it is impossible to determine, in a given decision or action, the
proportion of sexual to other motivations, impossible to label a decision or act 'sexual' or
'non-sexual.” (p. 196). Sexuality is a modality of existence, as opposed to a set of drives
or reflexive, physiological responses (Grosz, 1994). This also means that certain kinds of
injuries will have an effect on sexual life that one would not expect if sexuality were a
mere response to a physical stimulus, or a reflex, as Merleau-Ponty (1962) discusses in
the case of Schneider. Rather, sexuality is “co-extensive with life” (p. 196) and “It is at
all times present there like an atmosphere” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 195).
In Merleau-Ponty's view, sexuality is a part of expression in the world, not a
symbolic representation or cognitive function. It “condenses [a person's] basic mode of
relating to the world” (Heinämaa, 2003, p. 66), meaning particularly the world of others
and how one relates to them. It is not “self-enclosed” but “referential” and is “intentional
in the sense that it modalizes a relationship between an embodied subject and a concrete
situation” (Butler, 1989, p. 87). In other words, like other aspects of embodiment,
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sexuality takes place in the world and places one in relation to the world. Sexuality is a
way in which one is called into the world and shaped by the world.
The importance sexuality occupies in human life emerges from “a more general
drama which arises from the metaphysical structure of my body, which is both an object
for others and a subject for myself” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 194). Merleau-Ponty
(1962) writes that “sexual experience... [is] an opportunity... of acquainting oneself with
the human lot in its most general aspects of autonomy and dependence” (p. 194) and
“begins with the opening out upon 'another'” (p. 194). It is the mode in which one is
caught up in the world of others, thus a foundational aspect of human existence. Rather
than representations or reflexes, it is a foundational part of how a person lives from
moment to moment, with and as shaped by others. It follows that transformations to the
embodied self create transformations in sexuality, and the following shall explore how
Michael and others (including Merleau-Ponty's Schneider and persons whose bodies are
often miscategorized by others) are transformed sexually with a change in embodiment.
Schneider
Merleau-Ponty approaches the question of how the sexual body orients to the
world through the existential analysis of a case study of Schneider. Schneider is impotent
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 181). He is a 24-year-old man with brain injuries resulting
from being hit by “mine splinters.” These injuries result in “psychical blindness,” and
Schneider seems blind to a variety of images (Gelb and Goldstein, 1918/1974). As
Merleau-Ponty (1962) writes, “It was through his sight that the mind in him was
impaired” (p. 145). The observable result of Schneider's injury is an inability to perceive
holistically. Sensory data flows to him without meaning and objects become
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unrecognizable disparate bits. He suffers various “intellectual, perceptual and motor
disturbances” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 150) including “sexual inertia” and a generalized
lack of initiative (1962, p. 179). Schneider says with reference to his actions, “'I am
scarcely aware of any voluntary initiative... It all happens independently of me'”
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 120). Schneider is describing how the “intentional arc” which
“projects round about us our past, our future, our human setting, our physical,
ideological, and moral situation, or rather which results in our being situated in all these
respects” has, in him, “[gone] limp” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 157).
Because sexuality is continuous with existence, Schneider's sexual problems are a
component of his overall symptomatology. His problem manifests itself in his sexual life
in Schneider's seeming loss of all capacity for sexual satisfaction. In fact, “the very word
satisfaction has no longer any meaning for him” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 181). The
world of women's bodies does not call to him: “a woman's body has no particular
essence... physically they are all the same” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 180). Schneider “no
longer asks, of his environment, this mute and permanent question which constitutes
normal sexuality” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 181). This question presumably has to do
with whether the object he has settled his eyes upon is a sexually attractive object, or
perhaps a sexually available one. He does not see “the visible body... subtended by a
sexual schema... emphasizing the erogenous areas, outlining a sexual physiognomy”
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 180). The sensory data he perceives, particularly the visual
data, does not coalesce into a whole or an essence. As a consequence, Schneider “no
longer seeks sexual intercourse of his own accord” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 179) and he
has no interest in looking at pornography or attractive bodies or sexual conversation. It
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seems that “What has disappeared from the patient is his power of projecting before
himself a sexual world” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 181).
Sullivan (1997) elaborates that normally, human beings have a “centrifugal”
capacity for projection or to produce a “backdrop of a meaningful world against and in
which I live” (p. 2). Schneider's existence is centripetal and “operates against a given
background” (Sullivan, 1997, p. 2). That is to say, rather than providing his own
meanings, he accepts given meanings. Sullivan (1997) describes Schneider as
“constrained” and states that “the meaning of his world is that which presses in against
him” (p. 2). Similarly, once Schneider's sexual partners are no longer pressing against
him and producing sensation for Schneider, deciding for themselves that the sexual act is
over, Schneider does not pursue his own orgasm (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). Schneider's
sexual activity is not teleological—he does not appear to be concerned with orgasm (the
apparent meaning of “satisfaction” in Merleau-Ponty's discussion), nor is he an aggressor
sexually. His centripetal existence appears via Merleau-Ponty's descriptions as a
particular passivity. “Close physical contact causes only a 'vague feeling,' the knowledge
of 'an indeterminate something' which is never enough to 'spark off' sexual behavior and
create a situation which requires a definite mode of resolution” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, pp.
180-181). Because Schneider does not “require” a “definite resolution” to a sexual
situation, he “accepts and thus is restricted by the meaning his partner has given to [the
erotic situation]” (Sullivan, 1997, p. 2).
In sum, Schneider's abnormal sexuality is characterized by: a failure to view
women's visible bodies in a sexual way generally, a failure to enjoy pornography or to be
attracted primarily to the visual body (instead, “...it is, he says, pre-eminently character
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which makes a woman attractive” (Merleau-Ponty, p. 180)), not actively pursuing sex and
behaving passively in his role as a sexual partner, becoming aroused only in response to a
partner's initiation of sexual activity or primarily responding to his partner's desire during
sex rather than pursuing a desire of his own (although he will make “active movements...
a few seconds before the orgasm” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 179)—“Exactly how and why
a man who has no interest in sex has an orgasm, however brief, neither Goldstein and
Gelb nor Merleau-Ponty explain” (Grosz, 1994, p. 108)), and finally, by failing to
approach sex as a teleological act with the specific purpose of reaching climax. Based on
Merleau-Ponty's way of describing sexuality, Schneider seems to have become nonsexual, as the world has lost its “sexual context” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 181).
Normative Sexuality
Looking more closely at Schneider, however, it seems that Schneider's sexuality
has not vanished nor has he become asexual, but that his sexuality or the sexual
dimension of his existence has changed. It is, perhaps, unrecognizable as sexuality in
light of the normative sexuality implicitly posited by Merleau-Ponty. Specifically, it
seems that Merleau-Ponty's definition of normal sexuality refers to a style of sexuality
that generalizes its objects, is based on visual data, and is aimed toward orgasm, as well
as being a sexuality that belongs to a strictly heterosexual male.
Butler (1989) critiques this sense of “normal sexuality” set up in contrast to
Schneider. She notes that Schneider's deference in sex (described by Merleau-Ponty in
the statement, “if orgasm occurs first in the partner and she moves away, the half fulfilled
desire vanishes”) “signifies masculine 'incapacity', as if the normal male would seek
satisfaction regardless of the desires of his female partner” (Butler, 1989, p. 92). Indeed,
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this seems to be what Merleau-Ponty means that Schneider lacks when he describes
Schneider as “impotent” (p. 181).xii Butler (1989) also points out that Schneider's lack of
visual interest in bodies is presented as evidence of his sexual abnormality (i.e., his claim
that women's bodies look the same to him and that personality interests him instead, and
his lack of interest in pornography). “Central to Merleau-Ponty’s assessment of
Schneider’s sexuality as abnormal is the presumption that the decontextualized female
body, the body alluded to in conversation, the anonymous body which passes by on the
street, exudes a natural attraction” (Butler, 1989, p. 92). It also seems that this
anonymous body is what one may be drawn to in a given partner, in contrast to
Schneider's concern with the particularities of his sexual partners. The normal male
subject's “sexuality is strangely non-corporeal” by contrast (particularly strange in the
context of the significance Merleau-Ponty places on touch and bodily sensation, as
opposed to visual input), and Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the “visible body... subtended
by a sexual schema” (Butler, 1989, p. 93).
Butler (1989) also notes that Merleau-Ponty's description does not appear to
consider the experience of Schneider's sexual partner—“the erotic experience belongs
exclusively to the perceiving subject” (p. 93). However, it seems that the most
remarkable way in which Schneider's sexuality diverges from the norm Merleau-Ponty
establishes, or the most remarkable way that Schneider's sexuality changes following the
changes in his physical body, is that his sexuality has become relational in a way that it
was not before. It is not a production of the perceiving subject, but takes place between
partners. Schneider's sexuality takes place less “within” Schneider, and more between
himself and his partner—his sexuality is even more “in the world” (as in, it is less
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Schneider's and more an event between Schneider and another) than it was before his
accident. The female subject who is mostly absent as an actor from Merleau-Ponty's
account (“female bodies... have an essence which is itself physical [and] designates the
female body as an object rather than a subject of perception” and “she is never seeing,
always seen” (Butler, 1989, p. 94)) seems to play a significant, if not an orchestrating,
role in Schneider's sexuality.
Furthermore, Schneider acknowledges this. He admits that he is drawn to
women's characters rather than their bodies, emphasizing the significance of who his
partner is for his sexual response (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). He also reports that his partners
take the lead sexually, and that he responds to their desires. Rather than taking this as
evidence that Schneider is sexually repressed or otherwise damaged as a sexual body, one
may instead conclude that “Schneider is more true to Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological
account of bodily existence than Merleau-Ponty himself” because for Schneider, his
partner's body is “expressive of the life of consciousness” (Butler, 1989, p. 95).
Schneider's sexual partner's body is subtended not by a mere physical essence, but bound
up in her character, part of a subject whose sexuality, body, consciousness, and existence
are inseparable. This relational aspect of Schneider's sexuality, oddly missing from
Merleau-Ponty's presentation of normal sexuality, finds a parallel in Michael's
experience, detailed later on in this chapter.
Normative Bodies
In Merleau-Ponty's description (as well as in Western culture generally, as will be
discussed in the following chapter), a particular kind of sexuality is established as
normal, thereby excluding or pathologizing a number of other possible sexualities. In
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order to piece together this norm and gather “a concrete description of lived experience, it
seems crucial to ask whose sexuality and whose bodies are being described…” (Butler,
1989, p. 98). Before offering an alternative description of the lived experience of
sexuality, we must ask, whose body is the ideal body, or, whose body provides the basis
for normative sexuality?
In describing the significance of the sensory body in human experience, MerleauPonty (1962) writes,
“[If]... we conceive man in terms of his experience... his distinctive way of
patterning the world, and if we reintegrate the 'organs' into the functional totality
in which they play their part, a handless or sexless man is inconceivable as one
without the power of thought” (p. 197).
Merleau-Ponty is here making the point that a human being (or “man”) is not composed
of distinct parts which can be separated out, but that the body makes up a whole.
Cognitive abilities are neither separable from nor more important than physical sensation,
and cannot be pulled from a body as though cognition were the essence of what it means
to be human while the body was merely casing for thought. This idea contrasts with the
notion that cognition is a more significant component of human experience than any
other human component. This includes body parts—hands or genitals are no more
characteristic of what it means to be human than cognition. Therefore, a person missing
any of “his” component parts is no longer a “functional totality,” for all of these parts
contribute to “his distinctive way of patterning the world” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 197).
The problem, however, is that Merleau-Ponty implies a particular whole. While
Merleau-Ponty may not privilege cognition over body parts, he does seem to privilege
some bodies, body parts, or ways of living one's body over others. Sara Heinämaa
(2003), by way of Simone de Beauvoir, notes that the examples “hands” and “genitals”
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are misleading comparisons, as “genitals” is an ambiguous term: “All normal human
bodies have hands but not a similar or analogous 'sexual apparatus'” (Heinämaa, 2003, p.
87). To posit a single norm is to overlook the presence of two possible norms of the
human body—female and male bodies—and the female body becomes a deviation from
the male norm (Heinämaa, 2003). Bodies that fit neither of these norms, such as
intersexed bodies, are of course also excluded from the implied norm of embodiment.
Furthermore, the norm appears to be not only a male body, but a specific kind of
male embodiment which is “healthy, implicitly athletic,” “externally focused” and
“transparent” (“transparent” referring to the body as a means of action rather than an
object of attention, as described in chapter 2) (Ihde, 2002, p. 18). Beyond setting up a
normative sexuality by way of contrast with Schneider, “Merleau-Ponty sets up a
dialectic between what could be called a normative body experience and the pathological
experience that is only indirectly noted in his famous Schneider” (Ihde, 2002, p. 17,
italics added). The normative body “contrasts with the debilities of Schneider—but also
by extension with virtually any other form of unhealthy, or even less than wellconditioned sense of body” (Ihde, 2002, p. 18). Disabled bodies are also excluded from
this norm, for Merleau-Ponty posits that we all tend toward a particular body, that there is
in each of us “an I committed to a certain physical and inter-human world, who continues
to tend towards his world despite handicaps and amputations and who, to this extent, does
not recognize them de jure” (p. 94). The ways in which one diverges from this normal
body are presented her as absences or failures for which one strives to make up. In sum,
the “normal” body seems to exclude most bodies.
Merleau-Ponty overlooks the particularities of bodies, implying an ideal body or
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way of being embodied, such that most bodies (in particular, female bodies, bodies that
are not male or female or that are both, and disabled bodies of any variety) are only
recognizable as deficient, not as alternative embodiments. The bodies that neither fit the
ideal, nor which are attempting to approximate a “normal” human body, are absent from
Merleau-Ponty's discussion. There is still room, however, to understand forms of
embodiment that are not specifically described by Merleau-Ponty (Fisher, 2000) (and also
still by means of Merleau-Ponty's approach to embodiment and sexuality, as will become
apparent in this chapter). In describing these embodiments,
If we refuse to establish a singular sexual norm, those who were once 'outsiders'
will no longer be considered illegitimate or unnatural. In accepting other sexual
orientations as normal occurrences in the world, we also allow for a greater
number of accounts of embodiment. (Canode, 2002, p. 34).
It is precisely by reorienting himself, with help, as a new body de jure—not a
pathological body, nor a deficient male, nor necessarily male at all—that Michael
becomes able to develop an alternative sexual embodiment and experience sexual
satisfaction anew (Warkentin et. al., 2006).
Alternative Sexualities
By understanding Schneider's case as a snapshot of a particular kind of sexuality,
rather than framing Schneider as a sexual failure or deficient body, we may understand
more about sexuality generally (rather than normative sexuality alone). Just as Schneider
is presented as a pathological alternative to a normal body, Michael initially presents
himself in his narrative as a deficient or damaged body. Indeed, Michael has been
castrated, deprived of androgens (male hormones) and is unable to develop an erection.
Prior to using the strap-on dildo, Michael feels as though all that is left for him is to “give
up on life” (Warkentin et. al., 2006). Michael is separated from a component of human
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experience, feeling his existence is unbearably limited. He regards his penis, and by
extension, himself, as a “functional failure” (Warkentin et. al., 2006).
However, during the process of dildo incorporation, Michael's sexuality not only
reappears but expands. His orgasms are more expansive (“radiating across my pelvis”)
(Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392). Michael acquires more pleasure from sex, describing
sex as more purely “playful.” Sex no longer has a goal or particular structure, and does
not aim simply for climax. Instead, Michael can enjoy sex without orgasm, have multiple
orgasms, and can continue sex after his orgasm if his partner desires (Warkentin et. al.,
2006). “Castration” (the effect of hormonal prostate cancer treatment and prostate
removal) does not mean that Michael's sexuality has been cut off. Michael had imagined
that his world would close once he lost his functioning penis, and that he would no longer
have a connection to the world via sexuality. Instead, his world opens broadly. This is
similar to the experience of “Dr. A” who identifies as a “eunuch” after undergoing
androgen deprivation therapy for prostate cancer. Dr. A no longer experiences himself or
his sexuality in the same way, but does not cease to be a sexual body. Instead, he
becomes “more open to sexual exploration, as he is no longer driven in a narrow,
testosterone-determined, direction to achieve orgasm through coitus” (Wassersug, 2009,
p. 635).
In contrast to the way Merleau-Ponty presents the case of Schneider, Michael's
loss of functioning ultimately becomes a gain in terms of his ability for “projecting before
himself a sexual world” (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 181). Michael's horizons expand
beyond where they were prior to dildo incorporation. This transformation takes place
gradually, from object to instrument to organ to libido-invested image that is both a part
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of Michael's body and a part of the world, the mere sight of which is erotically arousing.
The following section will elaborate the way in which Michael's sexuality is expanded
following what initially appears to be a loss, and offers a description of the role of his
partner, the voice left out of Merleau-Ponty’s account of sexuality, in mediating this
transformation. The next section is also intended to contrast and supplement MerleauPonty's description of the sexual body via his discussion of Schneider's sexuality.

II. The Event of Sexuality
Sexuality takes place in the world of others, shaped and co-cocreated by those
around us. We are “given over from the start... it would seem that our being beside
ourselves, outside ourselves, is there as a function of sexuality itself... not the key or
bedrock of our existence, but... as coextensive with existence” (Butler, 2004, p. 33). If
sexuality is a phenomenon that takes place in the liminal space between self and other (or
indeed, something which emerges in the context of, or because of, the significance of this
liminal space in human life), how is it that the sexual body comes to be in this space?
What is the other's role in shaping one's sexuality and sexual body?
Michael and Schneider's sexual transformations both illuminate sexuality as a
phenomenon that takes place in the world of others. That is, sexuality is not located in an
individual (neither Michael nor Schneider), but emerges with others. Based on
descriptions from Schneider's case, Schneider's sexuality appears to emerge between
Schneider and his partner(s). Sullivan (1997) makes the significant point that “Schneider
accepts and is thus restricted by the meaning that his partner has given to [the erotic
situation]” p. 2). Schneider's inability to “project” means that one could characterize
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Schneider as passive: “The ultimate meaning and result of this situation are things that
are given to Schneider by his world” because he does not instead “take up the situation
and follow it through to its fulfillment (i.e., his own orgasm)” (Sullivan, 1997, p.2),
referring to Merleau-Ponty's statement about Schneider that, “If orgasm occurs first in the
partner and she moves away, the half-fulfilled desire vanishes.” (1962, p. 179). This also
seems to mean that Schneider's sexuality has become more dependent upon his partner's
desires. Michael's experience parallels Schneider's here, but he does not regard his
passivity or sexual dependence upon his partner as pathological, in contrast to how
Schneider's experience is framed by Merleau-Ponty.

The following section

elaborates the way in which sexuality emerges between Michael and his sexual partner
(whom we are calling “Susan”), including Susan's role in helping Michael accept the
dildo as a part of his sexual body. It fills in the missing female subject from MerleauPonty's account, as well as the missing description of sexual passivity or shared sexual
experience that is implicitly present in Merleau-Ponty's account of Schneider. Sexuality
may be regarded as an “event,” neither caused nor owned by a single agent. This
elaboration follows the spirit of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology without following the
letter; that is, the following is an attempt to present sexuality as “the opening out upon
'another'” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 194) and the expression of the life of consciousness
through the body, but without the biases, described above, that appear in some parts of
Merleau-Ponty's account of sexuality.
Sex as Imaginative Play
Michael's narrative presents two people as essential to his ability to achieve sexual
satisfaction using the dildo: his lesbian friend, who helps Michael open himself to the
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possibility that dildo sex could be sexually satisfying, and his sexual partner, Susan, with
whom Michael fulfills this possibility.
Michael's friend sets the stage for the dildo as a tool for play. Michael states that
“she insisted I consider [the dildo] a 'toy'” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391). Michael and
Susan also treat the dildo as a toy by approaching dildo sex as playful. In Michael's
narrative, Susan comes across as supportive, thoughtful (in terms of planning ahead and
surprising Michael in ways that ease his anxiety), and in possession of an affectionate
sense of humor. Michael approaches dildo sex initially as an event taking place in “the
theater of the absurd” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391); that is, he is entering a space of
imaginative play and acting, in which one may try on different roles. Susan is
“ultimately supportive of the exploration,” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391), also treating
dildo sex as an exploratory, improvisational act.
Susan and Michael continue to “accept the dildo as part of our sex play”
(Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392). It is worth noting that Michael uses the term “play”
repeatedly in his narrative to describe the sexual atmosphere between himself and Susan,
indicating that they operate within the ambiguous space of sexuality and explore the
possibilities of the sexual body. Susan and Michael together extend the boundaries of
their play and the possibilities of strap-on dildo sex. For example, Susan “started playing
with the dildo in a flirtatious fashion outside of the bedroom” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p.
393), which Michael experiences as erotic. Susan also performs oral sex on the dildo
(Michael states, “My partner and I took on the challenge” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p.
393)), further extending the range of their shared sexual experience. At one point (though
not the only point in the narrative) Susan creatively adds to the playful atmosphere
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between herself, Michael, and “our dildo”:
[O]ne morning, after having sex the night before, I went to the bathroom and
found the dildo sitting upright on the counter-top wearing one of my favorite
neckties. My partner had decided to personify and personalize it. I interpreted this
as a signal to me that the dildo pleased her and did so because of its association
with me. (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392)
It seems that just as Michael interprets Susan's actions here as indicative of an association
she has formed between pleasure, Michael, and the dildo, he has also formed a parallel
association between the dildo and pleasure he experiences with Susan. Because of her
playful participation, the dildo has taken on a sexual meaning for Michael. He reflects
this with the statement, “Each time [Susan and I] use [the strap-on dildo], it becomes
further imbued with the knowledge of the previous sexual satisfaction it has provided”
(Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392).
Michael also gradually comes to refer to the dildo as “our dildo” in his narrative,
and says the dildo is “a normal at the same time erotic part of our lives” (Warkentin et.
al., 2006, p. 392, emphasis added). His sexuality seems not only contained in another
object in the world, but in other people in the world; specifically, his sexuality is held in
the two-person, imaginative sexual world constructed with his partner. The dildo, as a
symbol of this sexuality, is owned neither by Michael nor by Susan. Sexuality is created
in the space between partners and shared, an ongoing invention.
“Passivity” in the Creation of Sexuality
Michael observes that when using the dildo, “I find it easiest to achieve orgasms
when my partner wants me to, especially in the context of mutually satisfying dildo
intercourse, but far more difficult on my own” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392).
Michael's world appears to be “given” to him by Susan, and he says, “I discussed
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extensively with my partner whether she was willing to have sex with me wearing a
strap-on dildo. She was at first hesitant but ultimately supportive of the exploration”
(Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391). Only in the context of Susan's support and collaborative
framing of dildo-use as an “exploration” was Michael willing to attempt to use a strap-on
dildo. The space of exploration could only come about between them. Michael is
surprised and pleased that he “carried the act through to orgasm, to the sexual satisfaction
of both my partner and myself” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392), emphasizing the
importance of his partner in his sexual encounters. Schneider's sexual receptivity and
approach to sex as responsiveness to his partner's desires rather than the pursuit of his
own are characterized as disconnection from his own satisfaction. Michael finds
satisfaction in this very situation. He states, in contrast to Merleau-Ponty's interpretation
of Schneider's lack of focus on achieving orgasm as disinterest in sex or sexual
gratification:
When I had a prostate gland, sexual arousal that did not lead to ejaculation was
frustrating, and I found it incomprehensible when a woman claimed she had
pleasure from sexual stimulation yet had not had an orgasm. After my prostate
was removed, I discovered that I too could have incremental pleasure from sexual
stimulation and enjoy sex without orgasms. (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391)
Indeed, for Michael (and one may suspect for Schneider), sexual “satisfaction” is not
synonymous with sexual discharge, just as Michael discovers (and as his lesbian friend
knew all along) that having a functional penis is not essential for sexual enjoyment.
A non-pathologizing way to understand this phenomenon may be to recognize
him as the aspect of Michael's body that Feenberg (2003) calls a “dependent body,”
explaining that one might supplement Ihde's bodies 1 and 2 (see chapter 2), bodies which
describe active dimensions of embodiment, with bodies as they are given over to the
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world and reacted to by the world. “We live our body not only as actors in the world but
also as beings who invite action on our bodies by others” (Feenberg, 2003, p. 103). This
is not to say that these bodies no longer have agency nor that they are entirely dependent
or passive, but rather to acknowledge the ways in which our bodies belong to or are
handed over to the world. Human beings are “dependent” in the sense that we depend
upon others, to varying degrees at various times, to create our experiences. MerleauPonty's concept of “reversibility” helps to illustrate the way in which one may inhabit the
dependent aspect of one's embodied existence, yet still remain an agent or a subject:
When I press my two hands together, it is not a matter of two sensations felt
together as one perceives two objects placed side by side, but of an ambiguous
set-up in which both hands can alternate roles of 'touching' and being 'touched.'...
In other words, in this bundle of bones and muscles which my right hand presents
to my left, I can anticipate for an instant the integument or incarnation of that
other right hand... The body catches itself from the outside... it tries to touch itself
while being touched, and initiates a 'kind of reflection' which is sufficient to
distinguish it from objects...” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, pp. 106-107).
One may be in the position of touched and at once be a body that is able to initiate touch.
Merleau-Ponty describes this in terms of two hands touching one another, but this seems
to apply to two bodies in a sexual encounter, as well. Because Michael can respond to
Susan's touch and identify himself as one who is touching back, he is not a lifeless objectbody. He possesses the possibility of “reversing” the situation by accepting or
responding to Susan's actions, creating an ambiguity between being the one who is
touched and the one who is touching. Michael's experiences of himself as a body,
including as a sexual body, come from his experience of being an active body, but also
from his experiences of his body being acted upon.
The body described here as a “dependent body” is a particular type of passive
body in which “our time horizon shrinks as we no longer control or plan the next
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sensation, yet we remain exquisitely alert” (Feenberg, 2003, p. 103). The dependent
body conveys the “lived first-person experience of our own instrumentalized status”
(Feenberg, 2003, p. 103). Michael seems to “hand himself over” to the new experience
of dildo sex, as well as handing himself over as a dildonic body to Susan, in their first
sexual experience with the strap-on dildo. Michael is “caught... by total surprise”
(Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391) at how “natural” sex feels when he is using the strap-on
dildo. It seems that Michael did not have a plan or a goal for this act. Part of Michael's
surprise is a response to Susan's actions. Michael describes that during this first instance
of dildo sex, Susan “reached down and held my penis in her hand... There was little
sensory difference between this act and intercourse—my penis was not in her vagina but
it did not know that” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391). Michael says “I had not expected
to achieve an orgasm and was astonished that it happened” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p.
391). Susan's independent actions provide the first steps to incorporating the dildo into
Michael's sexual body and into their shared sexual life.
The dependent body as an aspect of the sexual body seems to be particularly
relevant for aspects of Michael's and Schneider's experience that are overlooked in
Merleau-Ponty's account of normal sexuality (which seems to emphasize active pursuit of
sexual climax). In sex, the body may lose its position as a spectator or object for itself,
and instead become a more “immediate” form of consciousness (Feenberg, 2003). In
other words, sex is “a relation between subjectivized bodies” (Feenberg, 2003, p. 103).
Each subject attempts to bring about this subject-mode in the other, calling the other more
into immediate experience and sensation. “Sex is the construction of the dependent body
of this other” (Feenberg, 2003, p. 103). Merleau-Ponty's account of normal sexuality
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seems to overlook the experience of having oneself called forth as a dependent body, or
the experience of being the body that is touched. Again, this body retains subjectivity
and is not a mere object-body. In fact, the experience of being called into the immediate
moment or experiencing himself as a dependent body is the opposite of Michael's
experience prior to dildo incorporation, when he felt depressed and rejected multiple
interventions upon his object-body as viable solutions (i.e., “Viagra... a vacuum erection
device... a surgically implanted penile prosthesis” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 390)). The
experience of a body in pain or disease is described by Drew Leder: “I no longer simply
'am' my body, the set of unthematized powers from which I exist. Now I 'have' a body, a
perceived object in the world” (1990, p. 77). The body itself is a clumsy, incomplete, or
pathological object viewed from without. Alternately, with the help of his partner,
Michael's body goes from being a pathological object to a sexual body, and the dildo goes
from being an external object to an extension of himself.
Michael, and to some extent an alternative reading of Schneider's case, give a
response to the question of what it is like to be an object of action, or to have the lived
experience of sexual passivity as an aspect of overall sexual being. Their responsiveness
or receptiveness in sex, rather than demonstrating deficient sexuality, reveal the
dependence upon the other that partially characterizes sexuality. Schneider lacks an
ability to objectively assess a situation (i.e., to tell the difference between a story and a
riddle, to tell the difference between play-acting and reality (Merleau-Ponty, 1962)) and
seems stuck in the immediate, to the point that he is unable to think into the future
beyond the tasks immediately before him. This seems to place Schneider in a permanent
mode of dependent sexual partner, existing in the immediate moment.
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Michael describes coming to feel that sexuality is restored after feeling accepted
by his partner, or rather, feeling that his dildo-body has been accepted: “sexual
satisfaction has become easier, because both of us have come to accept the dildo as part
of our sex play” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392). This acceptance allows his observing
consciousness to recede and he simply enjoys sex in the immediate moment. He is
immersed in the imaginative sexual realm and experiences the dildo as an extension of
his flesh. Michael describes sex using the dildo, even the first time, as feeling “natural”
(Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391), meaning the dildo has already become a “transparent”
part of his experience or “ready to hand” (see chapter 2). Acceptance allows Michael to
return to his body and return to immediate experience.
Passing, Acceptance, and Love
Feenberg (2003) elaborates a second kind of passive body which he calls the
“extended body,” characterized not by our ability to extend our body schema through
incorporation of tools, but by what this incorporation signifies to others. He adds that the
body not only “acts through a technical mediation, but also a body that signifies itself
through that mediation” (p. 105), suggesting ways for others to respond to one's body
(Feenberg, 2003). Merleau-Ponty's example of the blind man whose body schema is
extended by a walking stick (see chapter 2), for instance, does not only experience bodily
extension in the realm of body activity. “The cane does more than sense the world; it also
reveals the blind man as blind” meaning his body is extended “also in the passive
dimension of its own objectivity” (Feenberg, 2003, p. 105). This leads others to
recognize and respond (helpfully, Feenberg assumes) to his blindness, and the blind man
“has a non-specific awareness” of these responses and the general world they compose
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for him (Feenberg, 2003, p. 105). The extended body denotes the aspect of experience
which is about the “consequences for bodily objectivity and the subject's awareness of
those consequences” (Feenberg, 2003, p. 104).
Of course, there are a range of ways that others might respond to one's body, and
the way in which a body is instrumentally extended might provide a suggestion to others
but does not necessarily elicit a particular response. Butler (2004) writes, “to be a body is
to be given over to others even as a body is, emphatically, 'one's own'” (p. 20), and “my
body is and is not mine... my body relates me—against my will and from the start—to
others” (p. 21, italics added). Feenberg (2003) seems to assume that others, upon
recognizing the blind man's cane as a signifier of his blindness will respond to his
dependent body helpfully, but there are a range of responses possible once his body is
handed over to the world in this way. We are left quite vulnerable to the responses of
others to and upon our bodies. We are our bodies, but our bodies are not entirely our
own. The way in which our bodies are given over to others also indicates the limitations
of sexual autonomy and how others shape our sexuality. The extended body “signifies
itself through mediation” and the subject's awareness of its “bodily objectivity” to others
shape experience (Feenberg, 2003). This includes significations of sex, gender, sexual
orientation, etc. among other aspects of self-presentation (Feenberg, 2003).
Hale (1998) notes that “the operation” for FTMs, often naively conceived as a
phalloplasty or a “phallic cure” for the “transsexual man's... condition” (p. 328) is a
“distorting imposition” (p. 329). To conceive of “the operation” in this way is to
understand the ftm's “gender identification as being primarily about absence of and desire
for a cock” (Hale, 1998, p. 329). Indeed, if the aim of transition is to be one's felt sex or
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gender, then one aim of the operation is to change one's signifying, object body such that
what it signifies to others is consistent with who one feels one is or desires to be. This is
more than a visual change. If the goal of transformations on the passive body (as one
aspect of embodied experience, the aspect in which one is given over to others) is to
communicate one's identity to others in order that others are better able to co-create one's
world, such that one can have a different experience of his own embodiment, then top
surgery (removing and reshaping breasts into a male-looking chest) would be more
significant than bottom surgery (constructing a penis for an ftm):
The most heavily weighted physical characteristic in making the gender
attribution “female” to adults is the presence of breasts, whereas the most heavily
weighted physical characteristic in making the attribution “male” is the presence
of a penis. (Hale, 1998, p. 330)
Zita (1998) explains that “passing” is not a strong enough term, given the
importance of others' responses to the passive body. “'Passing' implies pretense and
lying, not a new ontological reading of the body's sex,” adding that “when our 'male
lesbian' fails to maintain a consistent female identity at all times, this is... an indication of
the individual's inability to control overdetermined hegemonic readings from the outside
world forced on the body” (Zita, 1998, p. 106). The “new ontology” implies a stable
state and something maintained “at all times,” but difficult to maintain when in conflict
with hegemonic ideas about how body and identity align. “The very 'I' is called into
question by its relation to the one to whom I address myself” (Butler, 2004, p. 19).
Consistent reading of one's body by others as different than one desires that it be read, as
in the example of the male lesbian, “definitively 'sexes' his body,” (p. 106). Thus, how
others read and interpret the body impacts one's felt identity, and leads this identity to
waver when one is continually mis-read and affects one's experience from moment to
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moment.
It is through Susan's mediation that Michael comes to inhabit his new dildonic
sexual body, or through which the dildo comes to signify a sexual extension of Michael's
body (rather than a medical device or a means for mockery, as Michael envisions the
dildo prior to Susan's mediation). Susan enables particular forms of experience in him,
but there is certainly not a single, given way of responding to him. Indeed, Michael
seems to sense this with his reluctance to “go into a sex shop to buy a dildo,” fantasizing
that he, and the dildonically extended body he had just allowed himself to envision
becoming, would be “identified and mocked by someone who knew me” (Warkentin et.
al., 2006, p. 391) instead of embraced and adored, as it is by his partner. Beyond this, it
is Susan's mediation that allows Michael to form a new sexual identity that includes the
dildo. Michael “passes” as a dildonic sexual body through Susan's recognition, or in
other words, Susan allows Michael's sexual body to inhabit the dildo, and his
transformation begins. This feat is especially impressive given the constraining forces set
against alternative modes of sexuality, as discussed in the next chapter.
Walker & Robinson (2010), in their study of heterosexual couples in which the
male partner has undergone the same hormonal prostate cancer treatment as Michael, find
that these couples continue having satisfying sex lives when they are “unwilling to accept
a loss of sex,” are “open-minded about specific strategies,” and “placed great emphasis
on increasing relational intimacy” (p. 885). Together, the partners develop a way of
understanding and responding to the androgen deprivation therapy and prostate cancer
that does not render the male partner asexual or deficient. They become flexible and
open to new modes of sexuality and maintain a loving, intimate relationship. In their
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analysis of an interview of a woman whose husband had undergone prostate removal,
Rennie and Fergus (2006) comment on the way this couple shares experience: “[The
love] has taken shape on its own, so that one [becomes] transformed by it” (p. 492). In
Michael's case, love is a force of literal transformation, allowing his new body to come
into being. Michael's case demonstrates “how a thing or being begins to exist for us
through desire or love” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 178).

Conclusions
Identity and sexualities exist in the world of others and objects, not simply in the
individual mind or in reflexive action. As Merleau-Ponty describes, sexuality is a mode
of relation. This chapter has been an attempt to elaborate sexuality as a mode of relation
by presenting sexuality as an “event” between two people, rather than something that
emerges as a purposive action from a single (male) person. This chapter as also
attempted to discuss sexuality outside of normative ways of viewing the body and sexual
behavior, instead presenting sexuality as a complex aspect of self that is bound up with
identity. Recognizing the variability of bodies and refusing to establish a body norm also
allows bodies to become more playful—they are not attempting to approximate “normal”
bodies nor are they resigned to a partial life as partial and broken bodies, but instead offer
a new narrative of the self. Michael emerges from his experience with a new body and
new sexual horizon.
The following chapter will discuss clinical implications that follow from this view
of sexuality and the body as imaginative and co-created. This discussion not only applies
to Michael or patients with issues surrounding sexuality and identity, but has implications
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for clinical conceptualizations of sexuality and embodiment generally.
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Chapter 5: Clinical Implications
This chapter discusses implications for clinical practice based on Michael's
experience. It draws together and integrates findings from previous chapters and
discusses their clinical implications. It also places Michael's case in the context of the
medical model views of human sexuality and masculinity that it defies, and suggests an
alternate view of sexuality.
The first part of this chapter places Michael's case in the context of clinical
(particularly, psychological, psychiatric, and medical) discourses about sexuality, sex, and
gender. It addresses the dominant medical model in particular and its construction of
norms in the areas of gendered expression and sexual behavior. This part of the chapter
examines clinical perspectives on transsexuality/ gender identity disorder and impotence/
erectile dysfunction in particular, since these conditions/ diagnoses/ disorders/ etc. reveal
the medical model's view of sexuality, gender, and the body. This also includes debates
about what should be defined as a disease and the problems or advantages of doing so
and what it means to think of impotence or transsexual desires as disease (akin to the
previous chapter's question about whether it is appropriate to view Michael and
Schneider as flawed or deficient). Impasses and problems with the most common clinical
views of the body, i.e., views which tend to be pathologizing and grounded in the medical
model, are articulated. Elaborating these discourses also reveals how remarkable
Michael's case is, and how he and his partner develop a mode of sexuality together that
falls outside of these discourses.
The second part of the chapter is a clinical discussion of Michael's case and
general clinical implications which follow. It explores how Michael works around some
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of the limitations of medical model discourses. This conceptualization is intended to
bypass divisions present in the questions: Is his condition a disease or an acceptable form
of difference? Is it a condition of the body, a medical problem, or of the mind, a
psychological problem? Following Jay Prosser's analysis of transsexuality, this chapter
uses Didier Anzieu's concept of the skin ego to talk about Michael's case in an embodied
way. Anzieu seems to loosen the definition of what the body “should” be, and what
masculinity looks like. The self is returned to the body rather than the abstract norm
implied in the medical model and the textual, non-fleshy, theoretical body presented in
the extremes of gender flexibility. We might conclude that what Michael's lesbian friend
does for him is what this chapter hopes to accomplish more broadly—to offer an
understanding of sexuality that emphasizes its imaginative, playful, and transformative
aspects.

I. Discourses on Sexuality
Not surprisingly, like so many other cancer patients sexually incapacitated by modern
medicine, I was clinically depressed within a few months of starting hormonal therapy.
– Warkentin, K., Gray, R., & Wassersug, R., 2006, p. 391
When Michael begins treatments his for his prostate cancer, he is at odds with but
also seems trapped by medical discourses. Although they saved him from cancer,
Michael sees medical interventions as enemies of his sexual well-being. He cites
“modern medicine” as the source of his “sexual [incapacitation].” Michael's language,
“my cancer treatments and the sexual dysfunction they caused,” points clearly to medical
intervention (“radical prostatectomy and salvage radiotherapy” in addition to androgen
deprivation therapy (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 389)) as the source of his sexual
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problems. Beyond sexually incapacitating him in the first place, medical interventions
leave Michael no useful solutions to his sexual problems. He states, “Neither Viagra nor
a vacuum erection device worked for me. I am loath to inject drugs into my penis or
have surgically implanted penile prosthesis, the remaining medical options for treating
ED” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 390) As the case study authors note, “Patients on
antiandrogen therapy are particularly unlikely to find the common medical interventions
helpful” for impotence, as these treatments are typically ineffective or deeply
unappealing following the medical interventions they undergo to treat their cancer
(Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 390).
This section elaborates how psychology and related fields have approached sex
and gender issues historically, up to current debates about the status of sex and gender in
the upcoming DSM-V. The focus here is particularly on transgender and transsexual
identities and on impotence as a sexual disorder, and what the overlap reveals about
clinical and popular perspectives on sex and gender. This section is meant to offer a
sense of how sex, gender, and the body are regarded in popular and clinical discourse,
and provides background for the next section, which elaborates an alternative approach
with findings from Michael's case.
Dysfunctional Male Bodies
It seems that medical approaches not only “incapacitate” Michael in terms of
causing his impotence through hormonal treatments, but also sexually incapacitate him in
the way the medical model views and constructs sexuality and masculinity. That is, the
medical approach seems to view sex as a problem to be solved. All of the interventions
suggested to Michael, from Viagra to a penile implant, are focused on helping him to
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achieve an erection. The authors of his original case study call this the “coital
imperative,” explaining that, “Most treatments of erectile dysfunction (ED) focus
narrowly on restoring erectile function and coitus” (Warkentin, K., Gray, R., &
Wassersug, R., 2006, p. 390). Michael is “incapacitated” as a man in the medical model,
since masculinity is strictly defined as the ability to achieve and sustain an erection, and
incapacitated as sexual, since sex seems narrowly defined as coitus.
Angus McLaren, in his historical account of impotence, discusses how impotence
came to be constituted as a medical problem, something to be solved via medical
intervention rather than explored in the context of a relationship. In 1952, impotence was
listed in the DSM as a psychological problem (McLaren, 2007), and it has since moved
more in the direction of medical problem. Pfizer, makers of Viagra, retitled the problem
“erectile dysfunction” (McLaren, 2007, p. 241), giving the problem a name implying a
problem with bodily functioning and also implying that one should have functioning
erections— that not to have erections meant one was not functioning appropriately.
Masculinity also came to be associated with genital responsiveness (similar to the
discussion in ch.3 of this dissertation, in which masculinity is defined in terms of the
phallus), e.g. 'he is impotent” (McLaren, 2007, p. 252). This also implies “that sex
necessarily meant penetration” by “narrowing the definition of male arousal” (McLaren,
2007, p. 252). This increasingly narrow norm of health means the definition of healthy
male becomes harder to achieve and more all-encompassing, the medical model pushes
further that men are mostly their erections, or that erections are all that matter in the
sexual realm. McLaren notes, “...Biotechnology is being used to 'fix' or enhance
heterosexual male confidence and power, and thus avert 'masculinity in crisis.'” (2007, p.
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236) and “Men were egged on to take Viagra, not in order to sire children, but to match a
certain standard of masculinity” (2007, p. 250).
McLaren notes that, “Urologists turned to male sexual dysfunctions in search of
more patients. It obviously served their purposes to medicalize the issue of impotence
and exaggerate its extent” (McLaren, 2007, p. 240). The marketing of Viagra changed
over time; specifically, toward a younger range of men (McLaren, 2007), redefining
normal male sexuality as a sort of “sexual athlete” (McLaren, 2007, p. 248). For some
time, the target audience remained heterosexual, advertising heterosexual penetration
(McLaren, 2007, p. 252), but gradually moved on to include men who did not identify as
heterosexual, as well. Overall, it seems that the discourse has gradually moved in the
direction of producing a narrower range of normalcy. While the medical model may
recognize more men, i.e., has extended its reach to gay men, in doing so it also imposes
its norms on them as a group. “Some critics worried that one was moving from an age of
diversity to a 'new uniformity'” (McLaren, 2007, p. 259), in that a new sexual norm was
being put forth, sexual diversity was no longer regarded as normal, and the definition of
sexual normalcy narrowed to include all sorts of men (young, old, gay, straight). The
medical model reinforces a single, narrow norm of masculinity and male sexuality,
creating an increasingly large audience for medical intervention. Rather than adapt and
change their sexual activities according to context, men are pressed to match an
increasingly narrow norm.
Set against this background, Michael's case seems particularly noteworthy. He
and Susan are able to conceptualize sexuality not as a problem to be solved, but as a
playful process. Michael finds that available discourses about sexuality do not
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adequately meet his embodied experience, and he and Susan set about making a new
discourse around sexuality. The next major section of this chapter goes into greater detail
about clinical implications one may draw from this process and alternate ways of
clinically conceptualizing sexuality.
Transsexual Diagnosis
For all of the problems the medical model has with conceptualizing sex and
gender, it seems paradoxically to recognize the significance of the body for identity in its
urgency to restore erect penises to men; that is, the medical model seems to recognize the
significance that maintaining erections has for the masculine identity of some men. The
same might be said of the medical model's view of transsexuality (or, “Gender Identity
Disorder” or GID, mirroring the language of disorder and dysfunction used to re-title
impotence as “erectile dysfunction”), since “...the treatment proposed for the most serious
manifestation of GID (transsexualism) doesn't try to cure us of the 'disorder'; rather, it
concurs with our own narrative, compelling us into it as a way of resolving it” (Prosser,
2005, pp. 106-07). Prosser (2005) discusses “how transsexual autobiography emerges at a
homologous moment: when the transsexual autobiographer seizes on the self as a
medicodiscursive object” (p. 126). In other words, transsexuals came to have a distinct
identity and the beginning of a means of self-recognition through medical discourse.
Regarding transsexuality as a medical problem also designates it as an embodied
condition, acknowledging the physical significance of transsexuality rather than claiming
it is “all in the head” (similar to redefining impotence as a medical “dysfunction”). Harry
Benjamin is credited with the “invention of the transsexual” (or rather, the recognition of
transsexual people as a distinct group), naming transsexuals and distinguishing them from
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other categories, such as the category of homosexuals (Prosser, 2005). This distinction
informs clinical practice and DSM taxonomy follows suit. The DSM diagnosis of GID
“doesn't try to cure us of the 'disorder'; rather, it concurs with our own narrative,
propelling us into it as a way of resolving it” (Prosser, 2005, p. 107).
This is a general trend for clinical diagnosis. DSM-III included “premature
ejaculation, inhibited orgasm, transsexualism, and gender identity disorder of childhood”
and for the first time included “some different criteria sets for males and females”
(Widiger, 2007, p. 21). Over time (including up to the present debates around DSM-V)
information has become more specific according to gender and sexual identity. This is
the first time the DSM acknowledged gender dysphoria as well, with the diagnoses
Gender Identity Disorder in Children (GIDC) and Transsexualism (Drescher, 2010). This
established “transgender subjectivities as a unique psychological phenomenon in its own
right” (Drescher, 2010, p. 437) to the DSM-using community, beyond Benjamin's initial
“discovery.”
Prosser (2005) argues for the continuous presence of transsexuals, not as produced
by discourse but as productive of it, explaining,
the consistence and continuity of this narrative and its conventions... produced a
medical discourse around transgender that led to the writing of a transsexual
diagnosis in DSM-III. The diagnosis then stands for a recognition of the 'transhistory'... of trans narratives” (pp. 133-34).
In other words, the diagnosis emerges from a common transsexual narrative
(“autobiography in the clinician's office”, Prosser, 2005, p. 104). This is opposed to the
idea that transsexual subjectivity is constituted through a diagnosis, or through expert
clinical knowledge. Rather than being produced by discourse, transsexuals found a place
in discourse through the clinical and medical. Recognition of gender dysphoria as a
113

mental health concern has the function of presenting “sexual reassignment surgeries 'as a
legitimate treatment and not an elective or cosmetic surgery'” (Lev, 2005, p. 53, quoting
Pauly). The presence of a GID diagnosis brings “some benefit and recognition to an
underserved and disenfranchised community” (Lev, 2005, p. 53).
Discursive Elisions
Despite the advantages discursive recognition brings to transsexual, the medical
model's narrow views of sex, gender, and the body is reflected in its discourse on
transsexuality, just as they are in its views of impotence. Like the medical views of
impotence, “the diagnostic criteria of both GID and TF are based in stereotypical sexist
and heterosexist assumptions regarding normative male and female experience, as serves
to reify a traditional gender-based hegemony” (Lev, 2005, p. 43). For a person to receive
the medical interventions involved in sex transition, they must fit a particular narrative.
Lev (2005) notes that “many of the diagnoses in the current DSM are the legacy of...
early explorations into human sexual deviations from what was presumed common” (p.
38), although Kinsey's research had, at that point, called into question notions about
common or normal sexuality (Lev, 2005). Therefore, a major argument against the value
of medical discourses for transsexuality is the way these discourses serve to marginalize
and restrict transsexual identity. Scientific discourses, such as medical and clinical
discourses, establish norms and deviations from those norms, elaborating and describing
deviations, and establishing norms and deviations as markers of identity rather than
activities.
Even insofar as the medical model provides recognition and distinction for
transsexuals, and is a means to providing medical and psychological resources for them,
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it nevertheless restricts potential identities (i.e., some people may not be able to recognize
themselves in the discourse provided by medicine, or may be specifically excluded from
it—even as discourses proliferate, this seems to do more to reinforce a norm than allow
for greater varieties of difference). “The medical model has... left a problematic legacy
by reinforcing the gender binary and therefore legitimizing only certain kinds of gender
dysphoric people, and eliminating, or severely restricting, access to medical treatments
for people whose gender-variant expression follows atypical patterns” (Lev, 2005, p. 45).
Lev (2005, citing Carroll, 1999) states, “Clinicians and transgender individuals
themselves are finding that these categories are inadequate to describe the possible
resolutions to cross-gender experience” (p. 45), meaning that the DSM representation of
transgender and transsexual experience (“gender dysphoria”) describes, at best, a
subpopulation of this overall group—indeed, “the vast majority of research has focused
on studying natal males who apply for treatments through approved Gender Clinics” and
excludes, for examples, “FTMs, trans-identified butches, genderqueer [populations],” etc.
(p. 45).
In other words, in providing a transsexual narrative, the medical model also
delimits this narrative. Butler, 2004, p. 71: “...for the most part the gender essentialist
position... must be voiced for transsexual surgery to take place, and that someone who
comes in with a sense of the gender as changeable will have a more difficult time
convincing psychiatrists and doctors to perform surgery.” If one's experience does not fit
an established discourse, one will not receive the cooperation of medical institutions.
The gatekeeping system requires that people who desire medical treatments have
the same standardized autobiography... Cross-gendered people cannot simply
request services, but must fit a proscribed narrative to be eligible for services...
Those who are approved and pass through the gate have refined the same
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'transsexual narrative,' validating it as the transsexual trajectory (Lev, 2005, p. 54).
Prosser (2005) notes as well that “the standardization also renders some stories
unintelligible... censoring the number of possible legitimate transsexual tales... the
diagnosis acts as a narrative filter” (p. 107). The clinician is given a great deal of power
to approve or deny the transsexual patient's narrative. Indeed, “The clinician's reading
thus officially confers and by the same token may defer transsexual subjectivity”
(Prosser, 2005, p. 108). It would seem, then, that the discourse doesn't really flow “up”
from transsexual experience (at least not from the experience of all transsexuals), but is
reified via expert knowledge. Transsexuality becomes a specific discourse that
embodiment is forced to meet.
Towards an Alternate View of Sex
This trend is towards a proliferation of discourses about sexuality. By
“transforming sex into discourse” (Foucault, 1978, p. 22) aspects of sexuality are
recognized and put into discourse, leading to the recognition of groups that were
previously outside of discourse. However, this also leads to narrowing norms within
these recognized groups as the groups become more encased in a discourse. Varied
experiences are again left outside of discourse. At points when one does not fit,
Modernity has solved this problem by blaming, then erasing the subalterns: if
proletarian, we cannot “really” be queer, if queer, not “really” proletarian, if
unable to get up the stairs, not really mobile. I suggest that an inversion: we are
real, and if the stairs or the categories do not work, they should be redesigned
(Jensen, 2009, p. 63).
How, then, do we as clinicians do what works and respond to real bodies and real
situations, including those that are not readily taken up by current discourses?
Michael's situation provides an opportunity to explore this question. Michael
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observes, in his narrative, that the discourses he knows do not adequately meet his
experience (just as some transsexuals may not meet the proscribed transsexual discourse.
He writes,
I knew then that I could not seriously think of this piece of purple plastic as a
medical appliance. This was important in my reconceptualizing the situation.
Whatever I was going to do with the dildo was not in anyway [sic] a 'cure' for ED
nor was it meant to restore my masculine sense of sexuality. If this was going to
work, it was because it was something completely different. I had to stop thinking
about this clinically...” (Warkentin, K., Gray, R., & Wassersug, R., 2006, p. 391).
Present discourses limit our way of understanding the change in Michael's sexuality.
Discourses about impotence and masculinity are not adequate for Michael’s experience,
and medical discourses are also unhelpful, in the same way they may fail to serve other
sexual minorities. As noted in the previous chapter, imagination and relation are
significant for transition, and for the development and emergence of identity. It seems to
be the job of psychologists, then, to sustain and encourage this playfulness and broad
definitions of sexuality and identity, as well as maintaining an emphasis on what works
rather than achieving a socially-imposed ideal. In other words, rather than restoring
hegemonic masculinity to Michael, a clinician might find a way to aid Michael in
exploring the possibilities offered by his actual body.
The goal of this chapter might also be understood as elaborating alternative
discourses on sexuality, as Michael's lesbian friend does for Michael when he tells her
about his problems. Clinicians might follow her lead by remaining open to discoveries
about sexuality that are obscured by current discourses as well as helping people find
their way into their own discourses. The next section reconceptualizes Michael's case
based on a more open, playful approach to sexuality and identity, and includes
suggestions for clinicians.
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II. Clinical Concepts
I myself would oppose the formula: 'the unconscious is structured like a language' with a
formulation that is implicit in Freud: 'the unconscious is the body.' The unconscious
seems to me to be structured like the body.
 Didier Anzieu, 1990, p. 43
Anzieu and the Skin Ego
The psychoanalytic practitioner Didier Anzieu provides a means for clinically
conceptualizing and elaborating findings from Michael's case. Anzieu's approach is
helpful for a number of reasons, including his emphasis on the body and other people as
sources of identity, and his emphasis on conceptual and clinical imaginativeness and
playfulness. This imaginativeness also leads to a more complex, less narrow and
normative view of health.
Anzieu's approach also seems to bypass rigid conceptual divisions such as those
between material and representation, since he is able to see the body as both, and to see
these as intimately related features of the body. This section provides a way of
understanding Michael's case that does not overemphasize language or the mind, but
recognizes the significance of the body. This discussion will, as Anzieu prefers to do
with psychoanalytic texts, follow the spirit rather than the letter. That is to say, Anzieu's
concept of the “skin ego” will serve as a starting point for an imaginative psychoanalytic
conceptualization of Michael that reflects a clinical way of thinking about bodies which
contrasts with the popular views, elaborated above.
***
Anzieu emphasizes the significance of the body in identity formation. He
explains that “every psychical phenomenon develops in constant reference to bodily
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experience” (Anzieu, 1975, p. 84 and p. 96), i.e., that one becomes who one is based on
embodied experiences. Anzieu's emphasis is particularly on the surface of the body, the
skin. Anzieu presents an ambiguous distinction between “the real organ with its structure
and physiology and the imaginary one which the subject constructs as an envelope out of
different experiences, including physical and emotional traumas, pain and pleasure,
varieties of holding, and fantasy” (Kirshner, 1990, p. 544). In other words, the psyche,
the self, or identity, is an ambiguously biological and fantasied entity. This presents a
contrast to the over-simplified approach the medical model offers of psyche and soma:
“the psycho-physiologist tends to reduce the living body to the nervous system and
behavior to cerebral activities by which it is programmed through a process of collection,
analysis and synthesis of information” (Anzieu, 1975, p. 3). Instead, the self and the
body's surface are more complex and interactive than the medical model may recognize.
Recognizing this complexity may help in cases like Michael's, where the living body is
clearly more than the nervous system.
Anzieu's concept of the “Skin Ego” emerges from Freud's notion that “The ego is
first and foremost a bodily ego” (or “body ego,” in a later work by Freud) (Anzieu, 1975,
p. 85). Anzieu posits that tactile, sensory experiences transform into thoughts and
symbols (1975, p. 230) and states that “The Skin Ego is a reality of the order of
phantasy” (Anzieu, 1975, p. 4). This means that our embodied experiences form our
concepts about ourselves and the world, or that the body is formative of the self. It seems
that this is what happens in Michael's case, as his embodied experiences permit him to
accept the dildo as an extension of his own body. As discussed in chapter 3 of this
dissertation, physical bodies, including skin, are “Not simply costumes for our experience
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of our bodies, our theoretical conceptions of the body are foundationally formed by and
reformative of them” (Prosser, 2005, p. 96). Bodily experience is not predicated upon
discourse, but contributes to the formation of discourse (also as discussed in chapter 3).
Anzieu characterizes the ego, like the skin and as it is coincident with the skin, as
an “interface.” It is a point of contact between inside and outside, and self and other.
“The Ego is at once subject (the pronoun 'I' is used to refer to it) and object (it is called
the 'Self')” (Anzieu, 1975, p. 91). The skin and the ego are paradoxically inside and
outside of a body, the surfaces for meeting the world. Anzieu quotes Freud speaking
about the formation of the ego (1975, p. 84):
A person's own body, and above all its surface, is a place from which both
external and internal perceptions may spring. It is seen like any other object, but
to the touch it yields two kinds of sensations, one of which may be equivalent to
an internal perception.
Skin is meeting point for feeling and language, for acting and being acted upon. It is the
“point of contact between material body and body image, between visible and felt matter”
(Prosser, 2005, p. 72). It makes sense for identity to emerge from this place, and that a
change to the body is a change to oneself. The skin is what expands to encompass other
objects, to cover new surfaces, akin to a new sensory horizon. Anzieu also recognizes the
significance of others in forming identity, which is demonstrated in Michael's experience
with Susan (as discussed in chapter 4), and is a major reason for Anzieu's emphasis on the
body's surface. The body, particularly the surface of the body, is where one meets others,
as the place where “I” am.
In addition to placing an emphasis on shared experience and on embodiment,
Anzieu attempts to bypass rigid divisions between the biological and cognitive, between
the embodied and the psychological, and between the body and representation. Anzieu
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writes, “Western thought has been obsessed with a particular epistemological conception,
whereby the acquisition of knowledge is seen as a process of breaking through an outer
shell to an inner core or nucleus” (1975, p. 9). This fits the dualistic notion of an “inner
self” with an exterior body, as well as the idea of “having” a psychological or medical
disorder—the disorder is presented as being contained in an individual, rather than
representing a perspective on the way an individual lives her body or a condition that
involves others as much as the identified disordered person. Anzieu (1975) relocates
significance in the body, particularly the surface of the body, asking “what if thought
were as much an affair of the skin as of the brain?” (p. 9). Instead of “breaking through”
a surface, thinking is “a matter of relations between surfaces” (Anzieu, 1975, p. 10), a
kind of touching and being touched simultaneously. He explains that,
By placing emphasis on the skin as a basic datum that is both of an organic and an
imaginary order, both a system for protecting our individuality and a first
instrument and site of interaction with others, I am seeking to bring into being
another model—one resting on a solid biological foundation, out of which our
interaction with the environment arises, and which respects the specificity of
psychical phenomena in relation to both organic and social realities. (Anzieu,
1975, p. 3)
This model contrasts with the medical model, instead emphasizing the body and
relationality, and offers an alternative approach for formulating cases. Michael's
transformation seems to be a process of finding and creating a discourse as well as
responding to events that take place on the surface of his body. A change to the body is a
change to a person's psyche, for they are intimately connected.
Anzieu places an emphasis on theoretical playfulness, which fits the playfulness
that goes into Michael's transformation, and also the playfulness that goes into
elaborating an under-explored phenomenon. Anzieu explains, “My idea of the Skin Ego
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is, admittedly, a metaphor of very broad scope” (Anzieu, 1975, p. 6). The Skin Ego
seems to be a concept open to development and adaptation. In discussing Michael's case,
this chapter takes up Anzieu's invitation to be imaginative and to apply his concepts
liberally. Anzieu (1975) states, “In these last decades of the twentieth century,
psychoanalysis seems to me to have greater need of people who think in images than of
learned scholars, scholiasts and abstract or formalistic thinkers'” (p. 6) and also, “[The
success of] contemporary psycho-pharmacological research... has... brought about a
narrowing of both the field of observation and the theoretical field” (p. 3). In other
words, theoretical openness and playfulness are missing and concepts are becoming more
rigid—Anzieu is calling for imaginative play in clinical theory.
In addition to theoretical playfulness, Anzieu emphasizes conceptual openness and
experimentation when applying these ideas to clinical practice. He emphasizes finding
and doing what works in clinically. Anzieu states (in a 1975 statement cited by René
Kaës),
The question is not to repeat what Freud found when faced with the crises of the
Victorian era, but to find a psychoanalytic response to mankind's malaise in the
civilization in which we live. Work such as that of psychoanalysis needs to be
done wherever the unconscious arises, standing, seated or lying down;
individually, in a group or in a family, wherever a subject can allow his anxieties
and fantasies to speak out to someone who is supposed to listen to them and is
likely to help him understand them.
As noted in the previous section of this chapter, clinicians are over-prepared to reflect
dominant discourses, or overly ready to read the familiar into their patients, whether this
is a particular narrative (such as those about masculinity or transsexuality), a rigid
psychoanalytic perspective, or a rigid “psychophysiological” viewpoint. “The
hermeneutics of suspicion are reversed and reflected back on the clinicians themselves”

122

(Prosser, 2005, p. 113). Clinicians may fall into the position of viewing the world
through a given discourse which renders certain experiences from becoming visible or
intelligible to them. Anzieu encourages clinicians to stay open and imaginative, which
seems necessary for engaging clinically with someone undergoing a transition or
adjustment, i.e., someone who is finding her or his own meaning that may or may not fit
available discourses. In other words, it is the clinician's duty to adapt practice to fit
patients' needs. Clinical concepts cannot be applied too rigidly; it is best to work with
loose ideas rather than an inflexible barrier. Analytic concepts are regenerative and
flexible, like skin.
Finally, Anzieu writes “I hope the idea may stimulate freedom of thought among
psychoanalysts and broaden the range of their interventions in the treatment of their
patients” (Anzieu, 1975, p. 6). This discussion of Michael's case follows Anzieu's wish
that the broad idea of the Skin Ego open up new ways of thinking and practicing
clinically. This discussion accepts Anzieu's invitation to do what works, e.g., take
therapy/ analysis in whatever mode and setting works and to explore boundaries of skin,
Ego, and practice. References to clinicians are intended to refer to clinicians broadly, as
Anzieu refers to the process of psychoanalysis broadly, above—the “analyst” could be a
number of people who interact professionally with a patient like Michael, including
doctors and psychologists. This is an encouragement to think differently (as Michael and
Susan manage to do), and also to practice differently and experiment with technique
(again, as Michael and Susan do).
The next section of this chapter further discusses clinical implications that may
follow from Anzieu's emphasis on the significance of the body's surface and from the
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phenomenon presented by Michael. Anzieu’s theoretical playfulness seems to be an
invitation for playful therapeutic technique and application of his concepts, as well. This
playfulness seems to match the playfulness that takes place between Michael and Susan,
and which allows Michael's transition to take place. A clinician may help a patient like
Michael by employing and modeling this playful and imaginative attitude in the
consulting room, and by maintaining a willingness to leave established discourses behind
in the realm of clinical practice. This next section is an attempt to bring the body more
centrally into therapeutic work, to attend to subjective and embodied cues in addition to
discursive cues, including those aspects of embodiment which rupture discourse.
Clinical Thoughts and Suggestions
Michael experiences a rupture in his ego, his sense of self, when his physical body
is damaged. The loss of a functional penis means losing a part of his identity and his
“masculine sense of sexuality” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391). Medical model attempts
to restore his erect penis do not work. Not only do these solutions fail in their own right,
but they frame what was happening with Michael as a specific problem to be solved.
Instead of regaining an erect penis or masculine sexuality, however, Michael is restored
in a different way. He gains a different kind of sexual pleasure and undergoes changes to
the surface of his body. For Michael, and for others in bodily transition, changes in the
psychic skin parallel changes in the physical skin. This restoration is possible because
Michael is able to experience the dildo as an extension of his sensory horizon. He also
receives support from a friend who suggests an alternate way of conceptualizing the
sexual body, and engages in mutual exploration with a caring and imaginative partner.
Both of these supportive others frame dildo use as play without prior expectations, and
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Michael does the same. This playful and exploratory attitude seems to open space for
new sensory experiences that allow for a new kind of sexuality and the development of a
unique sexuality between Michael and his partner, and a new sexual and personal identity
for Michael. The dildo also becomes a kind of common skin between Michael and
Susan, a shared nonverbal object of experience that holds memories, “imbued with the
knowledge of... previous sexual satisfaction” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391). The dildo
is not merely a symbol of sexuality, but marks an actual change to Michael's embodied
experience—the dildo is denser and more substantive than a mere representation.
Michael and Susan are able to accomplish a unique sexuality between them despite
engrained discourses about sexuality, masculinity, and impotence. The following
thoughts and suggestions for clinical practice are based on Michael's case and Anzieu's
medical-model alternative way of clinical conceptualization. For the sake of
convenience, the following speaks specifically to psychotherapists, but these suggestions
may be applicable for many forms of clinical treatment, as suggested in the discussion of
Anzieu, above.
***
What might a clinician do for Michael, or patients in some way like Michael?
First of all, it seems that the clinician must provide a container for exploration. Rather
than approaching Michael as a person with a problem to solve, a clinician might instead
see Michael as a person with a situation to explore. The clinician’s goal is not to restore
to Michael a predetermined wholeness or normativity, but to restore Michael to himself.
The clinician may regard the body as an event (see chapter 4), or as always in transition,
a becoming which constitutes the way a person understands her or himself and the world.
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The body is not understood as a merely anatomical entity, nor something separable from
identity. Oliver Sacks equates the body ego (here, the skin ego) with proprioception, a
sense of one's place and one's boundaries (Prosser, 2005, pp. 78-79). Michael stretches
his skin to include the dildo, he undergoes a change in body image, but it takes place via
the felt body. Like the body, the clinician might think of “the boundaries of the Ego...
'perpetually changing'... They vary from one individual to another... and in different
phases of life, and they encompass different contents” (Anzieu, 1975, p. 90). The
clinician’s reading of the body remains open to change and supplement.
Therapy, then, would involve recognizing and facilitating this transitional process.
Rather than following a model of “breaking through” a skin or a surface, or of bringing
what's inside to the outside, therapy would follow a model of developing a skin. Therapy,
and the therapist, would act as a containing skin for the patient. Treatment can be a “skin
of words” (Anzieu, 1975, pp. 203-04) that helps “re-establish symbolically a containing
psychical skin that is able to make more bearable the pain caused by a wound to the real
skin” (Anzieu, 1975, p. 205), “traumatic breaches” (Anzieu, 1975, p. 215) in the skin or
in the psyche may be repaired via therapy. Therapy would enable the patient to develop a
new “skin.”
“Developing a new skin” involves helping a patient to feel whole, or restored to
wholeness, but a personal wholeness rather than a normative one (indeed, many
practicing clinicians already work from this principle). In cases like Michael's in which
someone has endured damage to the body and the ego or sense of identity, the clinician's
job may be to help client accept and feel with his new body. The clinician cannot simply
convince a patient that she is whole; for example, an attempt to convince Michael that he
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is “still a man” if he does not feel like one without having erections would be
problematic. Instead, the clinician might explore what the patient does feel like, and
begin restoring her wholeness from there. The clinician might view her role as helping
the client feel that her or his “skin envelope” is closed and containing rather than
damaged, or to help the patient fill in wounds in the skin envelope or stretch the skin in
new directions to contain the transitioning self. Anzieu notes that “to be oneself is first of
all to have a skin of one's own and, secondly, to use it as a space in which one can
experience sensations” (cited by Prosser, 2005, p. 61). Therapeutic space can allow
patients to develop complete embodied identities upon which to base new experience,
including literal sensory experience as Michael demonstrates.
Developing a skin is particularly important for problems that involve the sexual
body:
...For the subject to acquire a sexual identity, two conditions must be fulfilled.
One is a necessary condition: he must have a skin of his own, within which he can
indeed feel himself to be a subject, to contain that identity. The other condition is
that he must have sufficient experience... of the erogenous zones on that skin and
the jouissances that may be enjoyed there” (Anzieu, 1975, p. 219).
Anzieu explains further, “[one must develop a Skin Ego] not only in order to accede to
sexual identity... but in order first of all correctly to identify the site of erogenous
excitation” (Anzieu, 1975, p. 221). For Michael, then, experiencing sexual enjoyment
with the dildo, or identifying it as “a site of erogenous excitation” (even when it is not
attached to him, as discussed in Michael's narrative) allows him to begin developing a
new sexual identity, and vice versa—his partner's acceptance of his dildonic body allows
Michael to experience greater enjoyment of it.
There are a number of ways for therapists to help create a therapeutic space in
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which the patient can experience her own body and begin developing a psychic skin,
many of which some therapists do as a matter of course. Simply looking at the patient
may serve a containing function. A clinician may maintain a “visual envelope” for the
patient's body by looking at the patient during treatment, as opposed to types of
approaches which are focused on words only and in which a patient and therapist may not
maintain any visual contact, such as when a patient in psychoanalysis lies on the couch.
The clinician’s gaze may also simulate the mother’s gaze in early infancy, which serves a
significant developmental and supportive function. The “visual envelope” is a way of
communicating containment and acceptance of the patient’s body as well as maintaining
a unity between body and language or representation.
Further, therapy provides a container or a “holding space” that completes the skin
envelope (one of the functions of the skin ego). Creating a safe, containing space might
also mean alterations to physical environment of the therapy space. Based on the idea of
the skin ego, one might “modify the typical psychoanalytic setting by making a number
of possible physical adjustments to it… but also by taking into account the disposition of
the patient's body and his/ her representation of the analytic space within the analytic
setting” (Anzieu, 1975, p. 12). For instance, a patient who feels inadequately contained
by her skin and may regard the analytic space and analytic process as making painful
contact with raw, uncontained contents may benefit not only from a modification of
technique but may feel more comfortable in an altered space. This patient may, perhaps,
wish to sit farther from the clinician. The clinician may find it useful to notice how the
patient responds to the therapy setting as well as alterations or modifications of the
setting. The therapy space is where the patient “tries on” a new skin or stretches her skin
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to contain new life events, and the therapy setting (or at least, the patient's feelings and
fantasies about the therapy setting) may influence this development.
Modifications of the environment, or a shift in the patient's feelings about the
containing therapeutic space, offer the clinician some notion about shifts in the patient's
containing skin ego. Anzieu suggestions that a therapist should attend,
not only to the content and style of the patient's free associations, but also to the
fluctuations of his/ her Ego; the analyst has to identify the moments when these
fluctuations occur and to develop in the patients Ego a sufficient consciousness
(and one capable of surviving beyond the end of the analysis) of the modifications
of its own boundaries (p. 90).
This means the therapist regards the patient as someone engaged in a process, not
inflexible or tending toward a particular aim or goal. Therapy has to do with helping a
patient develop her own containing skin. Again, the goal is not to “restore” something
lost (in Michael's case, masculinity or masculine sexuality). Therapy, rather, is
constructive. It restores a new wholeness or integrity that has to do with how the patient
feels more so than her appearance or behavior with respect to a norm or narrative. This is
not to say that physical alterations to the body's actual surface may not also be a part of
therapeutic treatment, but that therapy itself aims to facilitate the creation of a complete
psychic skin. The clinician may find it useful as well to notice the patient's “tactile
reflexivity,” or the patient's experience of her own body (Anzieu, 1975, p. 62), including
how the patient lives her body in the therapy setting. For instance, a clinician may
observe how a patient uses her body to inhabit the space of the therapy room—whether
she tends to withdraw and shrink into her seat, or whether she seems to fill the space.
The clinician may also frame her work in the context of the emerging space
between partners; that is, rather than focusing on one individual, the clinician might focus
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on what is created in a relationship. Attending to the context of the patient's development
of a new skin also means awareness of the patient's social context—the skin is a
biological as well as a social entity (Anzieu, 1975). Indeed, the skin is an interface
between self and other, and the psychic develops in this space between. In Michael's
case, his new identity and new body develop in the context of his relationship with his
partner. It seems advisable, then, that a clinician working with Michael or anyone
experiencing engaged in a process taking place in a relational context, would choose to
bring the patient’s partner into the therapy context, since therapy is not the only container
for developing a new skin. Therapy might provide a safe, less restrictive space in which
partners can explore sexual identity outside modes of dominant discourse.

Conclusions
The space a clinician creates is not only containing, but exploratory and playful.
This playfulness and emphasis on constructing something new rather than restoring a
patient to a norm also means rejecting conceptual rigidity in exchange for imagination
and fluidity. This discussion has drawn out the importance of clinician’s task to be open
and playful theoretically and in technical application. Michael is open to try out a new
way of understanding the body when he accepts his lesbian friend's suggestion that one
can enjoy sexual pleasure through using a strap-on dildo. He acquires a new embodied
knowledge that transcends medical discourses about the meanings of the body and
engrained ideas about gender and sexuality. A clinician, in turn, could aid a patient by
opening up new possibilities about the body that draw hegemonic ideas into question.
This questioning may empower the patient to construct her own narrative. Various shifts
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become possible in the context of a playful attitude toward sexuality. In sum, one might
say that the clinician's task is to queer the body such that the patient will have space to
develop her own bodily integrity.
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Chapter 6: Discussion
Through phenomenological hermeneutic methods, this dissertation elaborated a
complex phenomenon with relevance for theorizing human embodiment, identity, and
sexuality. These findings were placed in dialogue with various feminist and
phenomenological perspectives, both to open up and contextualize the phenomenon, and
to challenge and build upon existing theoretical perspectives to increase their scope and
relevance. Because the phenomenon explored in this dissertation has previously been
relatively invisible (even if it is not uncommon), this primary aim of this dissertation has
been to open up this phenomenon. This “opening up” is intended to permit further
interrogation and elaboration, and to offer findings that may be applied to studies of
related phenomena. This chapter will briefly summarize the findings and questions
revealed in this dissertation, the limitations of this project, and directions for further
inquiry that this project opens.
Summary of Findings
The basic research questions of this project were “What is happening?,” a
question intended to define a phenomenon, and “How is it possible?,” a question about
the process that enables the phenomenon to come into existence. The phenomenon this
project centers on seems surprising at first—Michael is able to experience sexual
satisfaction by means of an external object, the strap-on dildo. Through
phenomenological elaboration and close examination of Michael’s narrative, what is
happening becomes clearer. Michael is able to incorporate the strap-on dildo into his
body schema and experience it as an extension of his own sensory body. The question of
how this happens, or what is likely to be true in order for this phenomenon to take place,
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leads to multiple questions about human embodiment, sexuality, and identity. For
instance, what must be true of the human body in order for it to extend itself with an
external object? And what must be true of human sexuality for a person to experience
sexual pleasure and orgasm with a dildo? Additionally, what must be true about identity
for a person to be able to adapt her body to a new situation, or to situate herself with a
new body? The responses to these questions, which follow from the basic question about
how the phenomenon takes place, constitute the basic research findings of this
dissertation. These findings in turn have broader implications that may be applied and
elaborated beyond this phenomenon, both to clinical practice and to develop greater
understanding of human embodiment, sexuality, and identity.
In order for the body to incorporate an external object, it seems that the sensory
boundaries of the body extend beyond the boundary of the skin. The body possesses a
“sensory horizon” which may expand to include objects that are not a part of the body.
This implies that the body is something other or something more than the anatomical
body. The body is a flexible, changeable entity that may alter its boundaries. Based on
Michael’s experience, this flexibility seems to have some limits, for it takes time and
practice for the dildo to feel like a part of his body. It also seems that the object itself has
some agency in how it is taken up—the dildo lends itself to certain kinds of practices, it
suggests being taken up in a way that may make it easier to include in a bodily schema
than other objects.
It also seems that in order for Michael to take up the dildo as part of his sexual
body, a particular aspect of bodily experience, he had to have a particular context.
Michael takes up the dildo as an aspect of his sexual body in collaboration with a sexual
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partner; prior to dildo sex, the strap-on is simply a “piece of purple plastic” (Warkentin et.
al., 2006, p. 391). It is between Michael and Susan that sexuality emerges. This way of
theorizing human sexuality presents sexuality as a co-created event as opposed to
something that emerges from a single person without definite context. It also presents
sexuality as something that develops imaginatively and experimentally, as opposed to
presenting sexuality as something with a template or definite way of emerging.
Sexuality, as it emerges through the phenomenon elaborated in this dissertation, has no
definite aim, form, or location.
Michael’s identity, particularly his understanding of himself as gendered (whether
and how he is masculine or feminine) and the meaning of his sexual practices (what
constitutes heterosexuality and what it means to “play the part of the lesbian” (Warkentin
et. al., 2006, p. 391)) also reveals itself to have some flexibility and ambiguity, like
sexuality and the sensory body. Michael’s experience also reveals the felt body, or
sensory experience, as well as bodily appearance and bodily practices, to be irreducible
with identity. These findings suggest that embodiment has deep significance for identity,
and cannot be entirely subsumed by discourse. It suggests, also, that the body is
malleable to a degree and can change the boundaries of its felt experience. Language and
discourses are involved in this process, and felt experience cannot be separated from how
a person conceptualizes her body, and to some extent how her body is conceptualized by
others. Michael’s identity changes as his senses and practices change. It does not seem
that identity is simply inscribed upon the body, nor that biology simply produces an
identity, but that the body and discourse come together to produce a self.
These ideas challenge some understandings of sex, identity, and embodiment,
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including understandings that influence clinical practice. This dissertation elaborates
implications for alternative ways of practicing clinically based on these ideas. By
acknowledging the significance of the body and felt experience, as well as the
significance of imagination and playfulness, clinicians may help patients adapt to new
bodies or develop new psychic “skins” to envelop their embodied identities. This
approach may be relevant to all sorts of clinical issues related to bodily changes,
particularly changes to the sexual body.
Further Implications and Areas for Further Study
This dissertation offers relatively broad findings that suggest ways to theorize
gender, sexuality, and embodiment. These ways of theorizing, in addition to having
implications for clinical conceptualization and practice, lead to a number of areas for
further research. Popular and general clinical understandings of embodiment, identity,
and sexuality are limited. There is more to find out based on unique experiences like
Michael’s and marginalized experiences like those of transsexual, gay, or people from
categories that are not recognized in discourse. It is also important to understand the
significance of the material body, that how the body feels is important, whether that
means one’s task is to alter the body or erase the dissonance between what one wants to
be and what one’s body is (i.e., trying to pretend to be a man without a functioning
penis). Reconceptualizing by thought and changing the body by getting a dildo are both
important aspects of Michael’s transition and release from depression and dissatisfaction.
Therapy can help one conform to what one is rather than what one is expected to be. It is
also important to recognize context and how things emerge between people rather than
within people; that discourses hold people in place but imaginative space between
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partners creates a new context. Clinicians can help support this, help open up space and
possibility by drawing into question those rigid categories, and attending to body and
relationality in ways that are generally overlooked. A valuable further study could
investigate how clinicians are already using a playful and exploratory stance, and how
they are not, particularly clinicians working affirmatively with transgender and
transsexual patients, in order to build upon current clinical practices.
Prostate cancer is very common, and changes to body form and functionality are
universal. Given the frequency of prostate cancer, as well as other changes to the body
that are significant for a person’s identity and embodied practices, the implications of
Michael’s experience may be far-reaching. This study has implications for clinically
treating people with body and identity issues, including people whose bodies have
changed due to accident or natural process, or who feel there is something wrong with
their bodies. It shows the adaptability of felt bodies to expand sensory horizons and
create a new skin, and how this may be useful clinically and conceptually.
Limitations
As discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, case study research is
inherently limited. Findings in this dissertation are drawn almost entirely from a single
narrative which is based on the experience of one person. Little is known about this
person other than that he is in his late fifties at the time he presents his narrative, that he
has gone through prostate cancer treatment, that he has a female partner, and that prior to
becoming impotent he had a “masculine sense of sexuality” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p.
391). These are the details about Michael given by the researchers who collected his
narrative, and what Michael shares about himself. He speaks descriptively about his
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experience in his narrative, and his narrative is rich and revelatory. It lends itself to
hermeneutic analysis and discussion, and speaks to common aspects of human
existence—embodiment, relationality, and sexuality. However, because the narrative is
circumscribed, it leaves open multiple questions about how the phenomenon would
manifest itself in other bodies. Race, socioeconomic status, and cultural background are
some of the most noteworthy absences here. These factors are not known, and this
dissertation does not address the intersections of multiple other markers of identity with
embodiment, gender, and sexuality. This dissertation also has a somewhat limited
discussion of gay and lesbian identities and strap-on dildo use, and also has room to grow
in discussing transsexual and transgendered identities. How originally female bodies
may incorporate the strap-on dildo is an open question, although dissertation findings
suggest that female bodies would be able to interpret and incorporate the dildo in their
sensory schemas in the same way that Michael did—by taking up the dildo not as a penis
or medical prosthetic, but as a toy, and object filled with potential.
The findings in this dissertation are also limited in that they are preliminary. This
dissertation explores an under-studied phenomenon in order to open up some basic
questions for further exploration. This project therefore offers some basic impressions
and ideas that are intended as beginnings. These beginnings may provide foundations for
other research questions, guidelines for interviews, guidelines for selecting study
participants, and reveal gaps that imply a need for further foundational studies.
Directions for Application and Further Research
This dissertation suggests multiple questions that may be explored with further
study, and the dissertation findings may be applied to further studying related
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phenomenon (for instance, in the formulation of interview questions, research participant
selection, or even in identifying a phenomenon for elaboration). Some potential research
questions are listed below. The list is certainly not exhaustive, but is meant to suggest
some possible directions.
If the body’s boundaries may extend beyond the boundaries of the skin, then what
limitations are there to this phenomenon? Can the body extend indefinitely? How might
the sensory body interact with other tools, or more complex technologies that may or may
not fall into the category of “tools”? And is the reverse possible—can the sensory body
exclude areas of the body contained by the skin, and how is this phenomenon possible?
Just as extending the skin to external objects has relevance for the sexual body (as
Michael demonstrates with the strap-on dildo), what relevance might the phenomenon of
contracting the sensory body to exclude areas covered by skin have for the sexual body?
What significance might that phenomenon have for sexual and gender identity?
What differences might one notice in a different body, if one were to compare the
phenomenon that appears in Michael’s case with other cases? For example, what might
distinguish Michael from a man who is not willing or able to incorporate a strap-on
dildo? What are some alternative ways of sexually adapting taken up by couples in
which one partner experiences impotence? What about strap-on dildo incorporation in
lesbians, like Michael’s friend? What might be learned by elaborating the phenomenon
of strap-on dildo incorporation as it presents itself in female bodies? How might a female
body take up the strap-on dildo differently than a male body? What effect might strap-on
dildo incorporation have on the identity of someone who identifies as a woman? What
about someone in a body others might identify as male who identifies as a woman, or in a
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body others might recognize as female who identifies as a man? What differences to
these variations in gender and sexual identity make for the phenomenon of strap-on dildo
incorporation, or adaptation to changes in embodiment?

Closing
This dissertation has been an attempt to open up a significant and underexplored
phenomenon. Multiple types of courage have gone into this work; the courage of
Michael to confront his changed body and try something new, the courage of his partner
and his friend to help create his transition, the courage of the authors of Michael's case
study in presenting Michael's narrative before an audience, and I will add my own, to say
the unsayable and put language to the phenomenon of strap-on dildo incorporation. By
means of exploring one human phenomenon, this project attempts to expand the meaning
and complexity of human life generally.

wrld (as in the case of Schneider) rather than a different, or in some cases, perhaps an even better, world.
as the gaze shapes one's experience and one's identity—this point is discussed further in the next chapter.
previous chapter on Don Ihde's “Body 1” and “Body 2” distinction.
The importance of other people, especially Michael's partner, as context for this transition will be discussed in the next chapter.
This is discussed in chapter 5 with regard to how medical and clinical approaches regard relationships between gender identity and the
body in cases on impotence and in transsexuality.
5 discusses how clinical and medical approaches contribute to transition narratives, rendering some unintelligible and presenting limits
to who may alter their bodies based on their recognition of particular narratives of transition.
chapter detail notions of sexual failure, impotence, and the construction of male sexuality.
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ENDNOTES
i. This dissertation makes use of a number of terms to refer to various identity
categories, such as sex, gender, transgender, gender identity and so on. The way
these terms are defined are distinguished in this dissertation is clarified in chapter
3.
ii. “Technology” in this dissertation is used interchangeably with other terms, like
“thing,” “object,” and even “nonhuman.” Although the discussions in this chapter
may apply to all technologies, even complex and apparently “disembodying”
technologies (as the author argues elsewhere: see Body and Technology:
Reframing the Humanistic Critique of Technology in Janus Head, October 2011),
the scope of this chapter only covers simple tools.
iii. This is similar to the statement I will argue for in chapter 4, in which MerleauPonty seems to claim that a changed world is a reduced world (as in the case of
Schneider) rather than a different, or in some cases, perhaps an even better, world.
iv. This is an inversion of Susan Bordo's (2002) statement that “the phallus is
haunted by the penis, and the penis is most definitely not one... it is perhaps the
most visibly mutable of body parts... Mercurial, temperamental, unpredictable” (p.
28).
v. “Erectile dysfunction” as a failure of masculinity and end of sexuality will be
further discussed in chapter 5.
vi. This inflexibility creates difficulty for anyone who, like Michael, is not able to
live up to these expectations, since their sexuality is defined as dysfunctional or
impossible. By de-centering the phallus from sexuality (though not from
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masculinity) Michael is able to return to sexuality. How Michael arrives at
sexuality differently and how this process might be useful clinically is discussed
extensively in chapters 4 and 5.
vii. Although the reader or interpreter of the body is particularly important for
someone whose body and identity are outside the norm, as the gaze shapes one's
experience and one's identity—this point is discussed further in the next chapter.
viii. See previous chapter on Don Ihde's “Body 1” and “Body 2” distinction.
ix. The importance of other people, especially Michael's partner, as context for
this transition will be discussed in the next chapter.
x. This is discussed in chapter 5 with regard to how medical and clinical
approaches regard relationships between gender identity and the body in cases on
impotence and in transsexuality.
xi. Chapter 5 discusses how clinical and medical approaches contribute to
transition narratives, rendering some unintelligible and presenting limits to who
may alter their bodies based on their recognition of particular narratives of
transition.
xii. The next chapter will explore in greater detail notions of sexual failure,
impotence, and the construction of male sexuality.
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Appendix 1
Michael's First-person Account (used with permission from the publishing authors)

Neither Viagra nor a vacuum erection device worked for me. I am loath to inject
drugs into my penis or have a surgically implanted penile prosthesis, the remaining
medical options for treating ED. Not surprisingly, like so many other cancer patients
sexually incapacitated by modern medicine, I was clinically depressed within a few
months of starting hormonal therapy.
This situation began to change when a close lesbian friend, who was aware of my
cancer treatments and the sexual dysfunction they had caused, refused to accept my
giving up on life. She told me that she uses a strap-on dildo. She claimed that she got
genuine sexual satisfaction from this and thought I could too. I was very skeptical. A
dildo is not innervated, and I imagined that sex performed with such an appliance would
be wholly contrived and not a sensual act at all. My friend persisted in encouraging me,
arguing that sexual satisfaction is as much in the brain as in the groin.
It took me more than a year to act on her suggestion. I was embarrassed to go into
a sex shop to buy a dildo. I had never used sex toys. I was afraid that I would feel foolish
and humiliated by using a strap-on penis. To do so meant facing fully, frontally (so to
speak), the functional failure of my own flaccid phallus. Despite my reservations, I
eventually agreed to experiment with a strap-on dildo. My expectations, though, were
muted. At most, I thought I might be able to please my partner. But I honestly did not
envision recreating a fully satisfying sexual experience.
My lesbian friend took the initiative to get me going on this project. She
fabricated a harness that was customized to fit me and took me shopping for a dildo,
which she insisted I consider “a toy.” I don’t think I could have even walked into the sex
shop without her. I was worried that I might be identified and mocked by someone who
knew me. In the store I debated buying a dildo that looked relatively natural or one that
was beyond the realm of real anatomy. I finally selected one that was similar in size,
shape, and angle to my erect penis before cancer treatments, to the best of my
recollection. It is made of silicone, which makes it durable, appropriately stiff, yet still
flexible, like a natural erect penis. Beyond that, the dildo that I bought bears little
resemblance to a human penis. Granted, it has an expanded “head,” like the real glans
penis but a uniformly smooth shaft, with none of the irregular surface texture caused by
real-life veins. And it is purple! Clearly, it does not constitute a realistic bio-mimetic
prosthesis. I knew then that I could not seriously think of this piece of purple plastic as a
medical appliance. This was important in my reconceptualizing the situation. Whatever I
was going to do with the dildo was not in any way a “cure” for ED nor was it meant to
restore my masculine sense of sexuality. If this was going to work, it was because it was
something completely different. I had to stop thinking about this clinically and accept the
idea that I was heading into the theater of the absurd, and I was going to play the part of a
lesbian!
Before this purchase, I discussed extensively with my partner whether she was
willing to have sex with me wearing a strap-on dildo. She was at first hesitant but
ultimately supportive of the exploration. We have now used the dildo many times. It
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caught me by total surprise how natural intercourse felt with this strap-on device. I
discovered that my hip movements with the dildo on were the same as during normal
intercourse. Our body contact and embrace was full and natural, as well. The first time
that we used the dildo, my partner reached down and held my penis in her hand. She had
coated her hand with the same lubricant used to coat the dildo and stimulated my penis in
synchrony with my pelvic movements. There was little sensory difference between this
act and intercourse—my penis was not in her vagina but it did not know that. It was in a
wet, warm place being firmly mechanically stimulated. My hindbrain took over, and I
carried the act through to orgasm, to the sexual satisfaction of both my partner and
myself.
My partner had not discussed with me her plan to hold my glans penis, so I was
totally surprised by that action. I had not expected to achieve an orgasm and was
astonished that it happened. At first I, thought it was the novelty of her holding my penis
that brought me to climax. I thus feared that being aware, and then self-conscious, of this
activity would defeat its effectiveness. This, however, has not been the case. If anything,
sexual satisfaction has become easier, because both of us have come to accept the dildo
as part of our sex play. Each time we use it, it becomes further imbued with the
knowledge of the previous sexual satisfaction it has provided. It is thus now both a
normal and at the same time erotic part of our lives.
We have both been able to have orgasms many times using the dildo. The
knowledge that it will never become flaccid means that my having an orgasm need not
prohibit further penetrative sex. The dildo gives me the sexual capacity to serve my
partner more reliably than I might have been able to achieve as a potent male (with or
without Viagra). Significantly, my partner claims that she could not previously have an
orgasm simply by penile penetration. However, with the dildo, I am able to continue
pelvic thrusts long and hard enough that she now regularly achieves an orgasm in the
missionary position. We have also used the dildo with me lying on my back and my
partner sitting on it, so she has control of the movement. This was sexually pleasurable
for her, although I have not achieved an orgasm in this position.
When I had a prostate gland, sexual arousal that did not lead to ejaculation was
frustrating, and I found it incomprehensible when a woman claimed she had pleasure
from sexual stimulation yet had not had an orgasm. After my prostate was removed, I
discovered that I too could have incremental pleasure from sexual stimulation and enjoy
sex without orgasms. I can also have multiple orgasms! Without a prostate gland, my
orgasms are less anatomically focused, radiating across my pelvis. They are of variable
intensity but sometimes massively cathartic. When I have multiple orgasms, they are
usually 2 or 3 within one minute or 2. I find it easiest to achieve orgasms when my
partner wants me to, especially in the context of mutually satisfying dildo intercourse, but
far more difficult on my own.
I am fascinated by the eroticism that has developed between my partner, myself,
and our dildo. For example, one morning, after having sex the night before, I went to the
bathroom and found the dildo sitting upright on the counter-top wearing one of my
favorite neckties. My partner had decided to personify and personalize it. I interpreted
this as a signal to me that the dildo pleased her and did so because of its association with
me.
On another occasion, I was waiting for my partner’s arrival and decided to put on
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the harness and dildo ahead of time. I covered myself and the dildo with a bathrobe, but
there was no mistaking the fact that when I looked down there was sticking out what
looked like a large firm erection. For a brief instant, it brought back my fear that wearing
a dildo would force me to confront in a demoralizing fashion my own failed phallus, my
mutilated masculinity.
But that was not at all what I felt. Instead, I felt joyfully empowered. My thoughts
went to a glib one-liner from my lesbian friend: “A dyke with a dildo can outlast a male
anytime.” I realized that that was equally true for a prostate cancer patient with a dildo,
and I almost started laughing. I was playing a role and doing it better than I ever could
before I became impotent. I had acquired a performance capability that surpassed “male”
and I was thoroughly enjoying the “play” part of sex.
When I reported this experience to my lesbian friend, she suggested that my
partner and I explore oral sex with the dildo. Once again, my first thought was, “That’s
absurd.” But since everything else she suggested had worked better than I could have
imagined, my partner and I took on the challenge. Simply stated, there has now been
enough acceptance of the dildo as a sexual object—and transference from “object” to
“organ”—that the visual image of my partner mouthing the dildo was indeed highly
erotic in the context of our sex play. On another occasion, in order to tease me, my
partner started playing with the dildo in a flirtatious fashion outside of the bedroom. I
found the activity erotic and sufficiently distracting that I had to ask her to stop so that I
could concentrate on what I was doing.
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Appendix 2
Text of Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License
THE WORK (AS DEFINED BELOW) IS PROVIDED UNDER THE TERMS OF THIS CREATIVE
COMMONS PUBLIC LICENSE ("CCPL" OR "LICENSE"). THE WORK IS PROTECTED BY
COPYRIGHT AND/OR OTHER APPLICABLE LAW. ANY USE OF THE WORK OTHER THAN AS
AUTHORIZED UNDER THIS LICENSE OR COPYRIGHT LAW IS PROHIBITED.
BY EXERCISING ANY RIGHTS TO THE WORK PROVIDED HERE, YOU ACCEPT AND AGREE
TO BE BOUND BY THE TERMS OF THIS LICENSE. TO THE EXTENT THIS LICENSE MAY BE
CONSIDERED TO BE A CONTRACT, THE LICENSOR GRANTS YOU THE RIGHTS
CONTAINED HERE IN CONSIDERATION OF YOUR ACCEPTANCE OF SUCH TERMS AND
CONDITIONS.
1. Definitions
a."Adaptation" means a work based upon the Work, or upon the Work and other preexisting works, such as a translation, adaptation, derivative work, arrangement of music
or other alterations of a literary or artistic work, or phonogram or performance and
includes cinematographic adaptations or any other form in which the Work may be recast,
transformed, or adapted including in any form recognizably derived from the original,
except that a work that constitutes a Collection will not be considered an Adaptation for
the purpose of this License. For the avoidance of doubt, where the Work is a musical
work, performance or phonogram, the synchronization of the Work in timed-relation with a
moving image ("synching") will be considered an Adaptation for the purpose of this
License.
b."Collection" means a collection of literary or artistic works, such as encyclopedias and
anthologies, or performances, phonograms or broadcasts, or other works or subject
matter other than works listed in Section 1(f) below, which, by reason of the selection and
arrangement of their contents, constitute intellectual creations, in which the Work is
included in its entirety in unmodified form along with one or more other contributions,
each constituting separate and independent works in themselves, which together are
assembled into a collective whole. A work that constitutes a Collection will not be
considered an Adaptation (as defined below) for the purposes of this License.
c."Creative Commons Compatible License" means a license that is listed at
http://creativecommons.org/compatible licenses that has been approved by Creative
Commons as being essentially equivalent to this License, including, at a minimum,
because that license: (i) contains terms that have the same purpose, meaning and effect
as the License Elements of this License; and, (ii) explicitly permits the relicensing of
adaptations of works made available under that license under this License or a Creative
Commons jurisdiction license with the same License Elements as this License.
d."Distribute" means to make available to the public the original and copies of the Work or
Adaptation, as appropriate, through sale or other transfer of ownership.
e."License Elements" means the following high-level license attributes as selected by
Licensor and indicated in the title of this License: Attribution, ShareAlike.
f."Licensor" means the individual, individuals, entity or entities that offer(s) the Work
under the terms of this License.
g."Original Author" means, in the case of a literary or artistic work, the individual,
individuals, entity or entities who created the Work or if no individual or entity can be
identified, the publisher; and in addition (i) in the case of a performance the actors,
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singers, musicians, dancers, and other persons who act, sing, deliver, declaim, play in,
interpret or otherwise perform literary or artistic works or expressions of folklore; (ii) in the
case of a phonogram the producer being the person or legal entity who first fixes the
sounds of a performance or other sounds; and, (iii) in the case of broadcasts, the
organization that transmits the broadcast.
h."Work" means the literary and/or artistic work offered under the terms of this License
including without limitation any production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain,
whatever may be the mode or form of its expression including digital form, such as a
book, pamphlet and other writing; a lecture, address, sermon or other work of the same
nature; a dramatic or dramatico-musical work; a choreographic work or entertainment in
dumb show; a musical composition with or without words; a cinematographic work to
which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to cinematography; a
work of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving or lithography; a
photographic work to which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to
photography; a work of applied art; an illustration, map, plan, sketch or three-dimensional
work relative to geography, topography, architecture or science; a performance; a
broadcast; a phonogram; a compilation of data to the extent it is protected as a
copyrightable work; or a work performed by a variety or circus performer to the extent it is
not otherwise considered a literary or artistic work.
i."You" means an individual or entity exercising rights under this License who has not
previously violated the terms of this License with respect to the Work, or who has
received express permission from the Licensor to exercise rights under this License
despite a previous violation.
j."Publicly Perform" means to perform public recitations of the Work and to communicate
to the public those public recitations, by any means or process, including by wire or
wireless means or public digital performances; to make available to the public Works in
such a way that members of the public may access these Works from a place and at a
place individually chosen by them; to perform the Work to the public by any means or
process and the communication to the public of the performances of the Work, including
by public digital performance; to broadcast and rebroadcast the Work by any means
including signs, sounds or images.
k."Reproduce" means to make copies of the Work by any means including without
limitation by sound or visual recordings and the right of fixation and reproducing fixations
of the Work, including storage of a protected performance or phonogram in digital form or
other electronic medium.
2. Fair Dealing Rights. Nothing in this License is intended to reduce, limit, or restrict any uses free
from copyright or rights arising from limitations or exceptions that are provided for in connection
with the copyright protection under copyright law or other applicable laws.
3. License Grant. Subject to the terms and conditions of this License, Licensor hereby grants You
a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive, perpetual (for the duration of the applicable copyright)
license to exercise the rights in the Work as stated below:
a.to Reproduce the Work, to incorporate the Work into one or more Collections, and to
Reproduce the Work as incorporated in the Collections;
b.to create and Reproduce Adaptations provided that any such Adaptation, including any
translation in any medium, takes reasonable steps to clearly label, demarcate or
otherwise identify that changes were made to the original Work. For example, a
translation could be marked "The original work was translated from English to Spanish,"
or a modification could indicate "The original work has been modified.";
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c.to Distribute and Publicly Perform the Work including as incorporated in Collections;
and,
d.to Distribute and Publicly Perform Adaptations.
e.For the avoidance of doubt:
i.Non-waivable Compulsory License Schemes. In those jurisdictions in which the
right to collect royalties through any statutory or compulsory licensing scheme
cannot be waived, the Licensor reserves the exclusive right to collect such
royalties for any exercise by You of the rights granted under this License;
ii.Waivable Compulsory License Schemes. In those jurisdictions in which the right
to collect royalties through any statutory or compulsory licensing scheme can be
waived, the Licensor waives the exclusive right to collect such royalties for any
exercise by You of the rights granted under this License; and,
iii.Voluntary License Schemes. The Licensor waives the right to collect royalties,
whether individually or, in the event that the Licensor is a member of a collecting
society that administers voluntary licensing schemes, via that society, from any
exercise by You of the rights granted under this License.
The above rights may be exercised in all media and formats whether now known or hereafter
devised. The above rights include the right to make such modifications as are technically
necessary to exercise the rights in other media and formats. Subject to Section 8(f), all rights not
expressly granted by Licensor are hereby reserved.
4. Restrictions. The license granted in Section 3 above is expressly made subject to and limited
by the following restrictions:
a.You may Distribute or Publicly Perform the Work only under the terms of this License.
You must include a copy of, or the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) for, this License with
every copy of the Work You Distribute or Publicly Perform. You may not offer or impose
any terms on the Work that restrict the terms of this License or the ability of the recipient
of the Work to exercise the rights granted to that recipient under the terms of the License.
You may not sublicense the Work. You must keep intact all notices that refer to this
License and to the disclaimer of warranties with every copy of the Work You Distribute or
Publicly Perform. When You Distribute or Publicly Perform the Work, You may not impose
any effective technological measures on the Work that restrict the ability of a recipient of
the Work from You to exercise the rights granted to that recipient under the terms of the
License. This Section 4(a) applies to the Work as incorporated in a Collection, but this
does not require the Collection apart from the Work itself to be made subject to the terms
of this License. If You create a Collection, upon notice from any Licensor You must, to the
extent practicable, remove from the Collection any credit as required by Section 4(c), as
requested. If You create an Adaptation, upon notice from any Licensor You must, to the
extent practicable, remove from the Adaptation any credit as required by Section 4(c), as
requested.
b.You may Distribute or Publicly Perform an Adaptation only under the terms of: (i) this
License; (ii) a later version of this License with the same License Elements as this
License; (iii) a Creative Commons jurisdiction license (either this or a later license
version) that contains the same License Elements as this License (e.g., AttributionShareAlike 3.0 US)); (iv) a Creative Commons Compatible License. If you license the
Adaptation under one of the licenses mentioned in (iv), you must comply with the terms of
that license. If you license the Adaptation under the terms of any of the licenses
mentioned in (i), (ii) or (iii) (the "Applicable License"), you must comply with the terms of
the Applicable License generally and the following provisions: (I) You must include a copy
of, or the URI for, the Applicable License with every copy of each Adaptation You
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Distribute or Publicly Perform; (II) You may not offer or impose any terms on the
Adaptation that restrict the terms of the Applicable License or the ability of the recipient of
the Adaptation to exercise the rights granted to that recipient under the terms of the
Applicable License; (III) You must keep intact all notices that refer to the Applicable
License and to the disclaimer of warranties with every copy of the Work as included in the
Adaptation You Distribute or Publicly Perform; (IV) when You Distribute or Publicly
Perform the Adaptation, You may not impose any effective technological measures on the
Adaptation that restrict the ability of a recipient of the Adaptation from You to exercise the
rights granted to that recipient under the terms of the Applicable License. This Section
4(b) applies to the Adaptation as incorporated in a Collection, but this does not require
the Collection apart from the Adaptation itself to be made subject to the terms of the
Applicable License.
c.If You Distribute, or Publicly Perform the Work or any Adaptations or Collections, You
must, unless a request has been made pursuant to Section 4(a), keep intact all copyright
notices for the Work and provide, reasonable to the medium or means You are utilizing:
(i) the name of the Original Author (or pseudonym, if applicable) if supplied, and/or if the
Original Author and/or Licensor designate another party or parties (e.g., a sponsor
institute, publishing entity, journal) for attribution ("Attribution Parties") in Licensor's
copyright notice, terms of service or by other reasonable means, the name of such party
or parties; (ii) the title of the Work if supplied; (iii) to the extent reasonably practicable, the
URI, if any, that Licensor specifies to be associated with the Work, unless such URI does
not refer to the copyright notice or licensing information for the Work; and (iv) , consistent
with Section 3(b), in the case of an Adaptation, a credit identifying the use of the Work in
the Adaptation (e.g., "French translation of the Work by Original Author," or "Screenplay
based on original Work by Original Author"). The credit required by this Section 4(c) may
be implemented in any reasonable manner; provided, however, that in the case of a
Adaptation or Collection, at a minimum such credit will appear, if a credit for all
contributing authors of the Adaptation or Collection appears, then as part of these credits
and in a manner at least as prominent as the credits for the other contributing authors.
For the avoidance of doubt, You may only use the credit required by this Section for the
purpose of attribution in the manner set out above and, by exercising Your rights under
this License, You may not implicitly or explicitly assert or imply any connection with,
sponsorship or endorsement by the Original Author, Licensor and/or Attribution Parties,
as appropriate, of You or Your use of the Work, without the separate, express prior written
permission of the Original Author, Licensor and/or Attribution Parties.
d.Except as otherwise agreed in writing by the Licensor or as may be otherwise permitted
by applicable law, if You Reproduce, Distribute or Publicly Perform the Work either by
itself or as part of any Adaptations or Collections, You must not distort, mutilate, modify or
take other derogatory action in relation to the Work which would be prejudicial to the
Original Author's honor or reputation. Licensor agrees that in those jurisdictions (e.g.
Japan), in which any exercise of the right granted in Section 3(b) of this License (the right
to make Adaptations) would be deemed to be a distortion, mutilation, modification or
other derogatory action prejudicial to the Original Author's honor and reputation, the
Licensor will waive or not assert, as appropriate, this Section, to the fullest extent
permitted by the applicable national law, to enable You to reasonably exercise Your right
under Section 3(b) of this License (right to make Adaptations) but not otherwise.
5. Representations, Warranties and Disclaimer
UNLESS OTHERWISE MUTUALLY AGREED TO BY THE PARTIES IN WRITING, LICENSOR
OFFERS THE WORK AS-IS AND MAKES NO REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES OF ANY
KIND CONCERNING THE WORK, EXPRESS, IMPLIED, STATUTORY OR OTHERWISE,
INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, WARRANTIES OF TITLE, MERCHANTIBILITY, FITNESS
FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, NONINFRINGEMENT, OR THE ABSENCE OF LATENT OR
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OTHER DEFECTS, ACCURACY, OR THE PRESENCE OF ABSENCE OF ERRORS, WHETHER
OR NOT DISCOVERABLE. SOME JURISDICTIONS DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OF
IMPLIED WARRANTIES, SO SUCH EXCLUSION MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU.
6. Limitation on Liability. EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW, IN NO
EVENT WILL LICENSOR BE LIABLE TO YOU ON ANY LEGAL THEORY FOR ANY SPECIAL,
INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF
THIS LICENSE OR THE USE OF THE WORK, EVEN IF LICENSOR HAS BEEN ADVISED OF
THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
7. Termination
a.This License and the rights granted hereunder will terminate automatically upon any
breach by You of the terms of this License. Individuals or entities who have received
Adaptations or Collections from You under this License, however, will not have their
licenses terminated provided such individuals or entities remain in full compliance with
those licenses. Sections 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 will survive any termination of this License.
b.Subject to the above terms and conditions, the license granted here is perpetual (for the
duration of the applicable copyright in the Work). Notwithstanding the above, Licensor
reserves the right to release the Work under different license terms or to stop distributing
the Work at any time; provided, however that any such election will not serve to withdraw
this License (or any other license that has been, or is required to be, granted under the
terms of this License), and this License will continue in full force and effect unless
terminated as stated above.
8. Miscellaneous
a.Each time You Distribute or Publicly Perform the Work or a Collection, the Licensor
offers to the recipient a license to the Work on the same terms and conditions as the
license granted to You under this License.
b.Each time You Distribute or Publicly Perform an Adaptation, Licensor offers to the
recipient a license to the original Work on the same terms and conditions as the license
granted to You under this License.
c.If any provision of this License is invalid or unenforceable under applicable law, it shall
not affect the validity or enforceability of the remainder of the terms of this License, and
without further action by the parties to this agreement, such provision shall be reformed to
the minimum extent necessary to make such provision valid and enforceable.
d.No term or provision of this License shall be deemed waived and no breach consented
to unless such waiver or consent shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged
with such waiver or consent.
e.This License constitutes the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the
Work licensed here. There are no understandings, agreements or representations with
respect to the Work not specified here. Licensor shall not be bound by any additional
provisions that may appear in any communication from You. This License may not be
modified without the mutual written agreement of the Licensor and You.
f.The rights granted under, and the subject matter referenced, in this License were
drafted utilizing the terminology of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works (as amended on September 28, 1979), the Rome Convention of 1961, the
WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996, the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty of
1996 and the Universal Copyright Convention (as revised on July 24, 1971). These rights
and subject matter take effect in the relevant jurisdiction in which the License terms are
sought to be enforced according to the corresponding provisions of the implementation of
those treaty provisions in the applicable national law. If the standard suite of rights
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granted under applicable copyright law includes additional rights not granted under this
License, such additional rights are deemed to be included in the License; this License is
not intended to restrict the license of any rights under applicable law.

Creative Commons Notice
Creative Commons is not a party to this License, and makes no warranty whatsoever in
connection with the Work. Creative Commons will not be liable to You or any party on any legal
theory for any damages whatsoever, including without limitation any general, special, incidental or
consequential damages arising in connection to this license. Notwithstanding the foregoing two
(2) sentences, if Creative Commons has expressly identified itself as the Licensor hereunder, it
shall have all rights and obligations of Licensor.
Except for the limited purpose of indicating to the public that the Work is licensed under the
CCPL, Creative Commons does not authorize the use by either party of the trademark
"Creative Commons" or any related trademark or logo of Creative Commons without the
prior written consent of Creative Commons. Any permitted use will be in compliance with
Creative Commons' then-current trademark usage guidelines, as may be published on its
website or otherwise made available upon request from time to time. For the avoidance of
doubt, this trademark restriction does not form part of the License.
Creative Commons may be contacted at http://creativecommons.org/.
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